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4
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33750060808
-
-
updated at where Hirsch and Macpherson's updated statistics may be found; see also www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm. Overall, employment in U.S. manufacturing industries fell by 1.8 million jobs between January 1997 and December 2001, but a disproportionate share of those lost jobs were concentrated among unions, which lost nearly 10 percent of their manufacturing sector membership in that five-year period. The decline of the American manufacturing is reflected in the union membership statistics
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Ibid. Overall, employment in U.S. manufacturing industries fell by 1.8 million jobs between January 1997 and December 2001, but a disproportionate share of those lost jobs were concentrated among unions, which lost nearly 10 percent of their manufacturing sector membership in that five-year period. The decline of the American manufacturing is reflected in the union membership statistics.
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(2004)
Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey
-
-
Hirsch, B.T.1
Macpherson, A.D.2
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5
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33750067459
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www.unitehere.org/.
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-
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6
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33750090783
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www.changetowin.org/.
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-
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7
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33750049117
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N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85
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N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
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(1995)
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-
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8
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33750074832
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See for the full text of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
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See www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/rules/act.asp for the full text of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
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-
-
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9
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33750060530
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note
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Interview with Richard Hurd, professor of labor relations, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, June 28, 2001. This estimate is conservative based on conversations with union officials. Some assert that the percentage of employees the union considers supporters (based on authorization card signatures) is between 75 and 90 percent.
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-
-
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10
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33750055344
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-
note
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A bargaining order is a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) mandate requiring a company to "cease and desist from their unfair labor practices, to offer reinstatement and back pay to the employees who had been discriminatorily discharged, to bargain with the union on request, and to post the appropriate notices." National Labor Relations Board v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 585 (1969).
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-
-
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11
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33750056174
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note
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Employers typically raise some or all of the following issues, based in part on advice from counsel and from their unique circumstances, and industry and employee demographics: • whether unions can "guarantee" increased pay, benefits, or anything else; • how collective bargaining really works; • what it costs to be a union member in terms of dues and initiation fees, where that money goes, how it is used, and by whom; • whether the union's leaders are trustworthy and capable; • the employer's record of responsiveness to employee issues; and • the fact that employees will be paying someone to do what they may have been able to do (represent themselves) for free.
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-
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12
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33750071192
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Surveys of union organizers and employees who have been through NLRB election campaigns seem to confirm this trend at least indirectly. For example, see American Rights at Work survey
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Surveys of union organizers and employees who have been through NLRB election campaigns seem to confirm this trend at least indirectly. For example, see American Rights at Work survey (2006), www.americanrightsatwork.org/press/press.cfm?pressReleaseID=33.
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(2006)
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-
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13
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33750060140
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Surveys of union organizers and employees who have been through NLRB election campaigns seem to confirm this trend at least indirectly. For example, see American Rights at Work survey
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Ibid.
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(2006)
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-
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14
-
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33750041445
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"Hotel Worker's Union in St. Paul Minn., Plans New Tack in Organizing"
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June 20, 2001 (quoting Jaye Rykunyk, head of Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees [HERE] Local 17)
-
Michael Hughlett, "Hotel Worker's Union in St. Paul Minn., Plans New Tack in Organizing," Hotel Online, www.hotel-online.com/neo/ news/2001_June_22/k.SPH.993243589.html, June 20, 2001 (quoting Jaye Rykunyk, head of Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees [HERE] Local 17).
-
Hotel Online
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-
Hughlett, M.1
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15
-
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0012427431
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"Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements"
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While most agreements define neutrality, the definitions vary widely. HERE agreements prohibit the employer from communicating any opposition to the union. Less typical definitions declare that management will make an affirmative statement to their employees that it welcomes their choice of a representative. See (October)
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While most agreements define neutrality, the definitions vary widely. HERE agreements prohibit the employer from communicating any opposition to the union. Less typical definitions declare that management will make an affirmative statement to their employees that it welcomes their choice of a representative. See Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky, "Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements," Industrial and Labor Relations Review (October 2001): Pp. 8-9.
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(2001)
Industrial and Labor Relations Review
, pp. 8-9
-
-
Eaton, A.E.1
Kriesky, J.2
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16
-
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33750064652
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"Union Organizing"
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Agreements may state that (1) the employer will not attack or demean the union; (2) the employer will not refer to the union as a third party; (3) the parties will strive to create a campaign free of fear, hostility, and coercion; (4) the parties will campaign in a positive manner; (5) the parties will keep their statements procompany or prounion; and (6) the employer will not state that it is corporate policy to avoid unionization. See
-
Agreements may state that (1) the employer will not attack or demean the union; (2) the employer will not refer to the union as a third party; (3) the parties will strive to create a campaign free of fear, hostility, and coercion; (4) the parties will campaign in a positive manner; (5) the parties will keep their statements procompany or prounion; and (6) the employer will not state that it is corporate policy to avoid unionization. See Eaton and Kriesky, "Union Organizing," 9.
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-
-
Eaton1
Kriesky2
-
17
-
-
33750064652
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"Union Organizing"
-
Agreements may state that (1) the employer will not attack or demean the union; (2) the employer will not refer to the union as a third party; (3) the parties will strive to create a campaign free of fear, hostility, and coercion; (4) the parties will campaign in a positive manner; (5) the parties will keep their statements procompany or prounion; and (6) the employer will not state that it is corporate policy to avoid unionization. See
-
Ibid., 8.
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-
-
Eaton1
Kriesky2
-
18
-
-
33750042652
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-
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 See also Corp., 177 NLRB 531 (1969)
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Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). See also Phelps Dodge Corp., 177 NLRB 531 (1969).
-
(1992)
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-
Dodge, P.1
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19
-
-
33750047297
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"Union Organizing"
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Eaton and Kriesky, "Union Organizing," 15.
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-
-
Eaton1
Kriesky2
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20
-
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33750066739
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-
note
-
See Aeroground, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, N.D. Cal., No. C-01-1628VRW, injunction granted July 9, 2001. Where the city established a labor peace rule that required any employer that leased, subleased, contracted, or subcontracted with the San Francisco International Airport to agree to a card-check authorization procedure with any union that initiated a representation request. The union had to register with the airport director also.
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-
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21
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33750040355
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www.changetowin.org/.
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-
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22
-
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33750048830
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See The actual text of the question at issue is as follows: "Some companies and union organizers want to make a special agreement to unionize the workers if at least half of the workers sign their names on cards saying they want a union, rather than letting all the workers vote in a secret-ballot election overseen by the government. Do you agree or disagree that it should be legal for a company and union organizers to make this special agreement to bypass the normal secret-ballot process to determine whether to unionize the workers?" Twenty-six percent of those polled agreed with the statement and 8 percent were not sure
-
See www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6806. The actual text of the question at issue is as follows: "Some companies and union organizers want to make a special agreement to unionize the workers if at least half of the workers sign their names on cards saying they want a union, rather than letting all the workers vote in a secret-ballot election overseen by the government. Do you agree or disagree that it should be legal for a company and union organizers to make this special agreement to bypass the normal secret-ballot process to determine whether to unionize the workers?" Twenty-six percent of those polled agreed with the statement and 8 percent were not sure.
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-
-
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23
-
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33750056775
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552 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir)
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552 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1977).
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(1977)
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-
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24
-
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33750043559
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688 F.2d 919, 936 (3rd Cir.)
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688 F.2d 919, 936 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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(1982)
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-
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25
-
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33750074539
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-
note
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Title 18 Section 201, Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses (8 U.S.C. 201), defines two crimes, bribery and illegal gratuity.
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-
-
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26
-
-
33750087062
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-
note
-
In unrelated holdings, the courts have found the following to be things of value: Promises of future employment, shares of stock with no commercial value, and the companionship of one's spouse or significant other during an overseas trip.
-
-
-
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27
-
-
33750044669
-
Hotel Employees Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality
-
Patterson v. Heartland Industrial Partners, LLP, 225 FRD 204 (ND Ohio 2004); 3rd Cir. 299 F. Supp 2d 461
-
Patterson v. Heartland Industrial Partners, LLP, 225 FRD 204 (ND Ohio 2004); Hotel Employees Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality, 3rd Cir. 299 F. Supp 2d 461 (2004).
-
(2004)
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-
-
28
-
-
33750077376
-
-
note
-
The Court cited the Third Circuit's reasoning in Hotel Employees Local 57 v Sage Hospitality, 3rd Cir. 299 F. Supp 2d 461 (2004), which it found persuasive: "The agreement here involves no payment, loan, or delivery of anything. The fact that a Neutrality Agreement-like any other labor arbitration agreement-benefits both parties with efficiency and cost saving does not transform it into a payment or delivery of some benefit. Furthermore, any benefit to the union inherent in a more efficient resolution of recognition disputes does not constitute a thing of value within the meaning of the statute."
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-
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29
-
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33750062686
-
-
note
-
S. 1173, H.R. 874, introduced by Senator Jim DeMint (SC) along with five Senate cosponsors, and by Representative Charles Norwood (GA) and ninety-one House cosponsors.
-
-
-
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30
-
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33750044963
-
-
note
-
S. 842, H.R. 1696, introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy (MA) and 42 Senate cosponsors, and Representative George Miller (CA) and 215 House cosponsors.
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-
-
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31
-
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33750071802
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-
note
-
Under McKay Radio, an employer who hired replacements to work during a strike does not have to terminate the replacements in favor of returning strikers after settlement. The threat, and the reality of permanent replacements, hurts unions in negotiations and in organizing.
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