Small unit cohesion: The case of fighter squadron 3-V1.G.IV

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 33-54

  Boer, Peter C ^a  

^a Royal Netherlands Military Academy   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035568271     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0102800103     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. U.S. Army, Military Leadership, FM 22-100. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1983.
2. OLO Research Project, Royal Netherlands Military Academy, Breda, The Netherlands.
3. M. Spick, Allied Fighter Aces: The Air Combat Techniques of World War II (London and Mechanicsburg, PA: Greenhill, 1997), 16.
4. P. T. Bartone and F. R. Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership in Small Army Units," in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. R. Gal and A.D. Mangelsdorff (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley, 1991), 393-409.
5. OLO Research Project.
6. Bartone and Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership," 402.
7. For example, M. Reynolds, The Devil's Adjutant, 2nd ed. (Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, 1997) ch.1.
8. For example, W. F. Craven and H. L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes, vol. 6. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 601-602. British OTU training of pilots or aircrew lasted only 8-12 weeks but was followed by a squadron workup period of about 3 months when a completely new squadron was brought up to operational status. Dutch and NEI army air force experience consisted of the training of 18 NEI squadron with the RAAF in 1942, 322 (Dutch) squadron with the RAF in 1943, and flying echelons for 18 NEI, 119 Netherlands East Indies (NEI), and 120 NEI squadron Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in the United States in 1943-1944.
9. E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948): 297-299; R. A. Gabriel and P. L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill, 1978), 31-36; Bartone and Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership," 395.
10. E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948): 297-299; R. A. Gabriel and P. L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill, 1978), 31-36; Bartone and Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership," 395.
11. E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948): 297-299; R. A. Gabriel and P. L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill, 1978), 31-36; Bartone and Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership," 395.
12. Bartone and Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership," 395.
13. F. J. Manning, "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps," in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. R. Gal and A. D. Mangelsdorff (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: John Wiley, 1991), 461-465.
14. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," 287; A. L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization and Military Performance," in Handbook of Military Institutions (Beverly Hills, CA: R. W. Little, 1971), 293-316.
15. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," 287; A. L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization and Military Performance," in Handbook of Military Institutions (Beverly Hills, CA: R. W. Little, 1971), 293-316.
16. J. Soeters and P. C. Boer, "Culture and Flight Safety in Military Aviation," The International Journal of Aviation Psychology 10, 2 (2000): 111-133.
17. Manning, "Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps," 462.
18. Ibid., 463.
19. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," 297-299.
20. Bartone and Kirkland, "Optimal Leadership," 397.
21. P. C. Boer, De Luchtstrijd rond Borneo (Bussem, Netherlands: Van Holkema and Warendorf, 1987), 51 (not available in English); P. C. Boer, De Luchtstrijd om Nederlands Indie (Houten, Netherlands: Van Holkema and Warendorf, 1990), 8-12 (not available in English); interviews by the author with 12 former pilots and mechanics of the unit, 1984-1989.
22. P. C. Boer, De Luchtstrijd rond Borneo (Bussem, Netherlands: Van Holkema and Warendorf, 1987), 51 (not available in English); P. C. Boer, De Luchtstrijd om Nederlands Indie (Houten, Netherlands: Van Holkema and Warendorf, 1990), 8-12 (not available in English); interviews by the author with 12 former pilots and mechanics of the unit, 1984-1989.
23. Boer, Indie, 8-12, 66-75, 134-136.
24. Interviews by author with 12 former pilots and mechanics of the unit, 1984-1989.
25. Ibid.
26. Interviews by author with A. J. de Vries, P. J. Tideman, R. A. Sleeuw, and J. B. H. Bruinier, 1984-1989.
27. Ibid.
28. Interviews, Note 20.
29. Interviews, Note 22.
30. Boer, Indie, 36-37; interviews by author with A. J. de Vries and R. A. Sleeuw, 1984-1989.
31. Boer, Indie, 36-37; interviews by author with A. J. de Vries and R. A. Sleeuw, 1984-1989.
32. Boer, Borneo, 52-54, 223-224. The Dutch version of the Brewster model B-339 (F2A with the U.S. Navy), with a Wright Cyclone engine delivering 1.200 hp on take-off, was the fastest and most maneuverable built. In the NEI the aircraft were modified several times. They were equipped with reflector gunsights and the armament was cleared for the use of tracer ammunition.
33. Interviews, Note 20.
34. Ibid.
35. R. Wittert, Het Vergeten Squadron, Bussem (Netherlands), 1976, 70-71 (not available in English).
36. A. E. van Kempen, Mijn Verhaal, een verhaal uit vele rond de tweede wereldoorlog (1989), 43 (not available in English).
37. OLO Research Project; G. Yukl, Leadership in Organisations, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 372.
38. OLO Research Project; G. Yukl, Leadership in Organisations, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 372.
39. Royal Netherlands Air Force personnel files.
40. Interviews, Note 20, and Boer, Borneo, 39-40.