Building a republican peace stabilizing states after war

International Security

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 87-112

  Barnett, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33646395670     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.87     Document Type: Article

References (150)

1. In Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations Press, 2002), par, 21, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." Later, the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations refined the definition as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. There are now many definitions, some of which are interchangeable with postconflict reconstruction.
2. For a review of how different agencies conceptualize, operationalize, and prioritize postconflict activities, see Michael Barnett, David Kim, Madalene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, "Peacebuilding: What's in a Name?" Global Governance, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2007).
3. For general statements on postconflict reconstruction, see Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005);
4. Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, "State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction," Development and Change, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2002), pp. 753-774;
5. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnaham, "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to Statebuilding," Working Paper No. 253 (London: Overseas Development Institute, September 2005);
6. Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005);
7. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Making States Work: From State Failure to Statebuilding (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005);
8. and Charles T. Call with Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).
9. For various statements, see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001);
10. Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 134-147;
11. Center for Global Development, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2004);
12. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations Press, 2004), a report of the secretary-general's high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change;
13. and Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4 (July/August 2005), pp. 153-163.
14. This argument is most closely associated with Roland Paris. See his At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004);
15. Roland Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice,'" Review' of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 637-656;
16. and Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 54-89.
17. See also Oliver Richmond, "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2004), pp. 129-150;
18. Allen Lens, "From Peacekeeping to Peace-building: The United Nations and the Challenge of Intrastate War," in Richard Price and Mark Zacher, eds., The United Nations and Global Security (New York: Palgrave, 2004);
19. Jens Meierhenrich, "Forming States after Failure/' in Robert Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 155-156;
20. and International Peace Academy, "The Future of UN Statebuilding: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq," executive summary from a conference held in Tarrytown, New York, November 14-16, 2002.
21. Robert C. Orr, "The United States as Nation Builder," in Orr, ed., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Postconflict Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), p. 12.
22. Farced Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003);
23. and Paris, At War's End.
24. Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding."
25. Paris, At War's End;
26. Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur, Making States Work;
27. Call with Hawkins Wyeth, Building States to Build Peace;
28. and Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and Slalebuilding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
29. In this view, the first case of modern peacebuilding was the early United States, where the federalists invented new governance principles to confront the threats posed by factions and arbitrary power. For relevant discussions, see David Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002);
30. and Daniel Deudney "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, circa 1787-1961," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 191-228.
31. My focus on postconflict activities suggests that there is a sharp break between the conflict and postconflict phases. Yet in many cases, conflict continues to define the "postconflict" stage. In these instances, republican peacebuilding, like any peacebuilding, will face a high degree of difficulty because of the need for some stability.
32. Anthony Giddens, Sociology, 2d ed. (New York: Polity, 1993), p. 309.
33. On inclusionary versus exclusionary institutions, see David Waldner, State Building and Late Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
34. See also Michael Mann's related distinction between infrastructural and despotic power. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results," Archives Europa Sociologica, Vol. 25 (1984), p. 185.
35. For related arguments, see Paris, At War's End;
36. Orr, "The United States as Nation Builder," p. 11;
37. and Meierhenrich, "Forming States after Failure."
38. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (December 2000), p. 779;
39. and Page Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars," International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 97.
40. On the procedural and substantive dimensions of legitimacy, see Mark Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches," Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1995), p. 517.
41. Political theorists debate the differences between liberalism and republicanism, the critical divides, and even whether they might be merged into either a liberal republicanism or a republican liberalism. See Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997);
42. Quentin Skinner, "The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,"in Gisela Bok, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, eds., Machiavelli and Republicanism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 293-309;
43. and Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian Debate," in Nancy Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 159-182.
44. For overviews of republican political theory, see Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002);
45. Maurizio Viroli, "Machiavelli and the Republican Idea of Politics," in Bok, Skinner, and Viroli, Machiavelli and Republicanism, pp. 143-171;
46. Alan Patten, "The Republican Critique of Liberalism," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 1996), p. 25;
47. Skinner, "The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty";
48. Taylor, "Cross-Purposes";
49. Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 1984), p. 81;
50. Dagger, Civic Virtues;
51. and Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
52. Viroli, Republicanism, pp. 8, 11.
53. John Maynor, Republicanism in the Modern World (New York: Polity, 2003), p. 37;
54. and Viroli, Republicanism, p. 41.
55. Quoted in Cass Sunstein, "The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism," in Stephen Elkin and Karol Soltan, eds., A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 181.
56. Quoted in Viroli, Republicanism, p. 58.
57. Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3 (August 1987), p. 359;
58. and Bernard Manin, Elly Stein, and Jane Mansbridge, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3 (August 1987), p. 338.
59. Sunstein, "The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism," p. 176.
60. See also Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, p. 130.
61. The literature on deliberative democracy offers a conception of deliberation that is related to, but goes considerably beyond, what 1 have in mind. The strong claim is that it is both desirable and possible to construct a nearly idealized communicative setting in which diverse groups listen patiently to each other, are willing to change their positions, and can eliminate even the most intractable differences. See Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996);
62. James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997);
63. and James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett, eds., Debating Deliberative Democracy (Maiden, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 2003). Among the criticisms of deliberative democracy are that the conditions under which it presumably works are so restrictive that few marriages would measure up; dialogue can harden positions and inflame conflict; sometimes decisions must be made before everyone's views can be acknowledged; and the weapons used to win an argument include not only logic but also character assassination, dirty tricks, and strategic action.
64. See Ian Shapiro, "Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is About Interests and Power," in Stephen Macedo, ed., Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 28-38;
65. and James Johnson, "Arguing for Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations," in Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 161-184.
66. Sunstein, "The Enduring Legacy of Republicanism," p. 176. This view informs a distinctive meaning of corruption - the failure to subordinate private interests to public interests, and thus the desire to use politics for private gain.
67. James Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion," in Elster, Deliberative Democracy, p. 54;
68. Jon Elster, "Deliberation and Constitution Making," in Elster, Deliberative Democracy, p. 104;
69. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, pp. 188-190;
70. Thomas Christiano, "The Significance of Public Deliberation," in Bohman and Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, pp. 243-277;
71. and Shelley Burtt, "The Politics of Virtue Today: A Critique and a Proposal," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (June 1993), p. 361. Publicity is not always preferable to secrecy: individuals might be deterred from changing their minds or adopting more flexible positions if they believe that there is an audience that might judge them harshly; and politicians are infamous for outbidding each other by staking out extreme positions.
72. Maynor, Republicanism in the Modern World, p. 125;
73. and Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," p. 359.
74. Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation";
75. and Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, p. 169. Deliberation requires and is nearly synonymous with civic virtue. Recently, communitarians have pushed the concept of civic virtue in their desire to counteract the perceived decline of a sense of community. Although republicans agree that civic virtue is necessary for the development of community, their concept is more restrictive, related to the goal of minimizing arbitrary power, and increasing the ability of individuals to listen respectfully to the views of others and to appreciate how their actions affect society.
76. Maynor, Republicanism in the Modern World, p. 56.
77. Cass Sunstein, "Beyond the Republican Revival," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 97, No. 8 (June 1988), p. 1549;
78. and Frank Michelman, "Law's Republic," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 97, No. 8 (June 1988), p. 1528.
79. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992 (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990), p. 206.
80. Mark Peceny and William Stanley, "Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America," International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2001), p. 149.
81. Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., Security Sector Reform and Postconflict Peacebuilding (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006).
82. This applies not only to military but also to police forces. See Charles Call, "Police Reform and Political Reconciliation: The Case of El Salvador," workshop on democratization and internal security, MacArthur Consortium on International Peace and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, California, February 1996.
83. Summary of Conference and Workshop on the Political Economy of Governance Reform, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 23-24, 2004, hosted by the World Bank's Public Sector Governance Group and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (emphasis in original).
84. For national-level activities, see Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002).
85. For national and local activities, see the War-Torn Societies Project, http://www.wsp-international.org.
86. Republicanism also differs from liberalism on the issue of rights. Liberalism embraces the language of universal, natural rights, holding that because of their common humanity all individuals have basic human rights that are intended to protect their autonomy and dignity. Republicanism views rights as emerging from the local community. Accordingly, because different communities have different histories and deliberative processes, they are likely to have different conceptions of rights, different understanding of how these rights are connected to the good life, and different views of which institutions and informal norms are necessary to protect them. Although different communities might converge on a common conception of basic human rights, this comes from human agreement, not by baptism.
87. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (Cutchogue, N.Y.: Buccaneer, 1961), pp. 315-317,
88. cited in Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Bohman and Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, p. 89 n. 28.
89. Machiavelli, codex 5.59.5, quoted in Viroli, Republicanism, p. 4.
90. Viroli, Republicanism, Ibid., p. 6.
91. For a general review of issues concerning elections after conflict, see Benjamin Reilly, "Postconflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers," International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 118;
92. and Terrence Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
93. For the possibility of democracy among nondemocrats after conflict, see Leonard Wantchekon, "The Paradox of 'Warlord' Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 17-33. 40. The legitimacy of these unelected bodies is further complicated when they are established either in the presence of or by international peacebuilders, creating the local perception that international actors have profoundly shaped the composition of these bodies and thus compromising their legitimacy. This is one reason why peacebuilders are anxious to hold elections as quickly as possible.
94. Bonn, formally known as the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions," was brokered by the four major Afghan factions and thus fell far short of any measure of representativeness.
95. For discussions of the loya jirga, see Daud Saba and Omar Zakhilwal, Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities, Afghanistan National Human Development Report, 2004 (Islamabad: United Nations Development Program, 2005), pp. 124-127;
96. J. Alexander Thier and Jarat Chopra, "The Road Ahead: Political and Institutional Reconstruction in Afghanistan," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 5 (October 2002), pp. 893-907;
97. Antonio Giustozzi, "'Good' State vs. 'Bad' Warlords? A Critique of Statebuilding Strategies in Afghanistan," Working Paper Series No. 51 (London: Crisis States Programme, London School of Economics, October 2004);
98. and J. Alexander Thier, "The Politics of Peacebuilding Year One: From Bonn to Kabul," in Antonio Donini, Karin Wermester, and Norah Niland, eds., Nation Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace, and Justice in Afghanistan (Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian, 2004), pp. 39-60.
99. For a critical commentary, particularly on the centralization of power in the hands of a few cliques, see International Crisis Group (ICG), Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga, Asia Briefing No. 29 (Kabul/Brussels: ICG, December 12, 2003), p. 11;
100. and Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (New York: Zed, 2004), chaps. 7, 8.
101. For discussions on the lack of planning, see George Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005);
102. Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005);
103. and James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 293, No. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 53-74.
104. Diamond, Squandered Victory, pp. 28, 34-35, 37, 42.
105. Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., p. 246.
106. Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., pp. 79-80.
107. Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., p. 251.
108. Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., p. 255.
109. Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., especially p. 295.
110. Although Diamond is sympathetic with the charge that the first sin was the invasion, he nevertheless says that the United States might have recovered had it "asked the UN to assume the responsibility for organizing a national conference in July 2003 to choose an interim government; if, instead of sanctioning what became an Anglo-American occupation of Iraq, [UN Security Council] Resolution 1483 had provided for a transfer of authority (at least over most matters) to an Iraqi interim government, which would then have had international recognition, the political corner might have been turned." Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., p. 302.
111. These initial moves, moreover, might have either relieved the pressure by the Shia for elections or created a movement for holding local elections before national elections. Diamond, Squandered Victory, Ibid., p. 310.
112. These three elements draw from G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 30-31.
113. For discussions of how constitutions are akin to institutions that constrain actors, see Barry Weingast, "Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 149, No. 1 (1993), pp. 287-311.
114. For a discussion of power sharing, see Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, "Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy," in Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, pp. 29-50.
115. The literature on constitutionalism is increasingly attentive to the relationship between postconflict and transitional settings, on the one hand, and the most functional electoral design, on the other. See Andrew Reynolds, "Constitutional Medicine," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 2005), pp. 54-68;
116. and Benjamin Reilly, "Does the Choice of Electoral System Promote Democracy? The Gap between Theory and Reality," in Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, pp. 159-172.
117. Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, "Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Divided Societies," in Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, pp. 16-18.
118. Roeder contrasts power sharing with power dividing in ways consistent with republicanism's emphasis on divided power. Roeder, "Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing," in Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, pp. 51-82.
119. Neil Kritz, "Constitution-Making Process: Lesson for Iraq," testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Constitutionalism, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law in Iraq, June 25, 2003, http://www.usip.org/aboutus/congress/testimony/2003/0625_kritz.htm;
120. Devra Moehler, "Public Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda" paper presented at Cornell Social Science Seminar, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, November 2003;
121. and Vivien Hart, "Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict," Peace and Change, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 153-176.
122. Kritz, "Constitution-Making Process."
123. Saba and Zakhilwal, Security with a Human Face, pp. 127-130.
124. ICG, Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, Policy Briefing No. 19 (Amman/Brussels: ICG, September 26, 2005), p. 1.
125. See also Nathan Brown, "Iraq's Constitutional Process Plunges Ahead," Policy Outlook series (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2005).
126. Diamond, Squandered Victory, chap. 7;
127. and Jonathan Morrow, Iraq's Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost, Special Report No. 155 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, November 2005).
128. For a discussion of the relationship between the constitution process and the prospects of postconflict stability and democracy in Liberia, see Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
129. For statements on how the local institutions and informal norms and rules limit what peacebuilders can accomplish, see Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004);
130. and Christopher Coyne, "The Institutional Prerequisites for Postconflict Reconstruction," Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 18, Nos. 3/4 (December 2005), pp. 325-342.
131. ICG, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States," Africa Report No. 87 (Dakar/Brussels: ICG, December 8,2004), pp. 21-22. The Accra accords of 2003 and the Lomé agreement of 1999, which ended the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars, respectively, might have rewarded and encouraged thuggery.
132. For a discussion of aid as leverage, see James Boyce, Investing in Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
133. Nicholas Wood, "Can an Iron Fist Put Power in Bosnia's Hands?" New York Times, November 5, 2005.
134. Although various authors advocate a greater role for a more permanent international presence, they have failed to consider adequately the restraints on power. See, for instance, Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 85-120;
135. and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 5-43.
136. Chesterman, You, the People, pp. 128-134;
137. and Wood, "Can an Iron Fist Put Power in Bosnia's Hands?"
138. In a report on Liberia and Sierra Leone, the International Crisis Group writes that peace builders possess an "operational checklist" that does not recognize the underlying political dynamics. ICG, "Liberia and Sierra Leone,"
139. Albert Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
140. For a related discussion of Peter Evans's concept of "institutional monocropping," see Evans, "Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation," Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 30-53.
141. Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 69.
142. Diamond, Squandered Victory.
143. Chesterman, You, the People, pp. 135-143.
144. See also Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 27-40.
145. Larry Diamond, "Lessons from Iraq," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 2005), p. 15;
146. and Chesterman, You, the People, p. 153.
147. Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 297.
148. Chesterman, You, the People.
149. Feldman, What We Owe Iraq, pp. 66-68.
150. Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1959), pp. 79-88.