General representation of epistemically optimal procedures

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 263-283

  Dietrich, Franz ^a,b  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745832339     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2     Document Type: Article

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