Redistributive taxation in democracies: Evidence on people's satisfaction

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 809-837

  Bernasconi, Michele ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INSUBRIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Preferences for redistribution; Survey evidence; Taxes

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749673757     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.09.007     Document Type: Article

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