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Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 73-82

Market models and pricing mechanisms in a multihop wireless hotspot network

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MULTIHOP WIRELESS HOTSPOT NETWORK; PACKET FORWARDING SERVICES; PRICING MECHANISMS; RELAYING NODES;

EID: 33749514149     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/MOBIQUITOUS.2005.36     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (21)

References (35)
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    • Market models and pricing mechanisms in a multihop wireless hotspot network
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.