Alignment patterns, crisis bargaining, and extended deterrence: A game-theoretic analysis

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 587-615

  Zagare, Frank C ^a   Kilgour, D Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; CRISIS MANAGEMENT; GAME THEORY; SOCIAL THEORY;

EID: 0346901830     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00280.x     Document Type: Article

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