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Volumn 36, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 167-189

Mind and method in the history of ideas

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EID: 33749333596     PISSN: 00182656     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0018-2656.00009     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (39)

References (47)
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    • I presented an earlier version of the first part of this essay to the 1995 Political Thought Conference at New College, Oxford. I thank those present for their helpful comments
    • I presented an earlier version of the first part of this essay to the 1995 Political Thought Conference at New College, Oxford. I thank those present for their helpful comments.
  • 3
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    • Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought
    • London
    • J. Pocock, "Languages and Their Implications: The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought," in Politics, Language and Time (London, 1972), 25.
    • (1972) Politics, Language and Time , pp. 25
    • Pocock, J.1
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    • Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas
    • J. Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas," in Politics, Language and Time, 202-232.
    • Politics, Language and Time , pp. 202-232
    • Pocock, J.1
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    • The Political Economy of Burke's Analysis of the French Revolution
    • J. Pocock, "The Political Economy of Burke's Analysis of the French Revolution," in Virtue, Commerce and History, 193-212.
    • Virtue, Commerce and History , pp. 193-212
    • Pocock, J.1
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    • The Individual and Society
    • Against the weak thesis, see M. Bevir, "The Individual and Society," Political Studies 44 (1996), 102-114.
    • (1996) Political Studies , vol.44 , pp. 102-114
    • Bevir, M.1
  • 8
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    • Conventions and the Understanding of Speech-acts
    • See, in particular, Q. Skinner, "Conventions and the Understanding of Speech-acts," Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1970), 118-138;
    • (1970) Philosophical Quarterly , vol.20 , pp. 118-138
    • Skinner, Q.1
  • 9
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    • Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions
    • My difficulty with Skinner concerns the way his use of Austin entails sliding from premises applying to mind conceived in one way to a conclusion applying to mind conceived in another way. I do not think the confusion is present in Austin's work
    • and Q. Skinner, "On Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions," Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1971), 1-21. My difficulty with Skinner concerns the way his use of Austin entails sliding from premises applying to mind conceived in one way to a conclusion applying to mind conceived in another way. I do not think the confusion is present in Austin's work.
    • (1971) Philosophical Quarterly , vol.21 , pp. 1-21
    • Skinner, Q.1
  • 11
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    • ed. J. Tully Cambridge, Eng., Insofar as Skinner looks on the languages in which illocutionary intentions are expressed as social conventions, he ends up with a method resembling Pocock's. However, I think the proximity of the two usually is overstated. Skinner's emphasis on intentions has no real echo in Pocock's work, and the contexts that interest him are debates in which authors make moves, not languages that define what authors can say
    • Q. Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and Interpretation," in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. J. Tully (Cambridge, Eng., 1988), 77. Insofar as Skinner looks on the languages in which illocutionary intentions are expressed as social conventions, he ends up with a method resembling Pocock's. However, I think the proximity of the two usually is overstated. Skinner's emphasis on intentions has no real echo in Pocock's work, and the contexts that interest him are debates in which authors make moves, not languages that define what authors can say.
    • (1988) Motives, Intentions and Interpretation , pp. 77
    • Skinner, Q.1
  • 12
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    • Some philosophers define intentions to include beliefs and desires on the grounds that we intend to act in a way we believe will lead to the fulfillment of a desire. Skinner's illocutionary intentions are not like this. He defines an illocutionary intention as the point of an action in contrast to its meaning, that is, as a belief or desire embedded within it that points back to a reason for performing it in contrast to the beliefs that channel the reason in a particular direction
    • Some philosophers define intentions to include beliefs and desires on the grounds that we intend to act in a way we believe will lead to the fulfillment of a desire. Skinner's illocutionary intentions are not like this. He defines an illocutionary intention as the point of an action in contrast to its meaning, that is, as a belief or desire embedded within it that points back to a reason for performing it in contrast to the beliefs that channel the reason in a particular direction.
  • 13
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    • Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas
    • ed., Meaning and Context, 40 First published in History and Theory
    • Q. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in Tully, ed., Meaning and Context, 40. (First published in History and Theory 8 [1969], 3-53.)
    • (1969) Tully , vol.8 , pp. 3-53
    • Skinner, Q.1
  • 14
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    • Hobbes's Leviathan
    • Q. Skinner, "Hobbes's Leviathan," Historical Journal 7 (1964), 321-333.
    • (1964) Historical Journal , vol.7 , pp. 321-333
    • Skinner, Q.1
  • 16
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    • A Reply to My Critics
    • ed., Meaning and Context
    • Q. Skinner, "A Reply to My Critics," in Tully, ed., Meaning and Context, 258.
    • Tully , pp. 258
    • Skinner, Q.1
  • 22
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    • Two Dogmas of Empiricism
    • Cambridge, Mass.
    • Compare, in particular, W. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 20-46.
    • (1961) From A Logical Point of View , pp. 20-46
    • Quine, W.1
  • 23
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    • New York
    • The image of our beliefs as forming an interconnected web derives primarily from W. Quine and J. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York, 1970).
    • (1970) The Web of Belief
    • Quine, W.1    Ullian, J.2
  • 24
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    • ed. R. Rhees, transl. A. Kenny Oxford
    • For an early exposition of the notion of philosophy as the grammar of our concepts, see L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, transl. A. Kenny (Oxford, 1974).
    • (1974) Philosophical Grammar
    • Wittgenstein, L.1
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    • Analyticity and Apriority beyond Wittgenstein and Quine
    • Realism and Reason Cambridge, Eng.
    • On Wittgenstein in relation to Quine's critique of analyticity, see H. Putnam, "Analyticity and Apriority Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine," in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3: Realism and Reason (Cambridge, Eng., 1983), 115-138;
    • (1983) Philosophical Papers , vol.3 , pp. 115-138
    • Putnam, H.1
  • 27
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    • Cambridge, Mass, For a defense of the ineliminable and sufficient nature of folk psychology
    • See, for example, S. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1983). For a defense of the ineliminable and sufficient nature of folk psychology.
    • (1983) From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science
    • Stich, S.1
  • 29
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    • Some philosophers prefer the term pro-attitude to that of desire because they think desires are just one of several possible bases for our preferences and so motives
    • Some philosophers prefer the term pro-attitude to that of desire because they think desires are just one of several possible bases for our preferences and so motives.
  • 30
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    • Actions, Reasons, and Causes
    • Oxford
    • See D. Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980), 3-19.
    • (1980) Essays on Actions and Events , pp. 3-19
    • Davidson, D.1
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    • Oxford
    • I am following Skinner in defining intention in a way indebted to G. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, 1957).
    • (1957) Intention
    • Anscombe, G.1
  • 32
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    • Objectivity in History
    • For two recent, rather different ways of doing so, see M. Bevir, "Objectivity in History," History and Theory 33 (1994), 328-344;
    • (1994) History and Theory , vol.33 , pp. 328-344
    • Bevir, M.1
  • 33
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    • Objectivity and Rationality
    • ed. W. Natter, et at. New York
    • and T. Schatzki, "Objectivity and Rationality," in Objectivity and its Other, ed. W. Natter, et at. (New York, 1995), 137-160.
    • (1995) Objectivity and Its Other , pp. 137-160
    • Schatzki, T.1
  • 34
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    • Oxford
    • The idea of conceptual priority as a norm governing ascriptions of belief is a familiar one to philosophers who have used it to defend not only the weak notion of coherence for which I am arguing but also notions of objective rationality, truth, and the like. Compare the accounts of radical interpretation in D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1984);
    • (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
    • Davidson, D.1
  • 36
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    • The importance of a concern with consistency has been stressed even by philosophers who deny that logical truths are given as self-evident
    • The importance of a concern with consistency has been stressed even by philosophers who deny that logical truths are given as self-evident.
  • 37
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    • Quine, Richard Rorty argues that a restricted concept of rationality as consistency has no real content since everyone can meet it
    • See Quine, Word and Object, 59. Richard Rorty argues that a restricted concept of rationality as consistency has no real content since everyone can meet it.
    • Word and Object , pp. 59
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    • Princeton, However, even if Rorty is right, his argument shows only that a restricted concept of rationality has no place in the evaluation of beliefs, not that it has no place in the interpretation of beliefs
    • R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979), 174. However, even if Rorty is right, his argument shows only that a restricted concept of rationality has no place in the evaluation of beliefs, not that it has no place in the interpretation of beliefs.
    • (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , pp. 174
    • Rorty, R.1
  • 39
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    • Davidson
    • On the place of a concept of rationality in the criteria of application for the concepts of folk psychology, see Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes."
    • Actions, Reasons, and Causes
  • 40
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    • It is possible that some of our desires are so integral to our identity that people would consider us unreasonable if we changed them for no reason, but this certainly is not true of all of them
    • It is possible that some of our desires are so integral to our identity that people would consider us unreasonable if we changed them for no reason, but this certainly is not true of all of them.
  • 41
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    • Skinner, particularly
    • Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," particularly 38-43.
    • Meaning and Understanding , pp. 38-43
  • 42
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    • The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enquiry
    • (second series), ed. P. Laslett and W. Runciman Oxford
    • J. Pocock, "The History of Political Thought: A Methodological Enquiry," in Philosophy, Politics and Society (second series), ed. P. Laslett and W. Runciman (Oxford, 1972), 190.
    • (1972) Philosophy, Politics and Society , pp. 190
    • Pocock, J.1
  • 43
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    • Pocock I address my comments on positivism exclusively to Pocock because I do not think Skinner would respond to my critique in a positivist manner. For an attempt to condemn Skinner as a positivist
    • Pocock, "History of Political Thought," 186. I address my comments on positivism exclusively to Pocock because I do not think Skinner would respond to my critique in a positivist manner. For an attempt to condemn Skinner as a positivist
    • History of Political Thought , pp. 186
  • 44
    • 27144460301 scopus 로고
    • The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology
    • see B. Parekh and R. Berki, "The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology," Journal of the History of'Ideas 34 (1973), 163-184. For Skinner's justified surprise at the charge.
    • (1973) Journal of the History of'Ideas , vol.34 , pp. 163-184
    • Parekh, B.1    Berki, R.2


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