Institutional failure in resource management

Annual Review of Anthropology

Volumn 35, Issue , 2006, Pages 117-134

  Acheson, James M ^a  

^a University of Maine   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Conservation rules; Devising institutions; Natural resources; Rational choice

Indexed keywords

CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT; INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT; NATURAL RESOURCE; RATIONALIZATION; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SUSTAINABILITY;

EID: 33748703808     PISSN: 00846570     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123238     Document Type: Review

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