Central European between the EU and NATO

Survival

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 121-136

  Missiroli, Antonio ^a  

^a EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris   (France)

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EID: 33746479850     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330412331342496     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. For a tentative breakdown of their 'voluntary contributions' see Antonio Missiroli, 'EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP', European Integration, vol. 25, 2003, pp. 1-16.
2. On the actual military capabilities of the central Europeans see also Michael Quinlan, 'ESDP and EU Enlargement', in Esther Brimmer (ed.), The EU's Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS, 2002), pp. 23-34
3. and Timothy Edmunds, 'NATO and its New Members', Survival, vol. 45, no. 3, autumn 2003, pp. 145-166.
4. A similar outcome seemed to materialise in Poland, too, but in the end Lockheed Martin's F-16s got the contract. However, the Polish MoD is acquiring also eight C-295 light transport aircraft from EADS-CASA. For a comprehensive overview see Timo Behr, Albane Siwiecki, EU Enlargement and Armaments: Defence Industries and Markets of the Visegrad Countries, edited by Burkard Schmitt, Occasional Paper no. 54, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004.
5. According to the draft Constitutional Treaty (CT), a) 'enhanced cooperation' proper is just a generally enabling provision, which may be used only 'as a last resort' and on certain conditions (Articles I-43 and III-325 CT); b) 'a group of member states' may indeed be entrusted with 'the implementation of a task' under the authority and supervision of the whole Council (Article III-211 CT): Yet selective participation to operations is already a fact in both the EU and NATO; c) what is called 'structured permanent cooperation' on defence concerns, in principle, all member states, and the accession criteria look sufficiently flexible to allow for a large set of participants (Article III-213 CT); d) both the mutual defence clause (Article I-40 CT) and the solidarity clause (Articles I-42 and III-231 CT) apply to all EU members and do not threaten the primary role of NATO; e) the rotational presidency remains in place, if slightly modified, for all policy areas but foreign and defence policy, where the task of representing and coordinating the EU is assigned to the newly created 'Union Minister for Foreign Affairs', combining the roles currently played by the Commissioner for External Relations and the Council's High Representative for CFSP (Article I-39-40 CT). For a more detailed analysis see Antonio Missiroli, 'Mind the Steps: The Constitutional Treaty and Beyond', in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy - The First Five Years (1999-2004), EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, pp.145-154. It is also worth noting that all member states bar Denmark, which has made use of its exemption clause, are founding members of the newly established European Defence Agency based in Brussels.
6. See Anatol Lieven, Dmitri Trenin (eds.), Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003)
7. Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (London and New York, Routledge, 2004).
8. Cf. also Judy Batt et al., Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe, Chaillot Paper no. 64, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003.
9. It is also worth noting that on 3 September, in the immediate aftermath of the Beslan massacre, the Dutch EU presidency - that represents the entire Union - made a free comment before the press in which, along with a declaration of solidarity against terrorism, it said that the Russian side was expected to give further 'explanations' on the episode. The statement sparked a minor diplomatic crisis with Russia, which reacted angrily to the remark. Yet some nuances among EU governments could be spotted in the different capitals' reactions to the massacre; further nuances emerged a few days later, when President Putin announced his domestic reform plans: Cf. Judy Dempsey, 'EU divided in reaction to Putin's power play', International Herald Tribune, 15 September 2004.
10. See Judy Dempsey, 'Russia casts energy web over Eastern Europe', International Herald Tribune, 1 October 2004.
11. The decision - it was adopted at the end of September 2004 but still has to be ratified by the Duma - is mostly seen as part of a broader informal deal between the EU and Moscow, encompassing also the Union's eventual green light to Russian WTO membership in return for higher domestic gas prices. Signed in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol presently has 124 signatories, including all 25 EU members. However, it can come into effect only if ratified by countries responsible for at least 55% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. Russia alone accounts for 17% of global emissions and is crucial to reaching the threshold.
12. For a detailed overview see Maguy Day, 'CPI: L'autre offensive américaine', Le Monde-2, no. 32, 25 September 2004, pp. 24-25.
13. Cf. all the relevant documents in Antonio Missiroli (comp.), From Copenhagen to Brussels: European Defence - Core Documents, Chaillot Paper no. 67, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, pp. 343 ff.
14. Cf. the relevant documents in Missiroli, From Copenhagen to Brussels: European Defence - Core Documents, pp. 283 ff., 445 ff.
15. See Thomas Fuller, 'President of Poland "deceived" on Iraq', International Herald Tribune, 19 March 2004. In an interview to Gazeta Wyborcza published on 30 April 2004, however, Kwasniewski acknowledged that he should have rather said 'badly informed' - and not by American and British allies, but just by 'intelligence services'.
16. See Judy Dempsey, 'Poland unexpectedly says troops may quit Iraq in 2005', International Herald Tribune, 5 October 2004.
17. For an overview see Daniel Dombey, 'Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus, say surveys on world view', Financial Times, 9 September 2004.
18. See Marcin Zaborowski, David H. Dunn (eds.), Poland: A New Power in Transatlantic Security (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
19. Even less US-friendly responses were recorded from Slovakia: Cf. www.transatlantictrends.org.
20. See Heather Grabbe, 'The Constellations of Europe: How Enlargement Will Transform the EU', CER Pamphlet, London, April 2004.
21. In all eight central European countries turnout was well below the average in the old EU-15 (28% vs. 47%). Only in Lithuania - mainly thanks to the presidential elections held on the same day - did it attain 46%, followed by Latvia (41.2%) and Hungary (38.5%), while Slovakia (16.6%) recorded the lowest turnout throughout the Union, followed by Poland (20.4%). On top of that, in almost all countries the parties in office scored very poorly.
22. See Pal Dunay, 'Boxes: Why CFSP and ESDP Do Not Matter Much to EU Candidate Countries', Robert Schuman Centre Policy Paper no. 01/5, European University Institute, S.Domenico di Fiesole, 2001
23. Paul Luif (ed.), 'Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Problems, Perceptions, Policies', Laxenburg Papers no. 12, Vienna, 2001
24. and Franciszek Draus, 'L'Europe élargie peut-elle être un acteur international influent? Les PECO et les finalités politiques de l'intégration européenne', Etudes et Recherches, no. 32, Notre Europe, Paris, February 2004.