The European Union and human rights: Towards a post-national human rights institution?

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 323-360

  Besson, Samantha ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG   (Switzerland)

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EID: 33750173020     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: 17441021     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngl001     Document Type: Article

References (286)

1. In the present article, the terms 'European law'or 'EU law' refer to the law of the Treaties on the European Union, including the law of the European Community. Although in many cases, European law will in fact be EC law, I will refer for reasons of clarity to European or EU law in general. For the same reasons, I will often refer to the European Union to talk of what has now become the Union.
2. von Bogdandy 'The EU as a Human Rights Organisation? - Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307 at 1337.
3. In this article, I will use 'human rights'and 'fundamental rights' interchangeably, although international human rights are usually said to have a larger scope than national fundamental rights. Indeed, in the EU context, the distinctions between national and international human rights protection, on the one hand, and between Member States' constitutional fundamental rights traditions, EC fundamental rights qua general principles of EC law and the European Convention of Human Rights, on the other, have become moot. It is true that the distinction between human rights and fundamental rights is also often used to emphasise the legal nature of fundamental rights, and in particular to distinguish between moral human rights and constitutional fundamental rights. However, since human rights can be regarded as the most encompassing group, the concept will generally be used as a default concept.
4. See, for example, Lenaerts, 'Fundamental Rights in the European Union', (2000) 25 European Law Review 575;
5. De Burca, 'Human Rights: The Charter and Beyond', Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/2001;
6. Beaumont, 'Human Rights: Some Recent Developments and Their Impact on Convergence and Divergence of Law in Europe', in Beaumont, Lyons and Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 151;
7. Kühling, 'Grundrechte', in von Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Theoretische und Dogmatische Grundzüge (Berlin: Springer, 2003) 583;
8. Dutheil de la Rochère, 'The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft Constitutional Treaty', (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 345;
9. Alston and de Schutter, 'Introduction: Addressing the Challenges Confronting the EU Fundamental Rights Agency', in Alston and de Schutter (eds), Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU, The Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 1.
10. Declaration of the Laeken Council, available at: http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf
11. Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe - European Council, 16 and 17 June 2005. Available at: http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/conseil/2005/06/ 17conseur-decl/index.html.
12. See, for example, Eeckhout, 'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question', (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 945;
13. Jacobs, 'Human Rights in the EU: The Role of the Court of Justice', (2001) 26 European Law Review 331.
14. See, for example, C-112/00, Schmidberger Internationale Transporte and Planzüge v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659;
15. Application Nos 52562/99 and 52620/99, Soerensen and Rasmussen v Denmark Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 11 January 2006.
16. ETS No. 5
17. See Dutheil de la Rochère, supra n. 4 at 352-3;
18. Lawson, 'Human Rights: The Best is Yet to Come', (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 27 at 31-3.
19. von Bogdandy, supra n. 2.
20. In this article, I am using the term 'post-national' as a generic term to mean strictly 'non-national'. It should not be taken to mean that post-national law supplants and replaces national law, as 'supranational' law would; it can, and should, coexist with national law. Moreover, 'post-national' law is broader than 'international' law as it does not have the specific meaning of 'between States' and captures any laws amongst States, individuals and/or other kinds of entities such as international organisations and NGOs.
21. See, for example, Alston and Weiler, An "Ever Closer Union" in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights, in Alston et al. (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 3;
22. Eeckhout, supra n. 7;
23. Williams, 'The (Im)possibility of the European Union as a Global Human Rights Regime', in Brownsword (ed), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, Volume IV: Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 69, who speaks interchangeably of a human rights 'regime', 'organisation', 'framework' or 'policy'.
24. See Weiler, 'European Citizenship and Human Rights, in Winter et al. (eds), Reforming the Treaty of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 1996) 57 at 77.
25. Lawson, supra n. 9 at 27.
26. In the present article, I am using the term 'institution' in a generic political sense to encompass all legally organised entities, such as organisations, etc., as well as their inner 'organs', such as parliamentary assemblies, committees of ministers, etc., and inner 'bodies' such as consultative agencies or committees. As such, this use of the term should not be identified with the specific legal use of the term within EU law where the EU is an 'organisation' composed of organs which are referred to as 'institutions' (Article 7, ECT) as well as of various 'bodies' such as the Committee of Regions. A human rights 'institution' can then be said to dispose of a legally structured 'framework' in which a certain 'regime' of human rights can be enforced. I will come back to the exact definition of human rights institution below.
27. von Bogdandy, supra n. 2
28. and Williams, supra n. 12 are exceptions.
29. Besson, 'The European Union Qua Global Justice Agent' [forthcoming].
30. In the present article, I am referring to the EU as a post-national institution and legal order; it is indeed neither a supranational European State and State-like legal order (among others it lacks a demos and coercive force), nor a mere international organisation and legal order (evidence for this may be found in the primacy and direct effect of EU law, majority voting, the ECJ's compulsory jurisdiction, etc.). Space precludes discussing these issues a new in this article, but see for a discussion of the post-national nature of the EU and its law, Weiler and Wind, 'Introduction: European Constitutionalism beyond the State', in Weiler and Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 1;
31. Walker, 'Post-National Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation', in Weiler and Wind (eds), ibid., 27;
32. Shaw and Wiener, 'The Paradox of the 'European Polity', in Green Cowles and Smith (eds), The State of the European Union, Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 64.
33. The present article refers to 'obligations', 'duties' and 'responsibilities' interchangeably in the context of global justice. See O'Neill, 'Global Justice: Whose Obligations?', in Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 242 at 248.
34. For reasons of clarity, and in order to comply with most authors' choice in the matter (see, for example, O'Neill, supra n. 18;
35. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (New York: Polity Press, 2002)), I am not distinguishing between demands of justice and human rights in this article, although demands of justice have a broader scope and encompass demands that are not strictly rights-based. A reason for not distinguishing them too closely lies in the development of the theory of universal human rights and obligations, and hence of accounts of the institutional dimension of the fulfilment of those obligations.
36. See Pogge, 'Human Rights and Human Responsibility', in de Greiff and Cronin (eds), Global Justice (Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 2002) 151;
37. Beitz, 'What Human Rights Mean', (2003) 132:1 Daedalus 36;
38. Beitz, 'Human Rights and the Law of Peoples', in Chatterjee (ed), supra n. 18, 193.
39. See, however, on the importance of the distinction, Griffin, 'Discrepancies Between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International Law of Human Rights', (2001) 101 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1;
40. Tasioulas, 'Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin's Steps', (2002) 10 European Journal of Philosophy 79.
41. This section is largely inspired by the methodological considerations in Besson, supra n. 17.
42. Gosepath, 'The Global Scope of Justice', in Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2001) 145.
43. See Pogge and Barry, 'Introduction: Global Institutions and Responsibilities', (2005) 36 Metaphilosophy 1.
44. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1971);
45. Follesdal, 'Legitimacy Theories of the European Union', ARENA Working Paper 04/15.
46. See Gosepath, supra n. 21;
47. Gosepath, 'Globale Gerechtigkeit und Subsidiarität. Zur internen Beschränkung einer subsidiären und föderalen Weltrepublik', in Gosepath and Merle (eds), Weltrepublik: Globalisierung und Demokratie (München: Verlag Beck, 2002) 74.
48. See also in the European context, Nicolaïdis and Lacroix, 'Order and Justice Beyond the Nation-State: Europe's Competing Paradigms', in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 125 at 128, whose alternative paradigms both reflect and constrain European reality.
49. See Gosepath, 'Globale Gerechtigkeit', ibid. at 74.
50. See Gosepath, ibid. at 75;
51. Hurrell, 'Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?', in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 24 at 34.
52. See Gosepath, ibid.
53. Follesdal, supra n. 23.
54. See Pogge and Barry, supra n. 22 at 2.
55. Beitz, 'What Human Rights Mean', supra n. 19 at 46.
56. See Nicolaïdis and Lacroix, supra n. 24 at 153.
57. Ibid. at 137.
58. Of course, the distinction between the theory and the reality of human rights is slightly artificial, since their theoretical justifications affect their reality and their reality should feed their theoretical conceptualisations. See Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987);
59. Griffin, 'First Steps in an Account of Human Rights', (2001) 9 European Journal of Philosophy 306.
60. See Besson, The Morality of Conflict. Reasonable Disagreement and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) at Chapter 12 for a more extensive discussion of human rights theory.
61. See, for example, Nickel, supra n. 32;
62. Nickel, 'Human Rights', in Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu
63. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004).
64. Unless specified, references to 'rights' encompass 'human rights' in what follows.
65. Compare, however, Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra n. 19, who understands 'human rights' not as a special kind of rights, but as a new self-standing notion.
66. See Besson, 'Human Rights, Institutional Duties and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities', (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 507 for a critique.
67. See, for example, Alexy, 'Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat', in Gosepath and Lohmann (eds), Die Philosophie der Menschenrechte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997) 244.
68. Compare, however, Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra n. 19, who refers to Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) and his institutional account of justice and human rights.
69. On the opposition between interactional and institutional accounts of human rights, see Pogge, 'On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy', (2000) 29 Philosophy and Public Affairs 137.
70. Compare Cohen, 'Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice', (1997) 26 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3;
71. Murphy, 'Institutions and the Demands of Justice', (1998) 27 Philosophy and Public Affairs 251.
72. See Tugendhat, 'Die Kontroverse um die Menschenrechte', in Gosepath and Lohmann (eds), supra n. 37, 48.
73. See Hart, 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, (1954) 70 Law Quarterly Review 49;
74. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Westport: Greenwood, 1978).
75. See Raz, 'On the Nature of Rights', (1984) 93 Mind 194.
76. See Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', in Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 77.
77. See Waldron, 'Introduction', in Waldron (ed.), ibid. 1 at 10.
78. See Harel, 'Theories of Rights', in Golding and Edmundson (eds), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 191 at 193-7 for a more elaborate discussion and critique of both models.
79. See Waldron, ibid. at 9.
80. See Raz, supra n. 42 at 195.
81. On the different versions of Raz's definition of rights, see Kamm, 'Rights', in Coleman and Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 476 at 484 et seq.
82. See MacCormick, 'Rights in Legislation', in Raz and Hacker (eds), Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977) 189 at 192 et seq.
83. Ibid. at 201.
84. See Waldron, supra n. 44 at 10-1.
85. See Kamm, 'Conflicts of Rights. Typology, Methodology and Nonconsequentialism', (2001) 7 Legal Theory 239 at 242-7;
86. Kamm, supra n. 46 at 492-3.
87. See Kamm, supra n. 46 at 485.
88. Ibid. at 506 et seq.
89. See Kamm, supra n. 50 at 244.
90. Such a reinterpretation is in line with Raz's contentions about the relationship between fundamental or constitutional rights and the common good and the fact that in some cases the stringency of rights seems greater than the weight of the individual interests they protect. See Raz, 'Rights and Individual Well-Being', (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 127 at 135;
91. Raz, 'Rights in Politics', in Tasioulas (ed), Law, Values and Social Practices (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997) 75 at 83.
92. See also Harel, supra n. 44 at 202.
93. See Besson, supra n. 33.
94. See Raz, supra n. 42 at 208.
95. On the entities which can have such ultimate-valued interests and the nature of these interests, see Harel, supra n. 44 at 193-7.
96. See Raz, 'Rights and individual Well-Being', supra n. 54;
97. Raz, 'Rights in Politics', supra n. 54 at 83.
98. Compare Griffin, supra n. 32.
99. See Raz, Value, Respect and Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 202 on the importance of social practices when defining the scope and content of rights.
100. Hence, the weight or importance of a right depends on the weight or importance of the interest it protects. Talk of the 'weight' and 'balancing' of rights and interests is metaphorical, of course.
101. See Waldron, supra n. 44 at 14.
102. See also Raz, supra n. 42 at 200 and 209;
103. Marmor, 'On the Limits of Rights', (1997) 16 Law and Philosophy 1 at 10.
104. One may argue that this does not question the Hohfeldian conception of correlativity as the latter is meant as a stipulation, rather than as an empirical claim. See Raz, 'Disagreement in Politics', (1998) 43 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25.
105. It is also possible to have duties without rights. See Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University, 1995);
106. Feinberg, 'In Defense of Moral Rights', in Feinberg (ed.), Problems at the Roots of Law: Essays in Legal and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 37.
107. See MacCormick, supra n. 47 at 199-202;
108. Raz, supra n. 42 at 196-200;
109. Kamm, supra n. 46 at 480.
110. See Raz, supra n. 63 at 42.
111. See Marmor, supra n. 62 at 3.
112. See Raz, supra n. 42 at 197-9.
113. See Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 212 et seq.
114. See Raz, supra n. 42 at 208-9.
115. See Marmor, supra n. 62 at 15-6.
116. See Besson, supra n. 33.
117. Raz, 'Legal Rights', (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 12.
118. Ibid. at 14.
119. Ibid.
120. See Raz, 'Reasoning with Rules', (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 1 at 6, on the normative gap that is intrinsic to reasoning with legal rules.
121. See, for example, Feinberg, supra n. 64.
122. See, in the case of human rights, Alexy, supra n. 37;
123. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
124. See for example, Tasioulas, 'The Moral Reality of Human Rights', in Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right; Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) forthcoming;
125. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
126. Pogge, 'Human Rights and Human Responsibility', supra n. 19.
127. See Raz, supra n. 73 at 16-7.
128. Ibid. at 16-7.
129. See Raz, 'Rights and Individual Well-Being', supra n. 54 at 135 et seq.;
130. Raz, 'Rights in Politics', supra n. 54 at 83.
131. This question applies to both moral and legal human rights, but mostly to the latter given the heightened concern for the effectivity of the latter. In fact, the legal translation of human rights may even be regarded as the first step towards their enforcement. As I explained before, however, and contrary to authors like Habermas or Alexy, I do not regard the legal translation of a moral right as an automatic right to legalisation flowing from the existence of a moral right (i.e. a moral right to X amounts to a moral right to a legal right to X). In what follows, therefore, I will regard the legalisation of human rights as an important part of their institutional enforcement and discuss it as a particular instance of the latter.
132. See Feinberg, supra n. 64.
133. See Feinberg, ibid.;
134. O'Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
135. O'Neill, supra n. 18.
136. See Geuss, 'Outside Ethics, (2003) 11 European Journal of Philosophy 29;
137. James, 'Rights as Enforceable Claims', [2003] Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 133.
138. See Nickel, supra n. 32 at 35: 'Legal enforcement is often important to making rights effective, but such enforcement is not essential to the existence of rights'.
139. GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948, A/810 at 7.
140. See Tasioulas, supra n. 78;
141. Pogge, 'Human Rights and Human Responsibility', supra n. 19;
142. Griffin, supra n. 32.
143. See Nickel, supra n. 32.
144. In contrast, for those authors who link the existence of rights to their institutional effectivity, rights cannot influence normatively the institutions we have, since they would not exist without effective institutions. See, for example, O'Neill, supra n. 18.
145. This section, with the exception of C, is largely inspired by Besson, supra n. 17.
146. See O'Neill, 'Agents of Justice', in Pogge (ed), supra n. 21, 188 at 189.
147. See O'Neill, supra n. 18 at 242-4 and 249.
148. Ibid. at 243.
149. Ibid. at 256.
150. See Foot, 'Introduction', in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 1 at 4-5.
151. See O'Neill, supra n. 18 at 246-7.
152. See Foot, supra n. 96;
153. Hurrell, supra n. 26.
154. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 70 who restricts, however, his definition to 'State agreed' structures. This restriction does not fit the post-national approach chosen in the present article.
155. See O'Neill, supra n. 18 at 249.
156. Ibid. at 248.
157. Ibid. at 245.
158. See, for example, Raz, supra n. 42;
159. Tasioulas, supra n. 78.
160. These conditions include among others the existence of an objective interest fundamental enough to hold someone else in duty: See, for example, Raz, supra n. 42.
161. See Besson, supra n. 33 at Chapter 12.
162. See O'Neill, supra n. 18 at 250-1.
163. See also Gosepath, supra n. 21 at 163.
164. O'Neill, supra n. 18 at 250 and 258.
165. See, on the idea of a network of global institutions, Dryzek, 'Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies. Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia', (2005) 33 Political Theory 218;
166. Archibugi, 'Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review', (2004) 10 European Journal of International Relations 437.
167. Kostakopoulou, 'Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change', (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 233 at 236.
168. Kostakopoulou argues against Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations', (1998) 50 World Politics 324, that institutional (as opposed to social) constructivism does not lack a theory of agency at all.
169. See also Haas and Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions', (2002) 31 Millennium 573.
170. Kostakopoulou, ibid. at 236-7.
171. See Gosepath, 'Zur Begründungen sozialer Menschenrechte', in Gosepath and Lohmann (eds), Die Philosophie der Menschenrechte, supra n. 37 at 146;
172. Tasioulas, supra n. 78.
173. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 70.
174. See, for example, Alexy, supra n. 37 on the complex institutional structure required by fundamental rights protection at the State level.
175. von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1316.
176. See Waldron, supra n. 78 at Chapter 11.
177. This section is largely inspired by Besson, supra n. 17.
178. See, for example, C-2/69, Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419;
179. C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellsehaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125;
180. C-4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] ECR, 491;
181. C-5/88, Wachauf v Federal Republic of Germany [1989] ECR 2609;
182. C-260/89, ERT v DEP [1991] ECR I-2925.
183. See, for example, the German Federal Constitutional Court's decisions: Solange I BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974);
184. Solange II BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986);
185. Brunner BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993).
186. See Coppel and O'Neill, 'The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously', (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 669.
187. See von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1308: 'If these endeavours succeed, human rights would determine rather than simply limit the European legal system and would move to the forefront of its institutions' activity'.
188. [1986] OJ L 169/1.
189. [1992] Of C 191/1.
190. [1997] Of C 340/1.
191. [2002] OJ C 325/33.
192. For a detailed analysis of the implications of the constitutionalisation of the Charter for fundamental rights protection in the EU, see Lawson, supra n. 9.
193. Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759.
194. See the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Part II, TCE: 'It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice'.
195. [2000] OJ L 317/43.
196. Athens Declaration made at the Athens Informal European Council, 16 April 2003, [2003] OJ L 236, available at: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/ articles/2003/4/16/2531/index.asp?.
197. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 85.
198. Alston and Weiler, supra n. 12 at 21-3.
199. On the case law that is at the origin of Article II-111, TCE, see Jacobs, supra n. 7.
200. See von Bogdandy, supra n. 2.
201. See Eeckhout, supra n. 7 at 980 and 993.
202. On the network, see: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr.cdf/ index.en.htm.
203. COM (2005) 280 final. See, for different aspects of the Agency, Alston and de Schutter, supra n. 4.
204. See Eeckhout, supra n. 7 at 952.
205. T-315/01, Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000;
206. T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International v Council [2005] ECR II-0000.
207. See Benhabib. The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at Chapter 4.
208. This was confirmed recently by the ECJ in C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9923.
209. The following presentation focuses on the regime currently in force and does not refer to the new constitutional dispositions.
210. See Shaw, 'The Many Fasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union', (1997) 22 European Law Review 554;
211. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: 'Do The New Clothes Have An Emperor?', and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 324 et seq.
212. See Eeckhout, supra n. 7;
213. O'Leary, 'The Relation between Community Citizenship and Fundamental Rights', (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 519.
214. See also Advocate General Jacobs in C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig Standesamt [1993] ECR I-1991 at para 46: In my opinion, a Community national who goes to another Member State as a worker or self-employed person under Articles 48, 52 or 59 of the Treaty is entitled not just to pursue his trade or profession and to enjoy the same living and working conditions as nationals of the host State; he is in addition entitled to assume that [...] he will be treated in accordance with a common code of fundamental values [...] In other words, he is entitled to say 'civis europeus sum and to invoke that status in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights.
215. See C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691;
216. C-184/99, Grzelczyk v Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193;
217. C-413/99, Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091;
218. C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279.
219. See also C-138/02, Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-2703
220. C-456/02, Trojani v Centre publique d'aide sociale de Bruxelles [2004] ECR I-7573;
221. C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home D9partment, supra n. 140.
222. See Eeckhout, supra n. 7;
223. O'Leary, supra n. 143.
224. Nicolaïdis and Lacroix, supra n. 24 at 141-2.
225. Ibid. at 135.
226. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 77-8.
227. Eeckhout, supra n. 7 at 990.
228. See de Schutter, 'Mainstreaming Fundamental Rights in the EU', in Alston and de Schutter (eds), supra n. 4 at Chapter 2.
229. See Alston and Weiler, supra n. 12 at 13.
230. See also the essays in Alston and de Schutter, supra n. 4 and, in particular, Chapter 1: De Burca, '"New Modes of Governance" and the Implementation of Fundamental Rights'.
231. On the complexity of the relationships between these different jurisdictional layers, see Dutheil de la Rochère, 'Droits de l'homme: La Charte des droits fondamentaux et au-delà', Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/2001;
232. McCrudden, 'The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights', Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/2001.
233. See, for example, Weiler, 'In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg', in Weiler and Wind (eds), supra n. 17, 7;
234. Pernice and Kanitz, 'Fundamental Rights and Multi-level Constitutionalism in Europe', WHI Paper 7/04, available at: http://www.rewi.huberlin.de/WHI/english.
235. See Bribosia, 'La future Constitution: Point culminant de la constitutionnalisation des droits fondamentaux dans l'Union européenne', in Magnette (ed.), La Grande Europe (Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2004) 201;
236. Lawson, supra n. 9.
237. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 79.
238. See, for example, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1;
239. BVerfGE, Gorgülu, BVerfGE, 2 BvR 1481/04 (2004).
240. See Alston and de Schutter, supra n. 4 at 5-6.
241. von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1311-2.
242. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 78.
243. Ibid. at 78-9.
244. See Habermas and Derrida, 'What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea For A Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe', (2003) 10 Constellations 291.
245. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 77-8.
246. See, for example, Eeckhout, supra n. 7.
247. See, for example, Coppel/O'Neill, supra n. 119;
248. De Witte, 'The Past and Future Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Human Rights', in Alston et al. (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 859.
249. See Lawson, supra n. 9 at 29;
250. Bribosia, supra n. 155 at 208-10.
251. See, for example, C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659.
252. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 79.
253. Ibid. at 80.
254. The 2000 Charter Convention's President was Roman Herzog and his views regarding German constitutional sovereignty were well-known.
255. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 79.
256. Recent examples are Schmidberger v Austria, supra n. 167
257. and C-36/02, Omega v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
258. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 86.
259. von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1316-8.
260. See Besson, 'Sovereignty in Conflict', (2004) 8 European Integration On-line Papers, available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm
261. Besson, 'The Taming of Sovereignty. A Review of Neil Walker's Sovereignty in Transition', (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 147.
262. Follesdal, 'Subsidiarity, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Constitutional Treaty of Europe', (2006) 37 Journal of Social Philosophy 61.
263. Despite the addition of the Subsidiarity Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty and its consolidation in the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-11), the principle has not yet had the impact it deserves at EU level. See, for example, Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critiques (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6-7.
264. Compare von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1319 who does not seem to think this is possible, but whose proposal of a three-layered human rights protection system does not exclude subsidiarity concerns in the third layer of human rights that includes EC institutions and Member States when they apply EC law.
265. Pernice and Kanitz, supra n. 154.
266. See, for example, Keller and Bertschi, 'Erfolgspotenzial des 14. Protokolls zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention', [2005] Europäische Grundrechtszeitschrift 204;
267. Müller, 'Koordination der Grundrechtsschutzes in Europa - Einleitungsreferat', [2005] Revue de droit suisse 9.
268. See, for example, Spielmann, 'Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Inconsistencies and Complementarities', in Alston et al. (eds) supra n. 165, 758.
269. See Besson, 'From European Integration to European Integrity. Should European Law Speak With Just One Voice?', (2004) 10 European Law Journal 257.
270. See Williams, supra n. 12 at 80.
271. See de Schutter, supra n. 151 at Chapter 2.
272. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, supra n. 157.
273. Kadi v Council and Commission, supra n. 138.
274. Williams, supra n. 12 at 86.
275. See, for example, Lawson, supra n. 9;
276. Dutheil de la Rochère, supra n. 4.
277. Williams, supra n. 12 at 81-4.
278. See, for example, Weiler, 'Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries, in Neuwahl and Rosas (eds), The European Union and Human Rights (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995) 51.
279. See also Besselink, 'Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union', (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 629
280. Besselink, 'The Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of the Charter', (2001) Maastricht Journal of European Law 68.
281. On the principle of coherence in European law, see Besson, supra n. 182.
282. See Omega v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, supra n. 172.
283. See also Besson and Pfersmann, 'L'autorité du droit constitutionnel comparé dans l'UE', (2007) Revue internationale de droit comparé [forthcoming] on the method and justification of comparative constitutional law in the EU.
284. Williams, supra n. 12 at 85.
285. Alston and Weiler, supra n. 12 at 9.
286. Interestingly, for instance, while the degree of internal fundamental rights protection is inferior to that of external fundamental rights protection, European citizenship rights are better protected in the EU than the political rights of third-country nationals in EU Member States.