A simple graph-theoretic model for selfish restricted scheduling

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3828 LNCS, Issue , 2005, Pages 195-209

  Elsässer, Robert ^a   Gairing, Martin ^a   Lücking, Thomas ^a   Mavronicolas, Marios ^b   Monien, Burkhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS   (Cyprus)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COORDINATE MEASURING MACHINES; COSTS; GRAPH THEORY; MEASUREMENT THEORY; SCHEDULING; THEOREM PROVING;

BOUNDED INTERACTIONS; GRAPH-THEORETIC MODEL; NON-COOPERATIVE USERS; RESTRICTED SCHEDULING;

MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

EID: 33744927389     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11600930_20     Document Type: Conference Paper

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