The logic of Searle's Chinese room argument

Minds and Machines

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 163-183

  Damper, Robert I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Chinese room argument; Modal logic; Philosophy of mind; Strong AI; Thought experiments

Indexed keywords

FORMAL LOGIC; LOGIC DESIGN; NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING SYSTEMS; PSYCHOLOGY COMPUTING;

CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT (CRA); MACHINE INTELLIGENCE; MODAL LOGIC; THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 33750189098     PISSN: 09246495     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-006-9031-5     Document Type: Article

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