Profit maximization, industry structure, and competition: A critique of neoclassical theory

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

Volumn 370, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 81-85

  Keen, Steve ^a   Standish, Russell ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Competition; Cournot Nash game theory; Microeconomics; Monopoly; Oligopoly; Profit maximization

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; MARKETING;

COURNOT-NASH GAME THEORY; MICROECONOMICS; MONOPOLY; OLIGOPOLY; PROFIT MAXIMIZATION;

COMPETITION;

EID: 33747341623     PISSN: 03784371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2006.04.032     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Mas-Colell A., Whinston M.D., and Green J.R. Microeconomics (1995), Oxford University Press, New York
2. Stigler G. Perfect competition historically contemplated. J. Polit. Econ. 65 (1957) 1-19
3. Vega-Redondo F. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65 (1997) 375-384
4. Blinder A.S., Canetti E., Lebow D., and Rudd J. Asking About Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness (1998), Russell Sage Foundation, New York
5. Keen S. Deregulator: judgment day for microeconomics. Utilities Policy 12 (2004) 109-125
6. R.K. Standish, S. Keen, Emergent effective collusion in an economy of perfectly rational competitors, in: Stonier et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th Asia-Pacific Conference on Complex Systems, Cairns, arXiv:nlin.AO/0411006, 2004, p. 228.