Russia's debate on military-technological cooperation with China: From Yeltsin to Putin

Asian Survey

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 477-495

  Rangsimaporn, Paradorn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Arms transfers; China; Elite views; Foreign policy; Russia

Indexed keywords

ELITE POLITICS; FOREIGN POLICY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 33646388510     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2006.46.3.477     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. Figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), cited in Robert H. Donaldson, "The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: How Firm a Foundation?" presented at the Convention of International Studies on "Globalization and Its Challenges in the 21st Century," Hong Kong, July 2001, p. 8.
2. Pentagon figures cited in David Lague and S. V. Lawrence, "In Guns We Trust," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 2002.
3. Because of the secretive nature of Chinese arms purchases, exact figures are unknown. These amounts are calculated from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), "Identified Contracts for Russian Arms Deliveries Signed in 2003" and "Identified Contracts for Delivery of Russian Arms Signed in 2004," Moscow Defense Brief, no. 2 (2004) and no. 2 (2005), respectively.
4. See Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergei V. Subbotin, Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s, SIPRI Research Report, no. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 75, 83-84.
5. American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, D.C., China Reform Monitor, no. 277, February 15, 2000.
6. See Stephen J. Blank, "The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China," U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, , accessed March 2, 2004.
7. For determinants of Russian arms trade policy, see Sergounin and Subbotin, Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia, ch. 2
8. and Ian Anthony, ed., Russia and the Arms Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1998), ch. 11.
9. Despite the Putin administration's efforts to ensure hard currency payments for Russian arms, a partial barter system remained in place. China negotiated a compromise deal stipulating that Russia had to use 50% of the payments to import Chinese goods. See also Sergei Blagov, "Ukraine Peddles Its Arms in China," Asia Times (internet ed.), Hong Kong, November 26, 2002.
10. Prominent Russian defense expert Pavel Felgengauer maintains that virtually nothing from arms sales makes it into the budget because the "money is stolen on a massive scale." See Gregory Feifer, "Russia: Analysts Saying Burgeoning Arms Sales Pose Security Threat," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE/RL), February 12, 2003, in CDI Russia Weekly (Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C.), no. 244, February 14, 2003.
11. Cited from Kommersant-Daily [Businessman-Daily] (Moscow), July 18, 1996, in Blank, "The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales," p. 5.
12. A 2001 Pentagon report named Russia and China as the main suppliers of NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) and missile-related equipment and technologies to "states of concern," such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Cited from "Russia, Chinese Entities Scored for Weapons Proliferation," Agence France-Presse, January 10, 2001, in CDI Russia Weekly, no. 136, January 12, 2001.
13. Evgenii Bazhanov, "Russian Perspectives on China's Foreign Policy and Military Development," in In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, eds. Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), p. 73.
14. "Arms Supplies to China Reportedly 'Insignificant'," ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), February 5, 1996, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-96-026, February 6, 1996
15. and "Rossii Nuzhen Sil'nyy Kitay" [Russia needs a strong China], Rossiya [Russia] (Moscow), no. 3, March 1997, p. 14,
16. cited in Alexander Lukin, "Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations," Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: CNAPS, 2001), p. 14, at , accessed October 17, 2004.
17. Cited in John Helmer, "Russian Arms Sales Draw Rapid Fire," Bangkok Post, February 9, 1997.
18. "Russian Official Sees China Remaining Major Arms Buyer," Interfax News Agency (Moscow), November 20, 1998, in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-98-324, November 20, 1998.
19. Greg Austin and Alexei D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 309.
20. "Brothers in Arms - Brothers Forever: Should We Sell Military Equipment to China?" Obshchaya Gazeta [Community Gazette] (Moscow), no. 31, August 7-13, 1997, p. 4, in FBIS, News/Russia, document no. FBIS-TAC-97-224, August 12, 1997.
21. For Makienko's comments, see fn. 13 above, "Russian Official Sees China"
22. Alexander Lukin, "Rossiia-Kitai: Druz'ia ili Soperniki?" [Russia-China: Friends or rivals?], Nezavisimaya Gazeta [Independent Gazette] (Moscow), August 3, 2001
23. and Pavel Felgengauer, "An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales," in Russia in the World Arms Trade, eds. Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitrii Trenin (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1997), p. 101.
24. See "Long-term Arms Cooperation with India, China Mapped Out," Interfax, October 8, 1997, in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-97-281, October 8, 1997
25. and "China to Remain Largest Russian Arms Importer in Coming Years," ibid., July 17, 2000, and document no. FBIS-SOV-2000-0717, July 17, 2000, respectively.
26. Alexander Timofeev, "Almost Relatives," Vremya MN [Time MN] (Moscow), June 14, 1999, in Defense and Security, What the Papers Say (WPS) News Agency (Moscow), DSE-No. 68
27. and Dmitrii Afinogenov and Viktor Yesin, "V Pleny Ustarevshikh Stereotipov" [In the captivity of out-of-date stereotypes], Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye [Independent Military Review] (Moscow), no. 14, April 26, 2002.
28. Blank, "The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales," pp. 6-8
29. and Felgengauer, "An Uneasy Partnership," pp. 98-99.
30. Sergounin and Subbotin, "Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia," p. 89. For instance, Vladivostok Novosti [Vladivostok News], June 26, 2002, reported that the Vladivostok office of the FSB (Russia's Federal Security Service) had detained several military officials and civilians in connection with alleged smuggling of military hardware and documents into China.
31. See Kunadze's view in Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 245.
32. Cited from Bazhanov, "Russian Perspectives," p. 71.
33. Sergei Kortunov, "Russia in Search of Allies," International Affairs (Moscow) 42:3 (May 1996), p. 151.
34. Iran is one such case. Although Russia maintains that its own exports are controlled by international obligations, China's exports to Iran are not.
35. See Donaldson, "The Arms Trade," p. 9
36. and Alexei Khazbiev's comments in Feifer, "Russia: Analysts Saying," respectively.
37. "Moscow: Nuclear Cooperation with China 'Totally Peaceful'," Interfax, January 21, 1999, in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-99-021, January 22, 1999.
38. Cited from Dmitrii Trenin, Russia's China Problem (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1999), p. 31.
39. See also Arbatov's comments in "Is the World Becoming Multipolar?" International Affairs (Moscow) 44:1 (1998), pp. 10-13.
40. Mikhail Urusov, "Destroyers in Exchange for Canned Meat," Moskovskiye Novosti [Moscow News], no. 44, November 2-9, 1997, in FBIS, News/Russia, document no. FBIS-UMA-97-310, November 6, 1997
41. E. Rumyantsev, "Military Cooperation: Arming the Dragon," Rossiiskie Vesti [Russian News] (Moscow), April 4, 2001, in Defense and Security (WPS, Moscow), DSE-No.41
42. and Sergei Orlov, "We Again Forget about National Interests," ibid., DSE-No.020, February 20, 2002.
43. Alexander Sharavin, "Tret'ya Ugroza" [The third threat], Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, no. 36, September 28, 2001.
44. Svetlana Babayeva and Dimitri Safonov, "We Do Not Want to Arm the Chinese," Izvestiya [News], May 31, 2002, in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-CHI-2002-0531, June 3, 2002.
45. "Russia's Threats Come from Asia," Izvestiya, July 10, 2002, in Defense and Security, DSE-No.079.
46. In January 2003, Japan proposed around $13.5 billion in soft loans for construction of the pipeline to the Pacific Coast proposed by Transneft, Russia's state monopoly for oil delivery. This move challenged plans for the pipeline to China, proposed earlier by the Russian firm Yukos. Because of financial, geopolitical, and domestic considerations (for example, the Kremlin's prosecution of Yukos and the rivalry among government agencies and energy firms), Moscow has not yet reached a final decision regarding the priority of the pipeline route. Although the Russian government signed a directive in December 2004 on the construction of the Taishet to the Pacific Coast route, Moscow has subsequently left open the option of first building a branch pipeline to China from Skovorodino.
47. Poll conducted on 1,600 Russian residents throughout the country by the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Study. See "Opinion Poll Reported on Attitudes to China," Interfax, July 26, 2001, in FBIS, Daily Report/ Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-2001-0726, July 27, 2001.
48. Polls conducted by Russian Public Opinion Foundation (POF) on 1,500 respondents. See "Opinion of the Russians about Arms Trade and Defense Industry," Eksport Vooruzheniy [Arms Exports] (CAST, Moscow, no. 2, March/April 2001.
49. Stephen J. Blank, "Russo-Chinese Military Relations and Asian Security," Issues and Studies (Taipei) 33:11 (November 1997), pp. 58-94. Pre-1996, former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev fits within this second group.
50. James Clay Moltz, "Russian Nuclear Regionalism: Emerging Local Influences over Far Eastern Facilities," NBR Analysis (National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle) 11:4 (December 2000), pp. 35-57.
51. Trenin, "Russia's China Problem," p. 38. Foreign policy expert Trenin suggested that Rodionov's statement reflected the collective apprehensions of the General Staff. This may have been true at the time, reinforced by the Soviet legacy of an inherent fear of a Chinese threat throughout all Russian social strata. Post-1999, however, the General Staff's attitude seems to have changed to a more balanced position for reasons that will be explained, although whether this change is uniform is hard to ascertain.
52. See, for instance, his April 1997 speech to the Chinese Academy of Military Science in Military News Bulletin (MoD publication, Moscow), MNB-No.005, May 1997.
53. Alexei Tikhonov, "Thus Strengthening the Chinese Army," Novye Izvestiya [New News] (Moscow), July 20, 2001
54. Dmitri Koptev, "Not All Weapons Should Be Sold to China," Izvestiya, December 8, 2000, p. 2
55. and Ye. Grigoryeva and D. Safonov, "Wary Friendship: The Thinking behind Russia's Arms Sales to China," ibid., June 15, 2001.
56. V. N. Tsygichko and A. Piontkovskii, "Russia's National Security in the Early 21st Century," Military Thought (Moscow), no. 2 (2001), pp. 63-70.
57. Stephen J. Blank, "The Strategic Context of Russo-Chinese Relations," Conflict Studies Research Center (Surrey, U.K.), Occasional Paper, F68 (September 1999), p. 7
58. and "Expert: China No Military Threat to Russia for 15 Years," Interfax, April 19, 1997, in FBIS, News/Russia, document no. FBIS-UMA-97-109, April 23, 1997.
59. See A. F. Klimenko, "Military Doctrines of Asia-Pacific Countries: Coordination Aspects," Military Thought, no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 4-16
60. A. F. Klimenko, "Hadumannaya, Virtual'naya Ugroza' [The far-fetched virtual threat], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 2, 2001.
61. On the influence of the Center for Military-Strategic Research, see Stephen J. Main, "The 'Brain' of the Russian Army - the Center for Military-Strategic Research, General Staff 1985-2000," Conflict Studies Research Center (Surrey, U.K.), Occasional Paper, C101 (March 2000).
62. For Baluyevskii's views, see "Russian Military Views China as Strategic Partner," ITAR-TASS World Service, November 4, 1998, in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-98-308, November 5, 1998.
63. Emphasis added, "Russia, China Make Headway in Military Cooperation," ITAR-TASS, November 18, 2000, in ibid., document no. FBIS-SOV-2000-1118, November 20, 2000.
64. See Ming-yen Tsai, "China's Acquisition of Russia's SU Fighters: A Great Leap Forward?" American Journal of Chinese Studies (American Association for Chinese Studies) 8:1 (April 2001), pp. 1-5
65. Kevin Platt and Melinda Liu, "Beijing Has Turned to an Old Strategic Rival - Russia - to Help Modernize Its Military," Newsweek International, December 18, 2000
66. and I. Cherniak, "MTC: Interview with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov," Komsomolskaya Pravda [Komsomol Truth] (Moscow), June 5, 2002, p. 8, in Defense and Security, DSE-No.064, June 7, 2002.
67. In January 2005, Russia offered to sell China Tu-22M3 and Tu-95 bombers and showcased them during Russo-Chinese military exercises that August. See Lyuba Pronina, "Air Force to Offer Strategic Bombers to China," Moscow Times, January 14, 2005
68. and Ivan Safronov and Andrei Ivanov, "Internatsional'nyi Dolg: Naemniki Dobroi Voli" [International duty: Mercenaries of goodwill], Kommersant, August 18, 2005.
69. See K. M. Zisk, "The Foreign Policy Preferences of Russian Defense Industrialists," in Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, ed. Celeste A. Wallander (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 95-120
70. and Yuri Fedorov, "Economic Interest Groups and Russian Foreign Policy," International Affairs (Moscow) 44:6 (November 1998), pp. 173-83.
71. Konstantin Makienko, "Preliminary Estimates of Russian Performance in MTC with Foreign States in 2000/2001," Eksport Vooruzheniy [Arms Exports] (CAST, Moscow), January/February 2001 and November/December 2001.
72. Sergounin and Subbotin, "Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia," p. 23, identified five sectoral components: Military electronics, land-based weapon systems, aerospace, shipbuilding, and nuclear weapons.
73. "Russian Industrialist Hails Military Cooperation with China," Moscow RIA (Russian Information Agency), July 18, 2000, in FBIS, Daily Report/ Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-2000-0718, July 19, 2000.
74. "Plant Sends Missiles to China," Zolotoi Rog [Golden Horn] (Vladivostok), June 23, 2000
75. and Kotelkin citation from Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, p. 302.
76. See fn. 11 above, "Arms Supplies to China"
77. "Possibilities for Military Cooperation with Japan, China Noted," ITAR-TASS in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-2000-0908, September 12, 2000
78. and "Yeltsin Book Identifies China as 'Important Ally' Strategically," ITAR-TASS, October 10, 2000, in ibid., document no. FBIS-NES-2000-1010, October 12, 2000. The SCO derived from efforts to develop confidence building agreements in 1996-97 among Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan joined the grouping in June 2001 when the SCO was established in Shanghai. The SCO aims to promote political and economic co-operation among its members, especially in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
79. See fn. 44 above, Cherniak, "MTC: Interview with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov."
80. Lyuba Pronina, "Arming China Makes U.S. Nervous," Moscow Times, August 22, 2002, p. 1.
81. Stephen J. Blank, "Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?" Orbis (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia) 42:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 345-60, 359.
82. John Helmer, "Implications of Russia-China Deal: Latest Arms Sales to Total $2 Billion," Russia Journal (Moscow), no. 31, August 10-16, 2001.
83. For Makienko's comments, see fn. 13 above, "Russian Official Sees China"
84. and "Russian Arms Exports to China Assessed," Interfax, April 18, 1997, in FBIS/News, document no. FBIS-UMA-97-108, April 21, 1997.
85. See also, Richard D. Fisher, "China's Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the U.S.," Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, no. 142, July 31, 1996
86. and A. Nikolskii, "MTC: Russia Continues Arming China," Defense and Security, DSE-No.088, February 8, 2002.
87. John Pomfret, "Russians Help China Modernize Its Arsenal," Washington Post, February 10, 2000.
88. See, for instance, Dmitrii Vasil'ev, "Russian Arms Trade with Southeast Asia and the Republic of Korea," Moscow Defense Brief, no. 1, 2005.
89. For Russian arms sales to Southeast Asia, see Charles Bickers, "Bear Market: Russia Wants to Be the Top Arms Supplier to Asia," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1997
90. and Michael Brooke, "Helping Thailand Shoot for the Stars," Bangkok Post, April 1, 1997.
91. For cautious views regarding arms sales, see A. Timofeev, "Enforced Friendship," Defense and Security, DSE-No.100, August 27, 1999
92. and Alexander Yanov, "War over Taiwan - Not a Fantasy," Vremya MN, July 18, 2001, in FBIS, Daily Report/China, document no. FBIS-CHI-2001-0718, July 24, 2001.
93. V. Sviridov, "A Confrontation Already Exists: Interview with S. Orlov," Defense and Security, DSE-No.038, April 3, 2002.
94. For Arbatov's comments, see Alexander Golts, "A Taste of the Cold War," CDI Russia Weekly (Washington, D.C.), no. 150, April 20, 2001.
95. Sergei Trush, "Prodazha Rossiiskogo Oruzhiia Pekinu: Rezony i Opaseniia" [The sale of Russian arms to Beijing: Reasons and fears], Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, April 4, 1996.
96. Gennadii Ziuganov, Geografiia Pobedy: Osnovy Rossiiskoi Geopolitiki [Geography of victory: Foundations of Russian geopolitics] (Moscow: G. Ziuganov, 1997), pp. 168-71.
97. See Bazhanov, "Russian Perspectives," pp. 72-73
98. and Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, p. 248.
99. "Duma Panel Chief Favors Russia-China Military Alliance," ITAR-TASS World Service, February 24, 1999, in FBIS, Daily Report/Russia, document no. FBIS-SOV-1999-0224, February 25, 1999.
100. See Arbatov's comments in "Russia's Place in the World after September 11," International Affairs 48:2 (March 2002), p. 88
101. and Trenin, "Russia's China Problem," p. 38.