The German Federal Prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a former Uzbek Minister: Missed opportunity or prosecutorial wisdom?

Journal of International Criminal Justice

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 602-622

  Zappalà, Salvatore ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750227864     PISSN: 14781387     EISSN: 14781395     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jicj/mql035     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Human Rights Watch reported that 'On 13 May 2005 in Andijan thousands of protesters were surrounded by troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as security forces. Allegedly without warning these troops opened fire on the crowd; moreover witnesses have said that the fleeing civilians did not stand a chance against the government's firepower'. For more details see http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ uzbekistan0605/uzbekistan0605.pdf and http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/ uzbekistan0905/uzbekistan0905.pdf (visited 8 May 2006).
2. The CCAIL is available in English at http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/ legaltext/vstgbleng.pdf (visited 8 May 2006). For a thorough introduction to the CCAIL see G. Werle and F. Jessberger, 'International Criminal justice is Coming Home: The New German Code of Crimes Against International Law', in 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002) 191-214, which also contains a translation of the CCAIL (214-223).
3. On the question of how proceedings are commenced under the CCAIL see S. Wirth, 'Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court', 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 151-168.
4. Section 1 of the CCAIL on the scope of application reads as follows: 'Dieses Gesetz gilt für alle in ihm bezeichneten Straftaten gegen das Völkerrecht, für die in ihm bezeichneten Verbrechen auch dann, wenn die Tat im Ausland begangen wurde und keinen Bezug zum Inland aufweist'. (Translation: 'This Act shall apply to all criminal offences against international law designated under this Act, to serious criminal offences designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany': See http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/ legaltext/vstgbleng.pdf; visited 23 May 2006.)
5. It should also be noted that an affidavit on the issue of immunity had been filed by the complainants that persuasively argued that no immunity could be legitimately granted in the instant case.
6. Decision 23 March 2006, Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichshof, at 1, where it is clarified that 'Die Merzahl der anqezeigten Folterstraftaten wurde nach dem Vorbringen der Anzeigeestatter vor Inkrafttreten des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches am 30. Juni 2002 begangen. Auf diese Taten ist das VstGB nicht anwendbar (§2 Abs. 1 StGB; Art 103 Abs. 2 GG)'. (On file with the Journal and with the author.) In this respect, one may wonder whether it would have been possible to prosecute those crimes under a different characterization without necessarily resorting to the CCAIL.
7. In this respect, one may note that little is said by the Federal Prosecutor on the purposes of the Code, and in particular on the adoption of universal jurisdiction. Arguably the legislator never considered that prosecuting international crimes would be an easy task.
8. The provision reads as follows: '(1) Die Staatsanwaltschaft kann von der Verfolgung einer Tat, die nach den §§ 6 bis 14 des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches strafbar ist, in den Fällen des §153c Abs. 1 Nr. 1 and 2 absehen, wenn sich der Beschuldigte nicht im Inland aujhält und ein solcher Aufenthalt auch nicht zu erwarten ist'. (Author's translation: 'The public prosecution office may dispense with prosecuting an offence punishable pursuant to sections 6-14 of the Code of Crimes Against International Law, if the accused is not present in Germany and such presence is not to be anticipated'.)
9. See the Decision at §2.
10. The Federal Prosecutor clarified that: 'Ob und inwieweit vor diesem Hintergrund gleichwohl von einer nach §7 VStGB strafbegründenden Duldung oder gar Förderung systematischer Folter durch die usbekische Regierung ausgeqangen warden muss, ist durch deutsche Strafverfolgungsbehörden nicht aufklärbar' (Ibid., at 7).
11. The Decision expresses the disagreement of the Federal Prosecutor with the complainants in these terms: 'Dies würde im Ergebnis auf eine rein symbolische Strafverfolgung hinauslaufen. Eine solche war vom deutschen Gesetzgeber aber auch bei Völkerstraftaten ausdrücklich nicht gevolt, zumal hierdurch die ohnehin personell und finanziell beverfolgung langfristig gebunden würden (Ibid., at 7).
12. Section 153(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Strafproze bordnung, 'StOP') specifies that '(1) Die Staatsanwaltschaft kann von der Verfolgung einer Tat, die nach den §§ 6 bis 14 des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches strafbar ist, in den Fällen des §153c Abs. 1 Nr. 1 und 2 absehen, wenn sich der Beschuldigte nicht im Inland aufhält und ein solcher Aufenthalt auch nicht zu erwarten ist. Ist in den Fällen des §153c Abs. 1 Nr. 1 der Beschuldigte Deutscher, so gilt dies jedoch nur dann, wenn die Tat vor einem internationalen Gerichtshof oder durch einen Staat, auf dessen Gebiet die Tat begangen oder dessen Angehöriger durch die Tat verletzt wurde, verfolgt wird'.
13. In this respect it should be noted that various official reports (see, e.g. the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mission to Uzbekistan, E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, 3 February 2003, as well as the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Uzbekistan, CCPR/ CO/71/UZB, 26 April 2001 and the Concluding Observations/comments of the Committee against Torture, CAT/C/CR/28/7, 6 June 2002), as well as NGOs' public statements contained elements suggesting the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for various crimes committed in Uzbekistan. One could also add that the government cannot first issue a visa for humanitarian reasons, lifting a EU visa ban, and then claim it ignored the presence of the accused in Germany (in this connection, it is worth noting that the Federal Prosecutor's office depends on the Ministry of justice).
14. In this respect, it is worth noting that it took the Federal Prosecutor almost four months to decide not to prosecute.
15. Governmental Explanatory Memorandum at 82, the explanatory report is available in English at http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/legaltext/ VStGBengl.pdf (visited 8 May 2006).
16. See A. Cassese, 'Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction', in 1 JICJ (2003) 589-595.
17. Cf. G. Abi-Saab,'The Proper Role of Universal jurisdiction, ibid., 596-602, at 600-601.
18. In this respect, one may recall the general duty of all States Parties to the Geneva Conventions to respect the Conventions and ensure that the Conventions are respected. See L. Condorelli and L. Boisson de Chazournes, 'Quelques remarques a propos de l'obligation des Etats de "respecter et faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire en toutes circonstances' in Ch. Swinarski (ed) Études et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l'honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva/The Hague: ICRC and Nijhoff, 1984) 17-35.
19. See the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal STC 237/2005 of 26 September 2005, at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (home page for case law; visited 8 May 2006) and the comment by Hervé Ascensio in this issue.
20. Actually, had the suspect been detained and prosecuted in Germany, Uzbek non-cooperation could have resulted in his acquittal for lack of evidence, with serious consequences in terms of res judicata and ne bis in idem.
21. The provision in German reads as follows: '(2) Die Staatsanwaltschaft kann insbesondere von der Verfolgung einer Tat, die nach den §§ 6 bis 14 des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches strafbar ist, in den Fällen des §153c Abs. 1 Nr. 1 and 2 absehen, wenn 1. kein Tatverdacht gegen einen Deutschen besteht, 2. die Tat nicht gegen einen Deutschen begangen wurde, 3. kein Tatverdächtiger sich im Inland aujhält und ein solcher Aufenthalt auch nicht zu erwarten ist and 4. die Tat vor einem internationalen Gerichtshof oder durch einen Staat, auf dessen Gebiet die Tat begangen wurde, dessen Angehöriger der Tat verdächtig ist oder dessen Angehöriger durch die Tat verletzt wurde, verfolgt wird. Dasselbe gilt, wenn sich ein wegen einer im Ausland begangenen Tat beschuldigter Ausländer im Inland aujhält, aber die Voraussetzungen nach Satz 1 Nr. 2 and 4 erfüllt sind and die Überstellung an einen internationalen Gerichtshof oder die Auslieferung an den verfolgenden Staat zulässig und beabsichtigt ist. (3) Ist in den Fällen des Absatzes 1 oder 2 die öffentliche Klage bereits erhoben, so kann die Staatsanwaltschaft die Klage in jeder Loge des Verfahrens zurücknehmen und das Verfahren einstellen'.
22. This provision indicates that the intention of the legislator in providing for prosecutorial discretion in this regard was aimed more at avoiding the risk of multiple prosecutions and positive conflicts of jurisdiction, than at frustrating the legitimate expectations of victims.
23. This provision was further supplemented by the Elements of Crimes (Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3) clarifying that 'attack directed against a civilian population [...] is understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in Art. 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is understood that "policy to commit such attack" requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population' (at 116) (emphasis added).
24. Cf. G.Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (The Hague: Asser Press, 2005), at 79-80.
25. See Explanatory memorandum, supra note 14, 43.
26. In this respect, see G. Werle and F. Jessberger, 'Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch' in Juristenzeitung (2002), at 731.
27. A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 93-94.
28. Ibid.
29. See also G. Mettraux, 'Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda' in 43 Harvard International Law Journal (2002), 237-316, at 271 ss. and in particular at 280.
30. See EU Council Common Position 2005/792/CFSP of 14 November 2005, published in the EU Official Journal L/299, 16 November 2005, at 72-79.
31. Under international law a well-established principle provides that foreign state officials are to be granted immunity from jurisdiction for acts they have performed in the exercise of their official functions. This rule was enunciated in the famous McLeod incident between the USA and the UK. As the British Law Officers put it in 1854: 'The principle of international law that an individual doing a hostile act authorized and ratified by the government of which he is a Member cannot be held individually answerable as a private trespasser or malefactor, but that the Act becomes one for which the State to which he belongs is in such a case alone responsible, is a principle too well established to be now controversial' in 29 British and Foreign Papers (1912), at 1139,
32. as well as Lord McNair, International Law Opinions Selected and Annotated, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1956), at 230. Subsequently many courts have consistently held that state representatives acting in their official capacity enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction, see e.g. Danzig custom officials (Danzig Supreme Court 1932).
33. For further details see A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 111-112.
34. The principle was also upheld by the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) in the Scotland Yard case. The Supreme Court held that the Director of Scotland Yard was not amenable to German civil jurisdiction for he had acted as a state agent, in its judgment of 26 September 1978, reprinted in 32 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1979), at 1101-1102.
35. See also the cases referred to by M. Bothe 'Die strafechliche Immunität fremder Staatsorgane' in 31 Zeitschrift Auslandiches and Öffentliches Recht Völk (1971), at 246.
36. This rule was stated in Art. 7 of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 (setting forth the Statute of the International Military Tribunal, also known as the Nuremberg Tribunal), which provided that 'the official position of defendants whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment'. Subsequently, the rule has clearly acquired the status of customary law. In particular, the affirmation by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Nuremberg Principles (UN GA Resolution 95(1) of 11 December 1946). The UN ad hoc Tribunals' Statutes as well as the ICC Statute have testified to the existence of such a rule (Art. 7(2) ICTYSt., Art. 6(2) ICTRSt., Art. 6(2) Special Court for Sierra Leone St. and Art. 27 ICC St). Moreover, national courts have repeatedly upheld the rule as part of international customary law: Many cases brought before national courts against foreign state agents charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity prove that functional immunity does not apply to international crimes. The same opinion has also been set out or broadly echoed in the legal literature. See e.g. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 26, at 268-270.
37. See Sir A. Watts, 'The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers' in 247 RdC (1994-III), 9-130.
38. See e.g. Art. 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (1969).
39. International Court of Justice, Judgment 14 February 2002, at 19, § 53; the judgment can be read at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe.ijudgment.20020214.PDF (visited 8 May 2006).
40. See e.g. Art. 13(2) of the Resolution of the Institut de droit international adopted in Vancouver in 2001, at http://www.idi-iii.org/ idiE/resolutionsE/2001.van.02.en.PDF (visited 8 May 2006).
41. ICJ Judgment cited. supra note 33, at 22, §61.
42. In this respect, it may be worth noting that although Yerodia Ndombassi was entitled to personal immunity as a Minister of Foreign Affairs when the arrest warrant was issued, he had meanwhile become Minister of Education and had lost any right to further invoke personal immunity.
43. This conclusion is confirmed by Art. 1 (1) of the Convention on Special Missions of 8 December 1969 (of which, however, Germany is not party), which clarifies that 'The representatives of the sending State in the special mission [...] shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State'. In this respect, it is interesting to note that state practice seems to confirm this interpretation. In a recent case in the Bow Street Magistrates' Court, Re: Bo Xilai, 8 November 2005, at 2 (on file with the Journal and with the author), a UK judge declined to issue an arrest warrant against the Chinese Minister of External Commerce, Bo Xilai, who had been accused of crimes committed against the religious group Falun Gong, on the grounds that he did enjoy personal immunities. The magistrate, Tim Workman, based his decision on two arguments. First, he clarified that considering that
44. Mr Bo is the Minister for Commerce including International Trade for the People's Republic of China [...] his functions are equivalent to those exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs and adopting the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium, I reach the conclusion that under Customary International Law Rules Mr Bo has immunity from prosecution as he would not be able to perform his functions unless he is able to travel freely (at 2).
45. Second, the magistrate pointed out that Mr Bo was also'part of an official delegation for the state visit of the President of the People's Republic of China' and as such he enjoyed immunity under International Customary Law [...] as embodied in the Convention on Special Missions of the 8th December 1969 which by virtue of article 31 declares that the representatives of the sending state in the Special Mission and the members of all its diplomatic staff shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state (ibid).
46. Arguably the latter argument is the more convincing, and serves on its own to justify the conclusion reached by the magistrate (although one must emphasize that while the UK signed the treaty in 1970, so far it does not seem to have ratified it). However, the idea that any state official who has to travel abroad as part of the exercise of his official functions should enjoy personal immunity should not be accepted so lightly. International law provides for the granting of personal immunity to state officials for the purpose of the official mission they are carrying out. This is reasonable and acceptable. On the other hand, it cannot be suggested, as it seems it was in the aforementioned decision, that since a Minister of Trade may also be required, every now and then, to travel abroad as part of his official duties, he must enjoy a general personal immunity. This does not seem in keeping with international law and seems an excessive interpretation of the rules on immunity going far beyond the need to protect the undisturbed activity of state organs. In particular, it seems excessive when weighed against the protection of fundamental values through the prosecution of international crimes. In any case such a construction should be more carefully analysed and would require elaboration beyond the scope of this article.
47. In this respect, and on the basis of reasoning similar to that of the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in the decision in the Guatemalan Generals case of 26 September 2005, one may argue that such a practice would also be contrary to the right to justice provided by the Constitutions of many countries.
48. Thus, for instance, if State A is party to the 1984 Convention against Torture, it may not make an ad hoc bilateral agreement providing that a foreign state official accused of torture may reside or sojourn on private grounds on its territory without being prosecuted. The fact that the Convention against Torture does not contain specific provisions on immunities is itself highly significant. Torture is characterized under the Convention as a crime necessarily implying the responsibility of a state official; it must therefore, be inferred that it would be illogical to think that state officials may enjoy immunity. The Convention aims at the prosecution and punishment of state officials responsible for acts of torture. It imposes an obligation on all Member States to bring to justice alleged perpetrators of acts of torture, irrespective of their nationality, the nationality of the victims and the place where the crime was committed. Superior orders or public authority cannot justify torture. It is only logical to consider that it is implied in the Convention that both functional and personal immunities must be lifted, at least, in the relationships as between contracting states.