Governance structure changes and product market competition: Evidence from U.S. electric utility deregulation

Journal of Business

Volumn 79, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 1989-2017

  Rennie, Craig G ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748546944     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/503654     Document Type: Article

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