The Impact of Bid Defences in Hostile Acquisitions

European Management Journal

Volumn 24, Issue 2-3, 2006, Pages 142-150

  Schoenberg, Richard ^a   Thornton, Daniel ^b  

^a CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b Merrill Lynch Securities   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bid premium; Executive departure; Hostile acquisitions; Takeover defences

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744905353     PISSN: 02632373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2006.03.004     Document Type: Article

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