Strategic interactions, market information and predicting the effects of mergers in differentiated product markets

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 9, 2002, Pages 1277-1312

  Davis, Douglas D ^a  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust analysis; Differentiated products; Experimental economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 31244435797     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(01)00086-8     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Crooke, P., Froeb, L., Tschantz, S., Werden, G., 1999. Effects of assumed demand form on simulated post-merger equilibria. Review of Industrial Organization 15, 205-217.
2. Davis, D., 1999. Advance production and Coumot outcomes: An experimental investigation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 40, 59-79.
3. Davis, D., Wilson, B., 2000. Differentiated product competition and the Antitrust Logit Model: An experimental analysis, manuscript, Virginia Commonwealth University.
4. Deneckere, R., Davidson, C., 1985. Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition. Rand Journal of Economics 16, 473-486.
5. Eaton, C., Lipsey, R., 1989. Product differentiation. In: Schmalensee, R., Willig. R. (Eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 723-768.
6. Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 1990. Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review 80, 107-126.
7. Froeb, L. 1994, Antitrust website (http://www.antiturst.org).
8. Froeb, L., Tardiff, T., Werden, G., 1998. The Demsetz postulate and the welfare effects of mergers in differentiated products industries. In: McChesney, F. (Ed.), Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs: The Role of Economics in Modern Antitrust. Wiley, London.
9. Froeb, L., Tschantz, S., 2000. How much information is required to accurately predict merger effects? Manuscript, Vanderbilt University.
10. Froeb, L., Werden, G., 1996. Simulating the effects of mergers among noncooperative oligopolists. In: Varian, Hal (Ed.), Computational Economics and Finanace: Modelling With Mathematica. Springer, New York.
11. García-Gallego, A., Georgantzís, N., 2001. Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 493-518.
12. Huck, S., Normann, H., Oechssler, J., 2000. Does Information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets? International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 39-57.
13. Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., 1991. Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior 3, 82-100.
14. Noussiar, C., Robin, S., Ruffieux, B., 1998. The effects of transaction costs on double auction markets. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 36, 221-233.
15. Noussair, C., Plott, C., Riezman, R., 1995. An experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade. American Economic Review 85, 462-491.
16. Newey, W., West, K., 1987. A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica 55, 703-708.
17. Rassenti, S., Reynolds, S., Smith, V., Szidarovszky, F., 2000. Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated experimental Cournot games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 41, 117-146.
18. Rhode, P., Stegeman, M., 2001. Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with application to duopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 415-453.
19. Vega-Redondo, F., 1997. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375-384.
20. Wellford, C., 1990. Horizontal mergers: Policy and performance, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona.
21. Werden, G., Froeb, L., 1996. Simulation as an alternative to structural merger policy in differentiated products industries. In: Coate, M., Kleit, A. (Eds.), The Economics of the Antitrust Process, Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series. Kluwer, New York, pp. 65-88.
22. Werden, G., Froeb, L., 1994. The effects of mergers in differentiated products industries: Logit demand and merger policy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10, 407-426.