Not only whether but whom: Three-party extended deterrence

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 562-583

  Quackenbush, Stephen L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Alliance reliability; Direct deterrence; Extended deterrence; Targeting decision

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745788586     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706290431     Document Type: Article

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