Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 80, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 106-135

  Seki, Erika ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Alternating duopoly; Durable goods; Fisheries; Price discrimination; Rotation

Indexed keywords

FISHERY ECONOMICS; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; FISHING; MODEL; PRICE DETERMINATION;

EID: 33646409605     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.02.007     Document Type: Article

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