The making of the global gambling industry: An application and extension of field theory

Theory and Society

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 265-297

  Sallaz, Jeffrey J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33749446021     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: 15737853     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11186-006-9002-0     Document Type: Review

References (158)

1. International Gaming and Wagering Business (1989, 2000). While the definition of what constitutes a casino vis-à-vis other forms of gambling enterprises will vary, most legal systems refer to a casino as a physical structure containing slot machines and/or table-games such as blackjack and roulette.
2. For an account grounded in standard economics see, William R. Eadington, "The Economics of casino gambling," Journal of Economic Perspectives 13/3 (1999): 173-192;
3. for a radical critique that still adheres to the economic paradigm see, Charles T. Clotfelter and Philip J. Cook, Selling hope: State lotteries in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
4. Jerome Skolnick, House of cards: The Legalization and control of casino gambling (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), 27.
5. As a corollary, and as it is shown in this article, struggles over policy are also struggles to move the policy-making process to particular domains where both the content and structure of one's performances will encounter sympathetic audiences.
6. While it may appear strange that I am comparing a nation-state with a state within a larger nation, it is at these administrative levels in each case that casino policy was generated (i.e., at the federal level in South Africa, at the state level in the United States).
7. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Social structures of the economy, (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005). For examples see Rao's work on consumer watchdog organizations in the United States,
8. Hayagreeva Rao, "Caveat emptor: The Construction of nonprofit consumer watchdog organizations," American Journal of Sociology 103/4 (1998): 912-961;
9. Granovetter and McGuire's study of the American electricity industry, Mark Granovetter and Patrick McGuire, "The Making of an industry: Electricity in the United States," in The Laws of markets, edited by Michel Callon, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998): 147-173;
10. and Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch's work on the emergence of a recycling industry in the United States, Michael Lounsbury, Marc Ventresca and Paul M. Hirsch, "Social movements, field frames and industry emergence: A Cultural-political perspective on US recycling," Socio-Economic Review 1 (2003): 71-104.
11. Nick Couldry, "Media meta-capital: Extending the range of Bourdieu's field theory," Theory and Society 32 (2003): 653-677, at 672.
12. Erving Goffman, Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior, (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967).
13. This assumes that the event determining outcomes is either random, or, if a contest of skill, that participants are of roughly equal capabilities. In this sense, gambling constitutes a short-term temporal redistribution of income, analogous to the gift exchange, see Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and reason for exchange in archaic societies, (New York: Norton, 1990).
14. Gerda Reith, The Age of chance: Gambling in western culture, (London: Routledge, 1999).
15. Richard A. Epstein, The Theory of gambling and statistical logic, (New York: Academic Press, 1995), 73.
16. The main exception today is fundamentalist Islamic states. See Franz Rosenthal, Gambling in Islam (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers,1997).
17. A large literature exists that looks at the regulation of vice industries such as gambling or alcohol as an expression of status politics. Gusfield, for example, argued that debates surrounding vice industries were particularly salient in the United States due to the small role played by class-based parties in its political system. See Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status politics and the American temperance movement (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963),
18. Erich Goode and Ben-Yehuda Nachman, Moral panics: The Social construction of deviance (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 78;
19. Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance (New York: Free Press, 1963), ch.7;
20. Kai Erikson, Wayward puritans: A Study in the sociology of deviance (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). This study, by drawing on the work of Bourdieu, retains an attention to the symbolic struggles surrounding vice policy but considers as well its material nature.
21. Mauro F. Guillen, "The Economic sociology of markets, industries and firms," Theory and Society 32: (2003) 505-515, 505.
22. For a further discussion of the importance of Fligstein's work to the economic sociology of markets, see Richard Swedberg, Principles of Economic Sociology, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 172.
23. In the Polanyian tradition, Fligstein emphasizes the false antimony between free markets and state regulation that neo-liberal economics take for granted. Even an extreme capitalist economy such as the United States relies upon regulation (anti-trust laws are a prime example) to maintain markets; see Karl Polanyi, The Great transformation: The Political and economic origins of our time, (Boston: Beacon, 1957), at 39, 75, 139.
24. Legal institutions are powerful domains through which challengers may precipitate "legitimacy crises" for dominant organizations, Fligstein, The Architecture of markets, 39;
25. Lauren B. Edelman, "Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational mediation of civil rights law, " American Journal of Sociology 97 (1992): 1531-1576.
26. Fligstein, "Markets as politics," 663.
27. These typologies are based roughly upon those of Peter Evans, Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995);
28. and Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyter and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the state back in, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1985). They consider the extent to which states act as predators vis-à-vis industry, and the presence of an autonomous cadre of trained staff within the state. As Mauro Guillen points out, these typologies do not allow much leverage for understanding interventionist dynamics in developing countries such as South Africa;
29. see "The Economic sociology of markets, industries and firms," Theory and Society 32 (2003): 505-515.
30. Fligstein, The Architecture of markets, 241. For example, in his work on the European Union, Fligstein argues that the "European Commission played a pivotal role as a collective institutional entrepreneur." Yet his analysis discusses only how the Commission brokered among the interests of businessmen and bureaucrats by creating a broad and vague plan, not how EU commissioners conceptualized among themselves their interests in this plan.
31. See Neil Fligstein, "How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union," American Journal of Sociology 102 (1996): 1-33.
32. See Bourdieu, The Social structures of the economy.
33. See Pierre Bourdieu, The State nobility: Elite schools in the field of power, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 264-267;
34. Bourdieu, "The Genesis of the concepts of habitus and of field," Sociocriticism 2/2 (1985): 11-24;
35. Bourdieu, The Field of cultural production, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 38;
36. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to reflexive sociology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 94-98.
37. For summaries of the development of the concept of field and its utilization by American social science see, Rodney Benson, "Field theory in comparative context: A new paradigm for media studies," Theory and Society 28 (1998): 463-498.
38. Bourdieu's theory distinguishes between individual and delegated political capital (roughly analogous to Weber's conception of charismatic versus bureaucratic authority). Kauppi provides an overview though he is interested in demonstrating that the political field possesses the characteristics of fields generally, while I intend to point out the uniqueness of political capital, especially in relation to forms of value characteristic of the economic field; see, Niilo Kauppi, "Bourdieu's political sociology and the politics of European integration," Theory and Society 32/5-6 (2003), 775-789.
39. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991),192, italics in original.
40. Pierre Bourdieu, "Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field," Sociological Theory 12/1 (1994), 1-18, at 9;
41. see also Bourdieu, The State nobility, part IV;
42. Bourdieu, Practical Reason, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 120.
43. The historical evolution and specificity of the basis of modern state power, in which legitimacy is obtained to the extent one's own interests are erased and whose antithesis is encapsulated by Louis XIV's, "L'etat c'est moi," is discussed by Bourdieu in "De la maison du roi à la raison d' État. Un modèle de la genèse du champ bureaucratique," Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 118 (1997): 55-68.
44. Though the political field is not quite an "economic world reversed" like a pure artistic field, it does share broad commonalities with religious institutions. "It is important to know that the Church has long fulfilled quasi-state function of general interest and public service. . .which explains why it entered into very violent competition with the state at the moment when the 'social' state was put into place;" like the Church, the political field "is an enterprise with an economic dimension which cannot admit to so being and which functions in a sort of permanent negation of its economic dimension," Practical reason, 115, 120.
45. James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the Capitalist State, (New York: St. Martins, 1973).
46. O'Connor's work was prefigured by the work of Joseph Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the tax state," 99-140 in The Economics and sociology of capitalism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1918] 1991). Although O'Connor foresawthe financial pressures placed upon the state under global capitalism, his thesis has fallen into disrepute because of its primitive theory of state action - i.e., a base functionalism characteristic of orthodox Marxism which views the state as merely serving the interests of monopoly capital.
47. See Fred Block, "The Fiscal crisis of the capitalist state," Annual Review of Sociology (7): 1-27. In relation in gambling policy, we can say the following: for O'Connor legitimacy is associated strictly with the material well-being of the populace (hence welfare as the paradigmatic legitimacy-producing expenditure). He thus cannot account for the role played by "moral politics" in establishing the legitimacy of particular state regimes.
48. The concept of symbolic capital is usually translated in American sociology as legitimacy. See for example, David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 89.
49. David Swartz, Culture and power, 293.
50. Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation, 104.
51. Theda Scokpol and Edwin Amenta, "Did capitalists shape Social Security? " American Sociological Review 50 (1985): 572-575;
52. Edwin Amenta, and Bruce Carruthers, "The Formative years of US social spending policies: Theories of the welfare state and the American states during the Great Depression, " American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 661-678;
53. Harland Prechel, "Steel and the state: Industry politics and business policy formation, 1940-1989" American Sociological Review 55 (1990): 648-668.
54. Bourdieu and Goffman overlapped briefly at the University of Pennsylvania. Though Bourdieu never attempted to systematically integrate the principles of symbolic interactionism into his theory, he did state that, "I feel a kinship and a solidarity with researchers 'who put their noses to the ground' (particularly symbolic interactionists)." See Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation, 113.
55. My approach is thus roughly in line with symbolic interactionist research on politics and the media, especially those examining the social construction of neutrality. See William A. Gamson and David Stuart, "Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest: The Bomb in political cartoons," Sociological Forum 7/1 (1992): 55-86;
56. William A. Gamson, "Goffman's legacy to political sociology," Theory and Society 14/5 (1985): 605-622;
57. Steven E. Clayman, "Displaying Neutrality in Television News Interview," Social Problems 35/4 (1988): 474-492;
58. Gaye Tuchman, "Objectivity as strategic ritual," American Journal of Sociology 77 (1972): 660-679;
59. John Heritage and David Greatbatch, "Generating applause: A Study of rhetoric and response at party political conferences," American Journal of Sociology 92 (1986): 110-157.
60. Though this analysis deals primarily with the generation of official gambling policy, it must be emphasized that at the city or neighborhood level official law was often compromised by politicians and law-enforcement officials who sanctioned, usually in exchange for cash bribes, various forms of illicit gambling. See Henry Chafetz, Play the devil: A History of gambling in the United States from 1492 to 1955, (New York: Clarkson N. Potter Inc., 1960)
61. Mr. Plewman, South African Parliamentary Debates, (April 9, 1965).
62. Walter Bean and James J. Rawls, California: An Interpretive history, (San Francisco, CA: McGraw-Hill, 1983).
63. G. Robert Blakey, The Development of the law of gambling, (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1977), 378.
64. California Constitution of 1878, Amendment 489, emphasis mine.
65. California Penal Code, 330-337.
66. California Penal Code, 330.11.
67. Jerry M. Hill, California gambling law, (Sacramento, CA: Barash and Hill, 1992).
68. John Vorster, South African Parliamentary Debates, (April 30, 1965), emphasis mine.
69. Number 51 of 1965.
70. Mr. Visse, South African Parliamentary Debates, (March 26, 1965).
71. The act by bettors of studying and handicapping horses was labeled by lawmakers a gentlemanly exercise in rational calculation (Author interview with S. A. Strauss, Professor of Law, University of South Africa and Member of Howard Commission [August 1, 2001]).
72. S. Lotter, "The Odds against gambling," South African Criminal Justice 7 (1994): 189-199.
73. The homeland system was intended to create stable labor reserves for the mining industries, stop migration of blacks into the cities, and stem black political militancy by encouraging allegiance to traditional chiefs in rural areas. See Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid," Economy and Society 1 (1972): 425-456;
74. Michael Burawoy, "The Functions and reproduction of migrant labor: Comparative material from southern Africa and the United States," American Journal of Sociology 81 (1976): 1049-1087.
75. Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg and John Adams, The Black homelands of South Africa: The Political economy of development in Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
76. The "Self Governing Territories Constitution Act" of 1971 allowed homeland chiefs to legalize casinos.
77. Sunday Times (South Africa edition), Marcia Klein, "The Sun King Gets a License to Gild his Empire," October 26, 1996.
78. Jonathon Crush and Paul Wellings, "Southern Africa and the pleasure periphery," Journal of Modern Africa Studies 21/4 (1983): 673-698.
79. Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa ed.), Madeleine Wackernagel and Mungo Soggot, "How Pik got Sol off the Hook," October 2, 1997.
80. For a detailed account of the relation between Sun International and homeland leaders see Gerald A. Alexander, "Third report with particular reference to gambling rights," Commission of Enquiry into the Department of Works and Energy, (Transkei Government Press, 1988).
81. John Findlay, People of chance, (New York: Oxford Press, 1986).
82. A situation exacerbated by the fact that 90 percent of the state's land is owned by the federal government and the other 10 percent non-arable.
83. Further offsetting any perceived gains in symbolic capital from prohibition was the relative absence of "traditional" groups in Nevada who are on average more likely to view gambling as a vice. The state had the lowest percentage of church membership and of citizens born in the state; the highest percentage of 1 and 2 person households; and lacked a significant rural class. See, James W. Hulse, The Silver state: Nevada's heritage reinterpreted, (Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 296;
84. Jerome E. Edwards, "From Back alley to main street: Nevada's acceptance of gambling." Nevada Historical Society Quarterly 33/1 (1990): 16-27.
85. William R. Eadington, "The Casino gaming industry: A Study of political economy," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 474 (1984): 23-35;
86. Eugene Moehring, Resort city in the sunbelt: Las Vegas 1930-1970, (Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1989), 53.
87. Patrick C. Morris, "Termination by accountants: The Reagan Indian policy," Policy Studies Journal 16 (1988): 731-749.
88. In bingo multiple players pay an entry fee to then play against one another to be the first to form specific patterns on a card based upon a series of numbers and letters randomly drawn. The house collects a fee for each round of bingo played, thus making it a non-banked game.
89. According to P.L. 280, passed by Congress in 1953, the state of California does have jurisdiction over criminal violations on reservations, though none over civil matters. 59 The fact that the Supreme Court decided to hear the case in the first place was, according to the Tribe's lawyer in the case, a bad sign for the Tribe's chances of winning the appeal. An experienced court observer at the time told him the Tribe had "zero chance" of prevailing (Author Interview with Glenn Feldman, attorney for Cabazon Band, March 7, 2002).
90. California et al. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et al. No. 85-1708, Supreme Court of the United States. This point was made in relation to the civil/criminal jurisdictional distinction discussed above. The Court ruled that because California does allow bingo, gambling law in the state - at least concerning bingo - is regulatory/civil rather than penal/criminal in nature.
91. Roger Dunstan, "Indian gaming in California," (Sacramento, CA: California Research Bureau, 1999).
92. See for example The Citizen, Rosemary Northcott, "Jo'burg's Gambling Cold War Heats Up," September 20, 1977;
93. The Citizen, Jacky Lesage, "Police Take R1-M Haul in Gambling Den Raids," March 21, 1987.
94. State vs. Ibrahim Houssein, JHB 7.
95. Author Interview with former official in the South African Department of Justice, August, 2001. See also Sunday Times, Alan Greenblo, "Kerzner Unauthorized," October 26, 1997.
96. Sunday Times, Jocelyn Maker, "Sol Speaks Out as Casino War Reaches Climax," October 4, 1992.
97. M. A. Hendrickse, South African Parliamentary Debates (October 14, 1992).
98. Howard Commission Report on Gambling in South Africa, (Pretoria: Government Press, 1993), 110-112.
99. A rival casino's managing director complained of the Howard Report, "Sun International could end up with all ten licenses," while Sun's MD admitted, "The recommendations were very close to what SI proposed. . .We were pleased with the outcome;" see Sunday Times, Ciaran Ryan, "Casino Proposals Draw Fire from Kerzner's Rivals," October 12, 1993.
100. D.J. Dalling, South African Parliamentary Debates, (October 14, 1992);
101. N. A. Sisulu, South African Parliamentary Debates, (June 18, 1996).
102. Early in the hearings, Congress divided Tribal gaming into three classes. Class I consisted of traditional Tribal games played by Indians themselves and was to be subject to no outside regulation. Class II consisted of bingo style games such as those authorized under Cabazon, and were to be legal countrywide under a general set of federal regulations.
103. Historically the percentage of Nevada state revenue deriving directly from the casino industry has hovered around 60 percent. Unsurprisingly, scholarship on the state of Nevada has repeatedly remarked on the extent to which Nevada politicians act in the interests of the industry at the national level.
104. Reid [NV] US Senate Hearing 1987 100-341: 84; see also Vucanovich [NV] 1986 US House Debate; Rhodes [NV] 1988 US House Debate.
105. Herman Agoyo, chairman, All Indian Pueblo Council, S Hrg. 1987 100-341: 107.
106. Frenzel, 1988 House Debate H 8146.
107. Edward Webster and Glenn Adler, "Toward a class compromise in South Africa's 'double transition': Bargained liberalization and the consolidation of democracy. " Politics and Society 27/3 (1999), 347-385.
108. Howard Becker, Outsiders, 147.
109. Because of the large percentage of Nevada casino revenue deriving from Californians and large number of federally recognized Tribes in California (102, the most in the country), itwas assumed that if California Tribes were legally sanctioned to offer casino games, Nevada's casinos would take a major hit; see Bear-Stearns, Native American gaming in California: Nevada's biggest risk? (New York: Smith-Barney, 2000).
110. Dunstan, "Indian gaming in California." Though Nevada casino firms undoubtedly lauded Wilson's position, it does not appear that there were any formal connections between the two parties. As with the potential of earning revenue from Indian casinos, Wilson likely feared that accepting contributions from Nevada casinos would run him afoul of his conservative base.
111. The Wilson administration was by this point drawing heat from the state legislature for devoting so much money and manpower to the Indian gaming issue. Confident they would prevail in court, they saw the standstill agreement as a chance to conserve resources. See Dan Lundgren, Testimony before California Legislature Joint Hearing on Indian Gaming in California, Sacramento (November 29, 1993).
112. th Cir. 1994).
113. Author interview with Howard Dickstein, Attorney for Pala Band, (February 1, 2002).
114. In Connecticut, Tribes successfully argued that because state law allowed charities to operate small "Las Vegas Night" once a year, they could operate full-scale casinos. The state in turn negotiated a revenue sharing agreement with Tribes and by 1995 two of the world's largest casinos (the Pequot Foxwoods Casino and the Mohegan Sun Casino) were operating in Connecticut, producing hundreds of millions of dollars for the state government.
115. Michael Lombardi, "Long Road Traveled" (Sacramento: California Indian Gaming News, 2000).
116. Richard Maullin, "Passing California's Proposition 5," Campaigns and Elections, (February 1999).
117. Author Interview with Paul Mandabach, president, Winner/Wagner and Mandabach (Yes on 5 Campaign agency), (January 30, 2002).
118. Author interviewwith Gina Stassi, co-director of advertising firm in charge of No on 5 campaign (November 14, 2001).
119. For an elaboration of these key terms in the social movement literature on framing, see Timothy Kubal, "The Presentation of political self: Cultural resonance and the construction of collective action frames," The Sociological Quarterly 39 (1998): 539-554;
120. David E. Snow and Robert Benford, "Master frames and cycles of protest," in Frontiers in social movement theory (1992, edited by Morris and Mueller), 133-155;
121. Dawn McCaffrey and Jennifer Keys, "Competitive framing process in the abortion debate: Polarization-vilification, frame saving, and frame debunking," The Sociological Quarterly 41/1 (2000), 41-61;
122. Myra Marx Ferree and Frederick D. Miller, "Mobilization and meaning: Toward an integration of social movements," Sociological Inquiry 55 (1985), 38-61.
123. It would of course be incorrect to assume that promises made and symbolic framings disseminated during the course of a campaign are invariably translated into concrete policies. However, California's referendum process, in which specific proposals and policies are put in front of voters, contains considerably less "slack" for political actors to go back on their words than do, for instance, elections for political officers whose broad platforms may subsequently be transfigured or reinterpreted. Future studies of political action as capital conversion projects should consider the existence and efficacy of institutional mechanisms insuring exchanges of symbolic and material resources in the policy domain are replicated in the field.
124. Prop 5 received 63 percent of the votes cast. It should be pointed out too that we can see how the referendum process affected the structure of California's casino industry not just in comparison with South Africa, but with other US states as well. For instance, California's was the first state compact to establish a revenue sharing system for non-gaming Tribes, a provision added to the compact as a direct result of the controversy surrounding the "Mansions of San Manuel" advertisements.
125. Business Day (South Africa ed.), Edward West, "ANC shows its hand on gambling," February 28, 1994.
126. The only survey conducted during this period on public attitudes toward gambling found that only 10 percent of blacks and 4 percent of whites were "in favour of legalised gambling" in the new South Africa. See Human Sciences Research Council, "An Independent socio-economic assessment of the conditions and contents of Afrisun Mpumalanga's bid for a casino license in Mpumalanga," (Witbank, SA: Witbank Academics, 1996).
127. See Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to change: The Political economy of transformation, (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1998), ch. 4.
128. Author interview with former official in the South African Department of Justice.
129. For a detailed description of the use of the commission during apartheid see, Adam Ashforth, The Politics of official discourse in South Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 3;
130. T.R.H. Davenport, The Transfer of power in South Africa, (Cape Town: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 73. Bourdieu makes the same point in general concerning "this strange institution called a commission": consisting of "a set of individuals vested with a mission of general interest," they must "labor, if not to sacrifice their particular point of view on behalf of the 'point of view of society,' at least to constitute their point of view into a legitimate one, that is, as universal, especially through the rhetoric of the official;" "Rethinking the State," 20, italics in original.
131. Weekly Mail and Guardian, Hazel Friedman, "Russian Roulette and the RDP, " March 1, 1996.
132. Information in this paragraph derives from Author Interviews with Chris Fismer, former Deputy Minister of Justice, (July 17, 2002; November 5, 2002).
133. Author Interviews with Nic Wiehahn, (July 23, 2001; May 23, 2002). The three Commission members mentioned in this quote who helped with the research were trusted junior colleagues whom Wiehahn had worked with in the past. My interviews with each of these three revealed that they had been hand-picked by Wiehahn, and deferred to him on major decisions on policy. They today recall little about the report itself, in sharp contrast to Wiehahn himself who keeps several copies on his desk which he happily autographs and hands out to visitors.
134. S.A. Federation for Mental Health, representation to Wiehahn Commission (n.d.). For additional examples see submissions by S.A. Institute of Fundraising, Association of Racing Clubs of Southern Africa, Christian Reformed Church of Benoni, Community Chest of Durban.
135. Sun International, "Structuring the Gaming Industry in the Public Interest," submission to the Wiehahn Commission.
136. Pendant Casino Operators, South Africa, Submission to Wiehahn Commission (N.D.). See also submissions by Gaming Association of South Africa, Karos Hotels Ltd., Casino Club of Cape Town.
137. The Complete Wiehahn Report on Gambling in South Africa (hereafter WR), (Pretoria: State Press, 1996), 5.
138. WR (59-62). In adopting the rhetoric of pathological gambling the Wiehahn Report was introducing the concept, defined by the American Psychological Association in 1980, to South Africa for the first time. While this demonstrates the emergence of a new global discourse medicalizing social problems, it also shows how such global discourses can be appropriated and used by national elites for their own ends. Thus, in the United States, casino firms and pro-gambling politicians initially resisted the rhetoric of pathological gambling out of concern that it could be used by gamblers to achieve legal relief from their gambling debts. In South Africa, the discourse of pathological gambling was embraced by state and corporate elites because of its potential to individualize the social effects of mass-gambling. See Alan F. Collins, "The Pathological gambler and the government of gambling," History of the Human Sciences 9 (1996): 69-100;
139. Brian Castellani, Pathological gambling: The Making of a medical problem, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000).
140. WR (63-64).
141. WR (196).
142. WR (203).
143. WR (68, 4).
144. WR (3, 75).
145. WR (95-97).
146. WR (101-103).
147. An executive manager with Sun explained to me the firm's opinion of the new gambling dispensation: "I'll put it to you this way, Wiehahn's a bastard, a lackey of the ANC. His calculations were horrible, the result of politics."
148. Statistics on industry and state revenues can be found in the South African National Gambling Board's Annual Reports, available online at: www.ngb.org.za.
149. See for example National Health Minister Skweyiya's statements in Business Report, Claire Keeton, "SA starts to count the cost of get-rich-quick epidemic," April 17, 2001;
150. Financial Mail "How the lottery pillages the poor for the lucky," October 4, 2002;
151. Congress of South African Trade Unions, "Gambling and the Lottery," Central council public resolution, December 7, 2001.
152. National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report (Washington, DC,1999).
153. See for example the symposium on the 9/11 Commission Report in Contemporary Sociology 34/2 (2004).
154. Rodney Benson, "Mapping Field Variation: Journalism in France and the United States, 85-112 in Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 86.
155. Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi and Eleanor R. Townsley, Making Capitalism without capitalists: Class formation and elite struggles in post-communist Central Europe, (New York: Verso, 1998);
156. Michele Lamont, Money, morals and manners: The Culture of the French and American upper-middle class, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992);
157. Benson, Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field.
158. Eyal et al. do examine how individuals shuffled their portfolios of various capitals during and following the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Such conversions, however, occurred at the individual-level and during times of social upheaval; we instead document capital conversion at the institutional level and during "normal times."