The individual and society

Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 102-114

  Bevir, Mark ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030093420     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00759.x     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. A useful introduction to the structuralists and their successors is J. Merquior, From Prague to Paris (London, Verso, 1986). On their relevance to literary theory see J. Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
2. A useful introduction to the structuralists and their successors is J. Merquior, From Prague to Paris (London, Verso, 1986). On their relevance to literary theory see J. Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
3. A useful introduction to this debate is S. Mulhall and A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992).
4. cf C. Taylor, 'Cross-purposes: the liberal-communitarian debate' in N. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 159-82.
5. The difficulty of deciding questions of interpretation is indicated by S. Caney, 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate', Political Studies, 40 (1992), 273-89.
6. Because our interest is in the philosophical, conceptual relationship between the individual and society, our account of their mutual dependence differs in kind from those of social scientists who have constructed more empirical theories of their entwinement: e.g. A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, Polity, 1984).
7. Perhaps this is what communitarians are getting at when they characterize their work as 'philosophical anthropology' - cf. M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 50 - although their critics rightly have noted a degree of confusion here - cf. Caney, 'Liberalism and communitarianism'.
8. Perhaps this is what communitarians are getting at when they characterize their work as 'philosophical anthropology' - cf. M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 50 - although their critics rightly have noted a degree of confusion here - cf. Caney, 'Liberalism and communitarianism'.
9. Here we side with structuralists in their rejection of the existential freedom preached by J.-P. Sartre (H. Barnes, trans.) Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London, Methuen, 1957); and with communitarians in their rejection of the disembodied subjects behind the veil of ignorance in J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon, 1972); and with them both in their concern to relate their opposition to Sartre and Rawls to a general critique of a tradition of liberal individualism deriving from Kant's ideal of pure reason and Hobbes' and Locke's use of a state of nature.
10. Here we side with structuralists in their rejection of the existential freedom preached by J.-P. Sartre (H. Barnes, trans.) Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London, Methuen, 1957); and with communitarians in their rejection of the disembodied subjects behind the veil of ignorance in J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon, 1972); and with them both in their concern to relate their opposition to Sartre and Rawls to a general critique of a tradition of liberal individualism deriving from Kant's ideal of pure reason and Hobbes' and Locke's use of a state of nature.
11. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970); W. Quine, 'Two dogmas of empiricism' in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1961). pp. 20-46; D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon, 1984); and D. Lewis, 'Radical interpretation' in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 108-118.
12. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970); W. Quine, 'Two dogmas of empiricism' in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1961). pp. 20-46; D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon, 1984); and D. Lewis, 'Radical interpretation' in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 108-118.
13. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970); W. Quine, 'Two dogmas of empiricism' in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1961). pp. 20-46; D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon, 1984); and D. Lewis, 'Radical interpretation' in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 108-118.
14. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970); W. Quine, 'Two dogmas of empiricism' in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1961). pp. 20-46; D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon, 1984); and D. Lewis, 'Radical interpretation' in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 108-118.
15. Here we distance ourselves from the structuralists' rejection of authors in favour of epistemes in M. Foucault, 'What is an author?' in D. Bouchard (ed. and intro.), D. Bouchard and S. Sherry (trans.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 113-38: and M. Foucault (A. Sheridan Smith, trans.) The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon, 1972); and from the communitarian view of individuals as constituted by their communities in Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
16. Here we distance ourselves from the structuralists' rejection of authors in favour of epistemes in M. Foucault, 'What is an author?' in D. Bouchard (ed. and intro.), D. Bouchard and S. Sherry (trans.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 113-38: and M. Foucault (A. Sheridan Smith, trans.) The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon, 1972); and from the communitarian view of individuals as constituted by their communities in Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
17. Here we distance ourselves from the structuralists' rejection of authors in favour of epistemes in M. Foucault, 'What is an author?' in D. Bouchard (ed. and intro.), D. Bouchard and S. Sherry (trans.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 113-38: and M. Foucault (A. Sheridan Smith, trans.) The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon, 1972); and from the communitarian view of individuals as constituted by their communities in Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
18. This partial defence of the metaphysics of liberal individualism contrasts with two popular responses to communitarianism. The first emphasizes the extent to which the metaphysics of liberal individualism can sustain aspects of a communitarian politics: e.g. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989). The second argues we should adopt a liberal politics irrespective of our metaphysics: e.g. C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). Neither of these responses has as its main focus that metaphysical critique of liberal individualism which is the crux of communitarianism in so far as the communitarians themselves recognize it does not lead straightforwardly to a particular politics: cf. Taylor, 'Cross-purposes'.
19. This partial defence of the metaphysics of liberal individualism contrasts with two popular responses to communitarianism. The first emphasizes the extent to which the metaphysics of liberal individualism can sustain aspects of a communitarian politics: e.g. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989). The second argues we should adopt a liberal politics irrespective of our metaphysics: e.g. C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). Neither of these responses has as its main focus that metaphysical critique of liberal individualism which is the crux of communitarianism in so far as the communitarians themselves recognize it does not lead straightforwardly to a particular politics: cf. Taylor, 'Cross-purposes'.
20. This partial defence of the metaphysics of liberal individualism contrasts with two popular responses to communitarianism. The first emphasizes the extent to which the metaphysics of liberal individualism can sustain aspects of a communitarian politics: e.g. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989). The second argues we should adopt a liberal politics irrespective of our metaphysics: e.g. C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). Neither of these responses has as its main focus that metaphysical critique of liberal individualism which is the crux of communitarianism in so far as the communitarians themselves recognize it does not lead straightforwardly to a particular politics: cf. Taylor, 'Cross-purposes'.
21. See M. Foucault, The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London, Tavistock, 1970). Here Foucault shows - or rather purports to show - that everyone in a given episteme has ideas in common. This does not allow him to conclude - as he seems to think - that the ideas of individuals are mere products of epistemes. If there is an undecided space in front of the episteme, we must refer to individuals to explain how they fill this space.
22. For a defence of this argument see M. Bevir, 'Objectivity in history', History and Theory 33(1994), 328-44.
23. On the dependence of translation on some shared beliefs see W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1960); and Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.
24. On the dependence of translation on some shared beliefs see W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1960); and Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.
25. This is what is right in Foucault's suggestion that a change of episteme might lead to 'man' (our concept of an individual) being 'erased': Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 387. However, to allow Foucault this much is neither to accept our existing set of concepts is arbitrary, and so our view of the relationship of the individual to society irrational, nor that we have any reason to think a change of episteme immanent, and so to endorse his apocalyptic tone.
26. See particulary M. Foucault, 'The subject and power', afterword to H. Drefus and P. Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 208-26; and M. Foucault (A. Sheridan Smith, trans.) Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (London, Tavistock, 1977).
27. See particulary M. Foucault, 'The subject and power', afterword to H. Drefus and P. Rainbow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 208-26; and M. Foucault (A. Sheridan Smith, trans.) Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (London, Tavistock, 1977).
28. The classic defence of a closely related view of rights is T. H. Green, 'Lectures on the principles of political obligation' in R. Nettleship (ed.), The Works of Thomas Hill Green, 3 Vols (London, Longmans, 1885-1888), Vol. 2, Philosophical Works.
29. Green defended a closely related view of the common good: see T. H. Green (A. Bradley, ed.), Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford, Clarendon, 1884).