Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition

Naval Research Logistics

Volumn 53, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 448-463

  Gurnani, Haresh ^a   Xu, Yi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI   (United States)

Author keywords

Flexible pricing; Flexible quantity; Resale price maintenance; Retail competition; Sales effort; Supply contracts

Indexed keywords

FLEXIBLE PRICING; FLEXIBLE QUANTITY; RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE; RETAIL COMPETITION; SALES EFFORT; SUPPLY CONTRACTS;

CONSUMER PRODUCTS; COSTS; MAINTENANCE; MARKETING;

SALES;

EID: 33746343661     PISSN: 0894069X     EISSN: 15206750     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/nav.20152     Document Type: Article

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