The decision to begin talks with terrorists: Lessons for policymakers

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 29, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 403-414

  Byman, Daniel ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33746586519     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100600703996     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. This article does not address either the more tactical question of how to negotiate with terroultimate end of a conflict, although of course the latter issue is addressed in the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of initiating a dialogue.rists during a crisis (such as a hostage taking) or the broader question of when talks lead to the advantages and disadvantages of initiating a dialogue.
2. For interesting works on this subject, see Peter C. Sederberg, "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy," Journal of Peace Research, 32(3) (1995), pp. 295-312. This article does not look at talks with terrorists as part of a limited negotiation, such as during a hostage crisis. For a review of such issues, see R. Reuben Miller, "Negotiating with Terrorists: A Comparative Analysis of Three Cases," Terrorism and Political Violence, 5(3) (Autumn 1993), pp. 78-105.
3. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 85.
4. Kristen Sparre, "Megaphone Diplomacy in the Northern Irish Peace Process: Squaring the Circle by Talking to Terrorists through Journalists," The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 6 (1) (Winter 2001), pp. 88-104.
5. Ibid., pp. 97-99.
6. William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), pp. 369-372.
7. Ibid., pp. 367-368.
8. Ewen MacAskill, "UK ponders taking with Hamas and Hizbullah," Guardian, 20 May 2005. http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/ 0,2763,1488464,00.html
9. Louise Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," in Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds., Democracy and Terrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press), forthcoming 2006.
10. Robert Art and Louise Richardson, "Introduction," in Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds., Democracy and Terrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Peace Press), forthcoming 2006.
11. Stevenson, "Northern Ireland."
12. Martha Crenshaw notes that these are two primary reasons that terrorist groups decline. See Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism Research and Public Policy, 3(1) (Spring 1991), pp. 69-87 and Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends," USIP Special Report, 25 May 1999.
13. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 86.
14. Jonathan Stevenson, "Northern Ireland: Treating Terrorists as Statesmen," Foreign Policy no. 105 (Winter 1996-1997), electronic version http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?storyid= 1550&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyid=1550; Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," in Art and Richardson, eds, draft p. 37.
15. Steve Bruce, "Terrorists and Politics: The Case of Northern Ireland's Loyalist Paramilitaries," Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(2) (Summer 2001), p. 43.
16. Richardson, "Britain and the IRA".
17. Richardson, "Britain and the IRA".
18. Art and Richardson, Introduction.
19. Sara Roy, "Hamas and the Transformation of Political Islam in Palestine," Current History (January 2003), p. 17.
20. See Bruce Hoffman, "The Modern Terrorist Mindset," in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill, 2002), p. 93.
21. Richardson, "Britain and the IRA".
22. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, p. 86; Stevenson, "Northern Ireland."
23. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, p. 90.
24. Ibid., p. 90.
25. Ibid., p. 88.
26. Soderberg, p. 308.
27. Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security, 22(2) (Fall 1997), pp. 10-11.
28. Stevenson, "Northern Ireland."
29. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, pp. 88-90.
30. Stevenson, "Northern Ireland."
31. Stevenson, "Northern Ireland."
32. Ewen MacAskill, "UK ponders taking with Hamas and Hizbullah," Guardian, 20 May 2005. http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/ 0,2763,1488464,00.html
33. Jon Alterman, "How Terrorism Ends," USIP Special Report, 25 May 1999, p. 8.
34. Stevenson makes this point about the IRA as well. Stevenson, "Northern Ireland."
35. See I. William Zartman, "Negotiating with Terrorists," International Negotiation no. 8 (2003), pp. 443-450.
36. Soderberg, p. 306.
37. Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, "Political Parties and the Formation of Terrorist Groups," Terrorism and Political Violence, 2(2) (Summer 1990), p. 130.
38. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, pp. 90-91.
39. Richardson, "Britain and the IRA."
40. See Milton-Edwards and Crooke, "Elusive Ingredient," for a review on Hamas.
41. For a review, see Judith Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004) and Hala Jaber Hezbollah: Born With A Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
42. See Roy, "Hamas and the Transformation of Political Islam in Palestine."
43. For a review of Hamas' structure before the second intifada, see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela. The Palestinian HAMAS: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). In part this more decentralized structure was necessary due to Israeli counterterrorism measures, which made it dangerous for the organization to depend heavily on a few central leaders. Because Hezballah operated in Lebanon with more impunity than Hamas did in the Palestinian territories, it was less vulnerable to the constant threat of decapitation.