Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition - proof

Economics Letters

Volumn 60, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 157-162

  Peleg, Bezalel ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

C72; Coalition proof equilibria; Dominant strategies; Strategyproof mechanisms

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032345406     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00098-6     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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