An empirical analysis of failed intelligence reforms before September 11

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 121, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 33-60

  Zegart, Amy B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33746221930     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2006.tb00564.x     Document Type: Review

References (131)

1. and since then, forty separate reports have investigated and examined the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Intelligence." New York Times, 20 July 1948.
2. See for example Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to 9/11 (New York: Regnery, 2002);
3. John Miller, Chris Mitchell, and Michael Stone, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (New York: Hyperion, 2003);
4. Gerald L. Posner, Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11 (New York: Random House, 2003).
5. Richard Betts, "Fixing Intelligence," Foreign Affairs 81 (January/February 2002): 44.
6. See also Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1999).
7. James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations, 2nd ed. (London: Blackwell, 1993);
8. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993).
9. Howard Aldrich, Organizations Evolving (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 164.
10. James G. March, "Footnotes on Organizational Change," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (December 1981): 563.
11. Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change," American Sociological Review 49 (April 1984): 151.
12. March, "Footnotes," 563.
13. Samuel L. Berger, "Counterterrorism Policy," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, eighth public hearing, 24 March 2004, accessed at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/berger_statement.pdf, 16 April 2005.
14. Robert Gates, quoted in John H. Hedley, "The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix It?" Studies in Intelligence 39 (1996), accessed at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/hedley.htm, 16 April 2005.
15. According to The 9/11 Commission, national foreign intelligence program budgets declined every year between 1990 and 1996, and, with the exception of one large 1999 supplemental, remained basically flat between 1996 and 2000. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2004), 93.
16. U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence (hereafter, Joint Inquiry), Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter, Joint Inquiry Report), S. Rep. 107-351, H. Rep. 107-792, 107th Cong., 2d sess., December 2002: 254, 257.
17. J. Cofer Black, testimony before the Joint Inquiry, "9/11 Intelligence Investigation," 107th Cong., 2d sess., 26 September 2002.
18. J. Cofer Black, testimony before the Joint Inquiry, "9/11 Intelligence Investigation," 107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002. Ibid., 4.
19. The 9/11 Commission Report, 76.
20. This information was provided to the Joint Inquiry by former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger. See The 9/11 Commission Report, ibid., 12.
21. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat-Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 February 2002.
22. See in particular Thomas Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA" in The New York Review of Books, 17 January 2002, accessed at http://www.nybooks. com/articles/15109, 16 April 2005.
23. In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, April 2002.
24. George Tenet, "Activities of the Intelligence Community in Connection with the Attacks of September 11, 2001," testimony before a joint hearing of the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 October 2002.
25. Louis J. Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 13 April 2004, accessed at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ hearings/hearing10/freeh_statement.pdf, 16 April 2005.
26. Louis J. Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 2004, Ibid., 8.
27. March, "Footnotes," 563.
28. Hannan and Freeman, "Structural Inertia," 151.
29. In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, February 2004.
30. R. James Woolsey, "World Trouble Spots," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 103rd Cong., 2d sess., 25 January 1994;
31. R. James Woolsey, "World Threat Assessment Brief," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 10 January 1995;
32. John Deutch, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 22 February 1996;
33. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 6 February 1997;
34. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 105th Cong., 2d sess., 28 January 1998;
35. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 2 February 1999;
36. George Tenet, "Annual Assessment of Security Threats against the United States," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2 February 2000;
37. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 2001.
38. Eleanor Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," testimony before the Joint Inquiry, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 18 September 2002, 18.
39. Dale Watson, "9/11 Intelligence Investigations," testimony before a Joint Hearing of the House Select Intelligence Committee and Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 26 September 2002.
40. Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," 9.
41. Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," 9.Ibid.
42. J. Cofer Black, "Panel: Summer 2001," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 13 April 2004, accessed at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/ hearing10.htm, 30 August 2005, 4.
43. Samuel Berger, "Events Surrounding the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001," testimony before Panel II of a Joint Hearing of the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2002.
44. For a translated text of the fatwa, see www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ 980223-fatwa.htm, accessed 16 April 2005.
45. Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," 9.
46. The 9/11 Commission Report, 70.
47. Quotation from memo included in Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," 12.
48. Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I, 12. Ibid.
49. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 2 February 1999.
50. George Tenet, "Annual Assessment of Security Threats against the United States," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2 February 2000.
51. George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 2001.
52. In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, April 2002.
53. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees' Joint Inquiry noted that "knowledge of the DCI's declaration appears to have been limited ... . [M]any in the FBI had not heard of it. For example, the Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division testified to the Joint Inquiry that he 'was not specifically aware of that declaration of war.'" Joint Inquiry Report, 232;
54. see also The 9/11 Commission Report, 357.
55. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Draft FBI Strategic Plan: 1998-2003, Keeping Tomorrow Safe ("FBI Strategic Plan") unclassified version (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 8.
56. Quoted by Louis Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 13 April 2004.
57. Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," 4-6.
58. R. James Woolsey, remarks to American Bar Association, Washington DC, 29 April 1994.
59. President William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing the Second Term National Security Team and an Exchange with Reporters," 5 December 1996, in The 9/11 Commission Report, 101.
60. John P. O'Neill, remarks to National Strategy Forum, Chicago, IL, 11 June 1997, accessed at www.nationalstrategy.com/speakers/oneill.html, 16 April 2005.
61. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, 1 December 1997, accessed at http://http://www.fas.org/man/docs/ ndp/toc.htm, 16 April 2005;
62. William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, accessed at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr, 16 April 2005.
63. John McWethy, John Miller, and Ted Koppel, "One of America's Most Dangerous Enemies," ABC News Nightline, 10 June 1998.
64. President William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, United Nations," New York, N.Y., 21 September 1998, accessed at www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/ 980921_pres_terror.html, 20 January 2004.
65. William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," Washington Post, 26 July 1999.
66. President George W. Bush, "Defense: A Period of Consequences," remarks at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 23 September 1999;
67. George W. Bush, "Foreign Policy: A Distinctly American Internationalism," remarks at the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California, 19 November 1999.
68. President George W. Bush, "Foreign Policy: A Distinctly American Internationalism."
69. The 9/11 Commission Report, 198.
70. The 9/11 Commission Report, Ibid., 342. White House Counterterrorism Chief Richard Clarke and others argued that the Bush administration downgraded the priority given to terrorism. The 9/11 Commission's final report, however, underscored that neither the Clinton nor Bush Administrations gave the issue sufficient attention.
71. The commission reports are: Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence ("Aspin-Brown Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996);
72. National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism ("Bremer Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000);
73. Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Deutch Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999);
74. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, First Annual Report to The President and The Congress: Assessing the Threat ("1999 Gilmore Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999)
75. and Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress: Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism ("2000 Gilmore Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000);
76. United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change ("Hart-Rudman Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001);
77. Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement, Law Enforcement in a New Century and a Changing World: Improving the Administration of Federal Law Enforcement ("Webster Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000).
78. Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence ("CFR Report") (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996);
79. National Institute for Public Policy, Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century ("Odom Report") (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002;)
80. Twentieth Century Fund, In From the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence ("TCF Report") (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996).
81. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Draft FBI Strategic Plan: 1998-2003, Keeping Tomorrow Safe ("FBI Strategic Plan") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998);
82. National Performance Review, The Intelligence Community: Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993),
83. and National Performance Review Phase II Initiatives: An Intelligence Community Report ("National Performance Review 1995") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1995);
84. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century ("IC21") (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).
85. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Public Law 104-132, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (24 April 1996).
86. Hart-Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, 31 January 2001, accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/ threat/nssg.pdf, 30 August 2005, 83.
87. Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter, 1.
88. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study, IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Chapter 1, "Overview and Summary," 5.
89. IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, "Overview and Summary," Ibid., 7.
90. IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, "Overview and Summary," Ibid., 26.
91. IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, "Overview and Summary," Ibid., 28.
92. National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat, iv.
93. Countering the Changing Threat, Ibid., 13.
94. Gilmore Commission recommendations are from the panel's 1999 and 2000 reports. The Commission issued two reports after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that were not included in this analysis.
95. Amy Zegart, "Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions," Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (June 2004): 366.
96. For example, the National Performance Review recommended that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service reexamine its mission for a post-Cold War threat environment, and the FBI's 1998 Strategic Plan suggested that the FBI explore the feasibility of instituting a capability to exchange unclassified investigative material with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
97. Council on Foreign Relations Making Intelligence Smarter, 25.
98. The two exceptions were the Webster and Bremer Commissions.
99. National Performance Review, The Intelligence Community, 9.
100. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21, "Overview and Summary," 26.
101. Hart-Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security, 82.
102. These were the Webster and Deutch Commissions.
103. The Bremer and Gilmore Commissions recommended abolishing the guidelines. The Council on Foreign Relations task force and the Hart-Rudman Commission urged the CIA to review the guidelines and make recruiting clandestine assets one of the intelligence community's top priorities. For effects of the "scrub order," see Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: What Went Wrong," The New Yorker, 18 December 2001, accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011008fa_FACT, 16 April 2005.
104. National Performance Review, The Intelligence Community.
105. In a 2004 report, the House Intelligence Committee revealed that it had repeatedly criticized the CIA's human intelligence efforts and had recommended corrective action in classified annexes to its annual authorization bills years before September 11. The Committee noted, "After years of trying to convince, suggest, urge, entice, cajole, and pressure CIA to make wide-reaching changes in the way it conducts its HUMINT [human intelligence] mission,... CIA, in the committee's view, continues down a road leading over a proverbial cliff." House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005, H. Report 108-558, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 June 2004, 24.
106. National Institute for Public Policy, Modernizing Intelligence, 85-98.
107. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21, "Intelligence Community Management," 21.
108. Aspin-Brown Commission, Chapter 9, "The Need to 'Right-Size' and Rebuild the Community," in Preparing for the Twenty-first Century" 2-7.
109. The two exceptions were the Gilmore and Hart-Rudman Commissions.
110. Joint Inquiry Report, 43.
111. THe 9/11 Commission, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community," Staff Statement Number 11, 14 April 2004, 12.
112. 87 The 9/11 Commission Report, 357;
113. and Joint Inquiry Report, 236-237.
114. Joint Inquiry Report, 49.
115. The 9/11 Commission, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community," 9.
116. Joint Inquiry Report, 49.
117. The 9/11 Commission Report, 90.
118. Joint Inquiry Report, 265.
119. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: What Went Wrong."
120. In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, June 2004.
121. Editors, "Intelligence Gaps: America's Spy Network Needs a Quick Fix," San Diego Union Tribune, 22 April 2002.
122. Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA."
123. Joint Inquiry Report, xvi.
124. In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, January 2004.
125. For a more extensive discussion, see Amy B. Zegart, "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," International Security 29 (Spring 2005): 78-111.
126. Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000);
127. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
128. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1960).
129. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
130. Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
131. Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1989), 185-237.