Political allocation of US agriculture disaster payments in the 1990s

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 143-161

  Garrett, Thomas A ^a   Marsh, Thomas L ^b   Marshall, Maria I ^c  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agriculture; Congressional dominance; Disaster relief; Public choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749149706     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2006.08.006     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Abler D. Vote trading on farm legislation in the U.S. house. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71 (1989) 583-591
2. Anderson G., and Tollison R. Congressional influence and patterns of new deal spending, 1933-1939. Journal of Law and Economics 34 (1991) 161-175
3. Becker G. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (1983) 371-400
4. Brooks J., Cameron C., and Carter C. Political action committee contributions and U.S. congressional voting on sugar legislation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80 (1998) 441-454
5. Buchanan J., and Tullock G. The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy (1962), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
6. Bullock D. The countercyclicity of government transfers: A political pressure group approach. Review of Agricultural Economics 16 (1994) 93-102
7. Bullock, D., & Coggins, J. (2001). Do farmers receive huge government transfers in return for small lobbying efforts? Towards explaining the persistence and small rent dissipation of U.S. agricultural policy. Working paper, University of Illinois Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics.
8. Bullock, D., & Rutstrom, E. (2001). The size of the prize: Testing rent-dissipation when transfer quantity is endogenous. Working paper, University of Illinois Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics.
9. Couch, J., & Shughart II, W. (1997). The Political Economy of the New Deal. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar.
10. Faith R., Leavens D., and Tollison R. Antitrust pork barrel. Journal of Law and Economics 25 (1982) 329-342
11. Gardner B. Causes of farm commodity programs. Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987) 290-310
12. Gardner B. Crop insurance in U.S. farm policy. In: Heuth D.L., and Furtan W.H. (Eds). Economics of agriculture crop insurance: Theory and evidence (1994), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
13. Garrett T., and Sobel R. The political economy of FEMA disaster payments. Economic Inquiry 46 (2003) 496-509
14. Goodwin B., and Smith V. The economics of crop insurance and disaster aid (1995), The AEI Press, Washington, D.C.
15. Heckman J. Dummy endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system. Econometrica 46 (1978) 931-959
16. Kau, J., & Rubin, P. (1982). Congressmen, constituents, and contributors. Martinus Nijhoff, Boston.
17. Krueger A. The political economy of the rent seeking society. American Economic Review 64 (1974) 291-303
18. Lee H., Harwood J., and Somwaru A. Implications of disaster assistance reform for non-insured crops. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79 (1997) 419-429
19. Marsh, T. L., & Mittelhammer, R. C. (2003). "Generalized maximum entropy estimation of spatial autoregressive models", paper for advances in econometrics: Spatial and spatiotemporal econometrics, Louisiana State University.
20. Moe T. An assessment of the positive theory of congressional dominance. Legislative Studies Quarterly 12 (1987) 472-520
21. Schmitz A., Furtan H., and Baylis K. Agricultural policy, agribusiness, and rent seeking behaviour (2002), University of Toronoto Press, Toronto
22. Schmitz A., Just R., and Furtan H. Crop insurance in the context of Canadian and U.S. farm programs. In: Heuth D., and Furtan W. (Eds). Economics of agriculture crop insurance: Theory and evidence (1994), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
23. Smith R., and Blundell R. An exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply. Econometrica 54 (1986) 679-685
24. Tullock G. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (1967) 224-232
25. U.S. Department of Agriculture. (2003, February). Agricultural assistance act of 2003. Fact Sheet, Farm Service Agency, Washington, D.C.
26. U.S. General Accounting Office. (1989). Disaster assistance: Crop insurance can provide assistance more effectively than other programs. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives. GAO/RCED-89-211, Washington, D.C.
27. Weingast B., and Marshall W. Organization of congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy 96 (1988) 132-163
28. Williams J., Carriker G., Barnaby A., and Harper J. Crop insurance and disaster assistance designs for wheat and grain sorghum. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (1993) 435-447
29. Wright G. The political economy of new deal spending. Review of Economics and Statistics 56 (1974) 30-58
30. Wright B., and Hewitt J. All-risk crop insurance: Lessons from theory and experienc. In: Heuth D., and Furtan W. (Eds). Economics of agriculture crop insurance: Theory and evidence (1994), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston
31. Young M., Reksulak M., and Shughart II W.F. The political economy of the IRS. Economics and Politics 13 (2001) 201-220