Equilibrium price dispersion, mergers and synergies: An experimental investigation of differentiated product competition

International Journal of the Economics of Business

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 169-194

  Davis, Douglas D ^a   Wilson, Bart J ^b  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust analysis; Differentiated products; Experimental economics; Synergies

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746842679     PISSN: 13571516     EISSN: 14661829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13571510600783922     Document Type: Article

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