Panel data analysis of regulatory factors shaping environmental performance

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 391-401

  Earnhart, Dietrich ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842533388     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003465304323023895     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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