Does parallel behavior provide some evidence of collusion?

Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-102

  Buccirossi, Paolo ^a  

^a LEAR Laboratorio di Economia   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746601292     PISSN: 15555879     EISSN: 15555879     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1027     Document Type: Article

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