Critical rationalism and its failure to withstand critical scrutiny

Rationality and Reality

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 63-96

  Mayo, Deborah G ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33745487332     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-4207-8_5     Document Type: Chapter

References (38)

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6. Grünbaum, A. (1978) 'Popper vs. Inductivism', in Radnitzky and Andersson (eds.), Progress and Rationality in Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 58. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel, pp. 117-142.
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11. Mayo, D. G. (1997a) 'Duhem's Problem, The Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or 'What's Belief Got To Do With It'?' and 'Response to Howson and Laudan', Philosophy of Science, 64(2):222-24 and 323-33.
12. Mayo, D. G (1997b) 'Error Statistics and Learning from Error: Making a Virtue of Necessity', Philosophyof Science 64 (Proceedings) §195-212
13. Mayo, D. G. (2002a) 'Theory Testing, Statistical Methodology, and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge', Proceedings of the International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Press, pp. 171-190.
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28. Musgrave, A. (1999) Essays in Realism and Rationalism, (Chapter 16) Amersterdam: Rodopi; Atlanta, GA.
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