Licensing a new product with non-linear contracts

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 932-947

  Erutku, Can ^a   Richelle, Yves ^b  

^a Economic Policy and Enforcement Branch   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

D45

Indexed keywords

INNOVATION; TECHNOLOGY;

EID: 33746665850     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: 15405982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2006.00376.x     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Anand, Bharat N., and Tarun Khanna (2000) 'The structure of licensing contracts,'Journal of Industrial Economics 48, 103-35
2. Erutku, Can, and Yves Richelle. 'Optimal licensing contract and the value of a patent,' Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, forthcoming
3. Kamien, Morton I. (1992) 'Patent licensing,'in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 1, ed. R. Aumann and S. Hart (Amsterdam: North-Holland)
4. Kamien, Morton I., and Yair Tauman (1984) 'The private value of a patent: A game theoretic analysis,'Journal of Economics (Supplement) 4, 93-118
5. Kamien, Morton I., and Yair Tauman (1986) 'Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent,'Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 471-91
6. Rostocker, Michael D. (1983) 'PTC research report: A survey of corporate licensing,' IDEA - The Journal of Law and Technology 24, 59-92
7. Segal, Ilya (1999) 'Contracting with externalities,'Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 337-88