Using repeated games to design incentive-based routing systems

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages

  Afergan, Mike ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS PLAYERS; HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS; PROTOCOL PARAMETERS;

INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; INFORMATION USE; INTERCONNECTION NETWORKS; INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS;

ROUTING PROTOCOLS;

EID: 33750341858     PISSN: 0743166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/INFOCOM.2006.61     Document Type: Conference Paper

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