Corporate self-policing and the environment

Criminology

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 671-708

  Stretesky, Paul B ^a  

^a Veterinary Dentistry and Oral Surgery   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate crime; Corporate environmental behavior; Effectiveness of government interventions; Pollution prevention; Self regulation; Voluntary initiatives

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748333331     PISSN: 00111384     EISSN: 17459125     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.2006.00060.x     Document Type: Article

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