Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law

Journal of Conflict and Security Law

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 201-237

  Turns, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 33748111937     PISSN: 14677954     EISSN: 14677962     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jcsl/krl010     Document Type: Article

References (204)

1. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005).
2. Although a notable omission is the law of belligerent occupation.
3. For a general overview of the scope and ambit of the whole work, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 'Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict', (2005) 87(857) IRRC 175.
4. Ibid., 177.
5. See Iain Scobbie, 'Poisoned Chalice or Another Pictet', to be published in a future issue of this journal.
6. See Robert Cryer, 'Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study', published elsewhere in this issue of the journal, fn. 10 and cases cited therein.
7. See Bin Cheng, 'United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" Customary Law?', (1965) 5 Indian JIL 23.
8. The ICJ's 'classic' statement is contained in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Rep. 1969, 3.
9. Although, for an argument that these strict requirements are 'loosened' in the particular context of international humanitarian law by the Martens Clause's references to 'laws of humanity' and 'dictates of the public conscience', see Antonio Cassese, International Law (2005) 160-161.
10. David Turns, 'At the "Vanishing Point" of International Humanitarian Law: Methods and Means of Warfare in Non-international Armed Conflicts', (2002) 45 German YIL 115.
11. For a hard-hitting critique along these lines, as to both the general methodology of the Study and its specific results in relation to incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons and exploding bullets, see W. Hays Parks, 'The ICRC Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment', (2005) 99 ASIL Proc. 208.
12. Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2004) 61.
13. See below, text to fnn. 36-48.
14. During the American Civil War, Federal Major-General William T. Sherman, describing the Confederate use of mines in Georgia in December 1864 as 'not war, but murder', ordered the use of Confederate prisoners of war to clear them: See Mark E. Neely Jr., 'Was the Civil War a Total War?', (2004) 50 Civil War Hist. 434, 442-443.
15. This was the case, for example, with the German first use of chlorine gas on the Western Front in the First World War, at the 2nd Battle of Ypres in April 1915; within a short period of time, the British and French armies were also using poison gas. The Marquess of Lansdowne stated, 'We have all read the ghastly accounts of the results produced by the use of these gases upon our troops, and much as in our hearts we must abhor resort to such expedients I think we shall most of us be agreed that it would be impossible for us to allow our Army to be destroyed by such agencies as these without ourselves resorting to suitable reprisals': The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), 5th Series - Vol. XVIII, House of Lords, 18 May 1915, Col. 1023.
16. E.g. the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, reprinted at 25 AJIL Supp. 94 (1931), developed in reaction to the extensive use of poison gas by both sides during the First World War. Two exceptions are Protocols I and IV to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (1342 UNTS 137), which respectively prohibit the use of 'any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays' and blinding laser weapons. To date, no military forces are known to be in possession of or developing such weapons.
17. Although Article 36 of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1125 UNTS 3) requires States parties to undertake the 'study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon' contingent upon the latter's compatibility with the rules and principles of international humanitarian law; see Justin McClelland, 'The review of weapons in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I', (2003) 85(850) IRRC 397.
18. On landmines, see below, Section 3.2.7. On the US reaction to the Confederate use of torpedo boats, which US Rear Admiral John Dahlgren considered a weapon 'not recognized by civilized nations', see Raimondo Luraghi, A History of the Confederate Navy (1996) 263.
19. See below, Sections 3.1.2 (on cluster bombs) and 3.2.3 (on white phosphorus).
20. Study, Rule 72.
21. Ibid., Rule 73.
22. Ibid., Rules 74-76.
23. Ibid., Rule 77.
24. Ibid., Rule 78.
25. Ibid., Rule 79.
26. Ibid., Rule 80.
27. Ibid., Rules 81-83.
28. Ibid., Rules 84-85.
29. Ibid., Rule 86.
30. This form of words is found, mutatis mutandis, in each Rule throughout the Study.
31. Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. 1996, 226.
32. Study, vol. I, chapter 22. See below, Section 4.
33. See Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2000) 133-135.
34. ICC Statute (37 ILM 999), art. 8(2)(b)(xvii).
35. Ibid., art. 8(2)(b)(xviii).
36. Ibid., art. 8(2)(b)(xix).
37. See below, Section 3.2.3.
38. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, see fn. 8, p. 41.
39. Ibid., p. 42.
40. Ibid., p. 25.
41. Ibid., p. 42.
42. See, in the specific context of the evolution of customary law on the prohibition of the enlistment of child soldiers, The Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber Decision on preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction (child recruitment), 31 May 2004, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson.
43. Study, Vol. I, xxxii-xxxix.
44. Ibid., xxxvii.
45. To be fair to the Study, it should be noted that this statement can be partly justified by reference to the ICJ itself in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep. 1986, 14, at para. 186. However, the Court was there referring to situations where a state 'defends its [inconsistent] conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself', whereas in the law of weaponry States have often defended their conduct in using a particular weapon by claiming that it falls outside the scope of the relevant rule altogether.
46. Study, vol. I, xxxix.
47. For the orthodox statement of the persistent objector principle, see the Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Rep. 1950, 266 at 277-278.
48. But see Cassese, op. cit., fn. 8, pp. 162-163.
49. See The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic et al, Case No.IT-95-16-T, ICTY Trial Chamber II, Judgment of 14 January 2000, paras 515-520.
50. Study, vol. I, xxxix.
51. Ibid.
52. See Hays Parks, loc. cit., fn. 10
53. Are American Interests Being Disserved by the International Committee of the Red Cross?, US Senate Republican Committee Policy Paper, 13 June 2005, at: .
54. Rule 70 prohibits the use of methods and means of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; Rule 71 prohibits the use of weapons that by their nature are indiscriminate. See below, Section 3.1.
55. Rules 1-24 of the Study cover the principle of distinction, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack.
56. Dinstein, op. cit., fn. 11, pp. 61-62.
57. See above, text to fn. 9.
58. 75 UNTS 31.
59. (1977) 16 ILM 1442.
60. See above fn. 15; hereinafter 'CCW'.
61. Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, 105 ILR 419, at 516.
62. Turns, loc. cit., fn. 9, p. 128.
63. Tadić, loc. cit., fn. 56, p. 519 (emphasis added). These remarks by the ICTY Appeals Chamber only serve to reinforce the view expressed by Dinstein, op. cit., fn. 11.
64. Cryer, loc. cit., fn. 6. Of course, international law does not have a rigid system of stare decisis and obiter dicta as such, but the sense of Cryer's point is absolutely correct.
65. This was an important issue in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, see above fn. 30.
66. A similar conclusion has been suggested, for example, in relation to the exercise of universal jurisdiction: See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 2002, 3, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para. 45.
67. See The Lotus Case (France v Turkey), PCIJ, Series A, No.10, 1927, at 28.
68. ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xx). Note also that this provision applies only in respect of international armed conflicts.
69. In Physicians for Human Rights v O.C. Southern Command (HCJ 8990/02, 27 April 2003), the Supreme Court of Israel, Sitting as the High Court of Justice, in its decision on a petition to ban the use of flechette shells by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in operations in the Gaza Strip, stated: 'As the use of such artillery is not prohibited by international conventions, we cannot grant [the] petition' (at 4). The decision - and, apparently, the petitioners' arguments - made no reference at all to any relevant rule of customary international law. See below, Section 3.1.2.
70. Study, Vol. I, pp. 237-244.
71. Reprinted at 1 AJIL Supp. 95 (1907).
72. Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1908) 2 AJIL Supp. 90, art. 23(e).
73. The Trial of the German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal (1946), Part 22, 467.
74. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, loc. cit., fn. 30, para. 78.
75. Ibid.
76. See UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004), 6§.6.
77. For a more equivocal view of serrated bayonets, see Parks, loc. cit., fn. 10, 212.
78. Study, Vol. I, pp. 243-244.
79. See above, fn. 58.
80. Namely, the 1980 CCW (see above, fn. 15; as extended in scope of application by the amendment to its Article 1 in 2001), the 1996 Amended Protocol II thereto (35 ILM 1209) and the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (36 ILM 1507).
81. Study, Vol. I, p. 239.
82. See also ibid., vol. II, Part I, chapter 20 7§.
83. Ibid., vol. I, p. 240.
84. Ibid., pp. 241-242.
85. It is worth noting that while the English version of the Hague Regulations uses these two phrases, 'superfluous injury' and 'unnecessary suffering', the original (and authoritative) French version of the same text uses a single formulation: 'maux superflus'. See Dinstein, op. cit., fn. 11, p. 58.
86. Study, Rule 71. See below, Section 3.1.2.
87. UK Manual, op. cit., fn. 71, 6§.1.2.
88. Dinstein, op. cit., fn. 11, p. 60.
89. Study, vol. I, p. 241.
90. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 244-250.
91. ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
92. UK Manual, op. cit., fn. 71, 2§.5.1 n. 10.
93. Michael Bothe, 'War Crimes' in Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. I, (2002) 408.
94. Study, vol. I, p. 244.
95. Ibid., Rules 11-13.
96. Turns, loc. cit., fn. 9, p. 145.
97. Dinstein, op. cit., fn. 11.
98. Loc. cit., fn. 30, para. 57.
99. Loc. cit., fn. 64, 3.
100. Ibid.
101. Trial Chamber I, Decision in Rule 61 Proceedings, 8 March 1996, 108 ILR 39, at 47.
102. Ibid., 50-52.
103. See The Independent, 21 November 2005; Hugh Beach, Cluster Bombs: A Case for Banning? (International Security Information Service, Briefing Paper No. 79, February 2001), available at .
104. See House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 14th Report: Lessons of Kosovo (24 October 2000) HC 347-I, paras 147-150. The Committee referred to the reputation of cluster bombs as indiscriminate weapons, although this view is not shared by the British Ministry of Defence.
105. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (8 June 2000) 39 ILM 1257, at 1264.
106. See below, Section 3.2.7.
107. Final Report, fn. 98.
108. Hansard (HC Debs) 29 October 2001, vol. 373, Col. 623.
109. Ibid., 3 April 2003, vol. 402, Col. 1075.
110. Ibid., 31 March 2003, Col. 657.
111. Hansard (HL Debs) 3 April 2003, vol. 646, Cols. 1468-1469.
112. Hansard (HC Debs) 31 March 2003, vol. 402, Cols. 663-664.
113. Proposition de loi complétant la loi du 3 janvier 1933 relative à la fabrication, au commerce et au port des armes et au commerce des munitions, en ce qui concerne l'interdiction des sous-munitions, original text (1 April 2005) in Sénat de Belgique, Document législatif no 3-1152/1; adopted and submitted for royal assent on 16 February 2006, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, DOC 51 1935/ 009. Note that the original text referred specifically to the prohibition of 'bombes à fragmentation' (cluster bombs) and the broader term 'sous-munitions' (submunitions) was substituted at the recommendation of the Belgian Ministry of Defence: See Sénat de Belgique - Jeudi 7 juillet 2005 - Séance du matin - Annales 3-122/p. 27.
114. Sénat de Belgique, Document législatif no 3-1152/1.
115. Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la défense nationale (10 février 2006) DOC 51 1935/ 007, p. 42.
116. Sénat de Belgique - Jeudi 7 juillet 2005 - Séance du matin - Annales 3-122/p. 31.
117. See Partial Award on Ethiopia's Claim 2 - Central Front, 28 April 2004, paras 101-113, at para. 110.
118. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863, reprinted in Dietrich Schindler & Jiři Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (1988) 3.
119. 1 AJIL Supp. 157 (1907).
120. See fn. 15.
121. See Green, op. cit., fn. 32, p. 142.
122. See John Keegan, The First World War (1998) 213-215
123. Rolf-Dieter Müller, 'Total War as a Result of New Weapons? The Use of Chemical Agents in World War I', in Roger Chickering & Stig Förster (eds.), Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (2000) 95.
124. Ibid., p. 97.
125. See The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), 5th Series - vol. LXXI, House of Commons, 4 May 1915, Col. 951
126. ibid., Vol. XVIII, House of Lords, 18 May 1915, Col. 1018.
127. The first British use of poison gas on the Western Front was at Loos, on 25 September 1915: Müller, loc. cit., fn. 115, p. 98.
128. Field-Marshal French, Despatch VII to Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, 15 June 1915, reprinted in The Despatches of Lord French (Chapman & Hall, 1917), 359-360.
129. Interestingly, initial attitudes on the German side must have been similar, to the extent that the commanders of all the German armies on the Western Front balked at being the first to use chlorine gas, except that of the 4th Army, which was positioned at the Ypres Salient: Müller, loc. cit., fn. 115, p. 97.
130. Study, Vol. I, p. 251.
131. Ibid.
132. ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xvii).
133. See Turns, loc. cit., fn. 9, pp. 135-136.
134. Sydney Morning Herald, 24 June 2003.
135. Study, vol. I, p. 252.
136. Convention on Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons (1972) 1015 UNTS 164.
137. On which see below, Section 3.2.3.
138. Of the parties to the 1925 Protocol, only Angola and Israel have not signed up to the BWC and continue to maintain their 'no first use' reservations: Study, vol. I, p. 256.
139. The UK has withdrawn its reservation since ratifying the BWC: UK Manual, op. cit., fn. 71, §st1.27.1-1.27.2; also 6§.5 n.8.
140. Study, vol. I, p. 257.
141. This criticism is also applicable to the Rules dealing with chemical weapons and landmines.
142. Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) 32 ILM 804.
143. Study, Vol. I, p. 260.
144. ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xviii). Note that the Study is quite incorrect in its assertion that the ICC Statute bans chemical weapons as such, without any reference to the terms of the Gas Protocol: It does not. There were proposals at the Rome Conference to include the use of chemical weapons as a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC: Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Addendum (14 April 1998), UN Doc. A/ CONF.183/2/Add.1, pp. 18-20.
145. However, political tensions over nuclear weapons intervened (e.g. the statement of the Cuban delegate in Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (vol. II), p. 166), thus chemical and biological weapons provisions were dropped.
146. The elements of the war crime contained in Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) state that, 'Nothing in this element shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law with respect to the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons': Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum Part II, Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes (2 November 2000), UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, p. 32, n.48.
147. BBC News, 16 November 2005, . For detailed analysis, see David P Fidler, 'The Use of White Phosphorus Munitions by U.S. Military Forces in Iraq', ASIL Insight, 6 December 2005, available at: .
148. Hansard (HC Debs) 18 January 2006, Vol. 441, Col. 1327W.
149. The UK Manual considers WP under the rubric of incendiary, rather than chemical, weapons, and states that it should not be used directly against personnel or in any case where it would cause unnecessary suffering, but may be used to set fire to fuel and ammunition dumps or to create smoke: Op. cit., fn. 71, 6§.12.6. On incendiary weapons generally, see below, Section 3.2.8.
150. CCW, above, fn. 15.
151. Study, vol. I, p. 261.
152. Ibid., vol. II, Part I, chapter 24, 2§56.
153. Ibid., vol. I, 263-264; vol. II, Part I, chapter 24, §st534-548. Examples of such use would include the control of rioting prisoners of war, reduction of civilian casualties where civilians are being used as human shields, 'secure missions in remotely isolated areas' and protection of convoys in rear echelon areas outside the immediate zone of combat operations: Executive Order 11,850 - Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 8 April 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 16187.
154. On the Moscow theatre crisis, see Turns, loc. cit., fn. 9, pp. 136-137
155. David P Fidler, 'The Meaning of Moscow: "Non-Lethal Weapons" and International Law in the Early 21st Century', (2005) 87(859) IRRC 525.
156. Study, vol. I, p. 266. An American court has held that herbicides were not prohibited in either international customary or treaty law at the time of the Vietnam War: In re 'Agent Orange' Product Liability Litigation (MDL No.381, 04-CV-400), United States District Court, Eastern District of New York: Memorandum, Order and Judgment of 10 March 2005, available at .
157. Study, vol. I, p. 267.
158. Ibid., Vol. II, Part I, chapter 24, §st606-610. After the Vietnam War, the US renounced 'as a matter of national policy' (not as a matter of international law) first use of herbicides in war, but reserved the right to use them 'under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within US bases and installations or around their immediate defense perimeters': Executive Order 11, 850, loc. cit., fn. 139.
159. Study, vol. I, p. 269 (US)
160. vol. II, Part I, chapter 25, §st31-32 (UK).
161. See Green, op. cit., fn. 32, pp. 134-135.
162. See above, fn. 66.
163. Study, vol. I, pp. 272-273.
164. Ibid., vol. II, Part I, chapter 26, §st34-36.
165. The Study notes that Protocol I was adopted 'without any controversy': ibid., vol. I, 275.
166. See Turns, loc. cit., fn. 9, pp. 125-126
167. Louis Maresca, 'Second Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons', (2002) 84(845) IRRC 255. However, it should be noted that to date only 44 States parties have accepted the Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW.
168. See Cheng, loc. cit., fn. 7.
169. The ICRC website currently lists ninety-seven States parties to Protocol I: . The same source has been used for the numbers of States parties cited for other Protocols to the CCW in this article.
170. (1996) 35 ILM 1209.
171. On which see Green, op. cit., fn. 32, pp. 145-146.
172. Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines (1997) 36 ILM 1507.
173. Report to US Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 4 May 1862, in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (US War Department, 1884), Series 1, vol. 11 (Part III): 135.
174. Assistant Adjutant-General G. Moxley Sorrel, Despatch to Brigadier-General Rains, 11 May 1862, in ibid., p. 509.
175. Rains to Sorrel, in ibid., p. 510.
176. In justifying the use of mines to his immediate superior, Rains referred to their effectiveness in covering his troops' withdrawal (thereby protecting sick and wounded stragglers at the rear of the Confederate column) and also implied that they were a suitable reprisal for the bombardment of Yorktown by Federal gunboats: Rains to Major-General D. H. Hill, 14 May 1862, in ibid., pp. 516-517.
177. Ibid., p. 510.
178. Randolph, ibid.
179. Interestingly, Randolph's last comment is borne out in that there was never any corresponding claim that the Confederate use of mines in naval warfare was unlawful: See Rear Admiral Dahlgren, Report No. 16, 13 January 1864, in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion (US Government Printing Office, 1921), Series 2, vol. 1, pp. 238-239.
180. Partial Award on Ethiopia's Claim 2 - Central Front, above fn. 110, para. 95.
181. Study, vol. I, p. 282.
182. This approach would bring landmines within the orbit of the ICJ's general findings in its Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above, fn. 30.
183. See above, Section 3.1.2.
184. There are a number of significant dissenting States: The People's Republic of China and Russia have the world's largest arsenals of landmines and consider their use lawful, while India and Pakistan both maintain extensive minefields along their disputed border, as does South Korea along the Demilitarised Zone with North Korea. The current US policy on landmines is that they are 'a needed military capability... Landmines still have a valid and essential role protecting United States forces in military operations': See Back in Business? U.S. Landmine Production and Exports (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, August 2005), 4, n.12.
185. Loc. cit., fn. 110, para. 24 (emphasis added).
186. Study, vol. I, pp. 284-285.
187. Ibid., p. 285.
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid., p. 288.
190. Op. cit., fn. 71, §st6.12-6.12.1 (footnote omitted, emphasis added)
191. Jordan and the Soviet Union both condemned the alleged use of napalm by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War: Study, vol. II, Part I, chapter 30, §st201 & 204 respectively. Incendiary weapons were also allegedly used in the non-international armed conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia during the 1990s: Ibid., §st214-215.
192. 35 ILM 1217.
193. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, fn. 8, p. 44.
194. Op. cit., fn. 71, 6§.15.
195. Study, vol. II, Part I, chapter 31, §st49-53.
196. Ibid., vol. I, p. 255.
197. Loc. cit., fn. 30, p. 226.
198. For criticism of the Advisory Opinion, see Nicholas Grief, 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons', (1997) 46 ICLQ 681
199. Marcelo G. Kohen, 'L'avis consultatif de la CIJ sur la Licéité de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires et la fonction judiciaire', (1997) 8 EJIL 337.
200. See
201. also .
202. Readers may note that the present author's tongue is in his cheek. For comments on a similarly unsuccessful weapon (the No 74 ST Grenade or 'sticky grenade', developed by the British Army in 1940, again with the intention of use against German tanks although its adhesive coating more usually enabled it to stick to the hand of the soldier attempting to throw it), see .
203. Study, vol. I, xi.
204. E.g. in the UK, the CWC is incorporated by the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, the Ottawa Convention by the Landmines Act 1998. On this see Peter Rowe, 'The Effect on National Law of the Humanitarian Law Study', elsewhere in this issue of the journal.