The Chinese room argument reconsidered: Essentialism, indeterminacy, and strong AI

Minds and Machines

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 285-319

  Wakefield, Jerome C ^a,b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Artificial intelligence; Cognitive science; Computation; Essentialism; Functionalism; Indeterminacy; Philosophy of mind; Searle's Chinese room argument; Semantics

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATION THEORY; COMPUTER AIDED DIAGNOSIS; PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS; SEMANTICS;

ESSENTIALISM;

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS;

EID: 0037404304     PISSN: 09246495     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022947527614     Document Type: Article

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