Rebellion on the Saudi periphery: Modernity, marginalization, and the Shi'a uprising of 1979

International Journal of Middle East Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 213-233

  Jones, Toby Craig ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POPULAR PROTEST; VIOLENCE;

ASIA; EURASIA; MIDDLE EAST; SAUDI ARABIA;

EID: 33646141402     PISSN: 00207438     EISSN: 14716380     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743806412320     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. The decision to stage the 'Ashura celebration in public was a specifically political act. Because it had long been banned in the kingdom, marking the ceremony served notice that Saudi Arabia's Shi'i community sought to exert community will and challenge state efforts that not only prevented them from observing religious rituals but also, as the Shi'a believed, to suppress them politically.
2. The Communist Parry of Saudi Arabia (CPA), Ahdath nufimbir (al-muharram) 1979 fi al-Sa'udiyya (The Events of November [Muharram] 1979 in Saudi) (December 1979), 42.
3. Jacob Goldberg, "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia," in Shi'ism and Social Protest, ed. Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), 239.
4. My intent in using this word is not to reproduce or embrace the notions of "modernization" popularized by Western academics and policymakers in the 1950s, nor is my use of "center" and "periphery" to describe geopolitical relationships between Saudi Arabian cities a signal of my reliance on dependency theory. Modernization is meant to reflect a process discussed and planned for by Saudi Arabian officials whereby the Kingdom would achieve a level of technological and industrial capacity allowing for independence and integration. Saudi Arabians use various words to describe both policies and activities that I lump into the category of modernization, including development (namū and tanmiyya), renovation or reform (islāh, progress (taqaddum), and prosperity ('umrān). Importantly, although Saudi Arabian commentators did not embrace Western concepts of modernization (that only through it would they be able to arrive at the same stage of politicomoral development as the West), they did echo Western beliefs that the state had a burden to work on behalf of its citizens and that part of this burden was through providing social and technical services. As for my use of center and periphery, they are meant to portray a specific political and social relationship between regions within the east, but not necessarily one in which the periphery (as in a colonial or semicolonial state) provided the natural resources for the center. Rather, my use of the periphery is intended to reflect the idea of marginality, in that the peripheries inside the east were deliberately cut off as much as possible from the administrative and political center.
5. Noting the symbolic significance of the Islamic Revolution on Saudi Shi'is, David Lesch states that the uprising "indicated to all interested observers that the reverberations from the Iranian revolution would be more than just fitful" and that "the emotional atmosphere produced by the ashura [sic] celebration naturally led to riots amid loud support for the Ayatollah Khomeini." David Lesch, 1979: The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2001), 61.
6. Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 147.
7. Buchan, "Opposition in Saudi Arabia," in State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia, ed. T. Niblock (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 119.
8. Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf," in Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 177-79.
9. See Nikki Kidde, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003) - an update of her Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (1981)
10. Misagh Parsa, The Social Origins of the Iranian an Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989)
11. and Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
12. Author's interviews, Qatif, Saudi Arabia, September 2003.
13. Author's interviews, Qatif, Saudi Arabia, September 2003.
14. Author's interviews, Manama, Bahrain, February 2005.
15. Abdallah Nasir al-Subay'i, Iktishaf al-naft wa-atharuhu 'ala al-hiya al-iqtisadiyya fi al-Mantiqa al-Sharqiyya, 1933-1960 (The Discovery of Oil and its Effect on Economic Life in the Eastern Province) (Riyadh, KSA: Shariif Publishers, 1989), 30.
16. Hamza al-Hassan, Shi'a fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya (The Shi'a in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), vol. 2. (1993), 236-37.
17. See also Muhammad Ali Salah al-Shurafa', al-Mantiqa al-Sharqiyya min al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya (The Eastern Province in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), vol. 1. (Dammam: Al-Madukhil Publishers, 1994), 43-45.
18. Al-Subay'i, Discovery of Oil, 132, al-Hasan, Shi'a in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 232-79, al-Shurafa', The Eastern Province, 42-51.
19. It is impossible to accurately determine the population totals at virtually any time, as the Saudis published only one census in 1974 and did not distinguish citizens based on faith. Goldberg cites various estimates from 200,000 to 440,000. He settled on the figure of 350,000 for reasons that are not entirely clear, although he seems to rely on the work of James A. Bill for that determination. With a total population of 6 million at the time, that would place the Shi'a at approximately 6 percent of the total - a contested number. Other estimates suggest that the minority probably constituted anywhere from 10 percent to 15 percent of the total, although no figures can be considered absolutely reliable.
20. See James A. Bill, "Islam, Politics, and Shi'ism in the Gulf," Middle East Insight 3 (1980), 6
21. Goldberg, "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia," 230.
22. According to Juan Cole, the differences arise in the relationship between Shi'a religious leaders and the community around them - with adherents of the Usuli School having a more complex relationship with the community - as well as on matters of interpretation of the Qur'an. Akhbari mujtahids tended toward a greater degree of literalism when interpreting various texts and proved, according to Cole, to be more independent and conservative. Although the theological differences were most important in matters of law, and certainly helped define the different religious practices of the two communities, the significance of the split proved even more important in the turbulent era of the Iranian Revolution. In conversations with various community members gein Hofuf I was informed that the difference existed and was an important detail when considering what one of them called "The Revolution" of 1979. One Shi'a community leader from a village east of Mubarraz related to me that the difference accounted for the rebelliousness of those in Qatif and for the quietest approach of those in the al-Hasa oasis. He claimed that at least 80 percent of al-Hasawis were Akhbari, whereas all Qatifis were Usuli.
23. See Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
24. F. S. Vidal, "The Oasis of Al-Hasa," Arabian American Oil Company, 1955.
25. See also Ibrahim S. al-Abdallah al-Elawi, "The Influence of Oil Upon Settlement in al-Hasa Oasis" (Ph.D. diss., University of Durham, 1976).
26. Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Saudi Arabian Peninsula (OIR), Intifada al-Muharram fi al-Mantiqa al-Sharqiyya (with a'iq al-intifada), 1979 (The Intifada of Muharram in the Eastern Province [Documents of the Intifada], 1979), vol. 1. In other materials, the group dropped "Saudi" from its name.
27. OIR, The Intifada of Muharram, 2.
28. OIR, The Intifada of Muharram, 3.
29. OIR, The Intifada of Muharram, 4.
30. OIR, The Intifada of Muharram, 5.
31. OIR, The Intifada of Muharram, 7.
32. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Second Development Plan, 1975-1980, 4.
33. al-Yawm, 27 May 1979.
34. al-Yawm, 28 May 1979.
35. The pages of al-Yawm contain numerous articles critical of local government officials and institutions. These remarkable pieces of journalism are rare in the history of Saudi Arabia, as the kingdom has long monitored and discouraged open political discussion. Although the efforts of al-Yawm journalists to document social problems and government responsibility was not unprecedented in the kingdom, it was and is very rare. After the events of 1979, the state reigned in the paper and stopped critical writing.
36. Hussein al-Tantawi, "The Drinking Water Project in al-Hasa Demands Another Look," al-Yawm, 22 April 1979.
37. Muhammad Abd al-Rahman, "In 3 Years," al-Yawm, 21 April 1979.
38. Muhammad Abd al-Rahman, "Tarut Island," al-Yawm, 20 June 1979.
39. Ibid.
40. Ali Yusuf al-Jarudi, "The Municipality and the Indefinitely Postponed Projects of Qatif," al-Yawm, 22 September 1979.
41. Ibid.
42. Faisal al-Qu, "New Projects for the Center of Social Services in al-Jafar to Raise the Standard of Health of the Community," al-Yawm, 8 March 1979.
43. Abdallah al-Falah, "Social Assistance for Citizens of Qatif," al-Yawm, 1 May 1979
44. and Abdallah al-Falah, "The End of the Qatif Health Project," al-Yawm, 9 May 1979.
45. Falah al-Sughair, al-Yawm, 28 April 1979.
46. Abdallah al-Ghashri, al-Yawm, 7 May 1979.
47. Abdallah al-Ghashri, al-Yawm, 8 September 1979.
48. "Seminar on the Level of Services in al-Hasa," al-Yawm, 12 April 1979.
49. "Seminar Organized and Prepared by Ibrahim al-Muqaitib," al-Yawm, 2 May 1979.
50. Goldberg, "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia," 230
51. and Guido Steinberg, "The Shi'ites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia (al-Ahsa'), 1913-1953," in The Twelver Shi'a in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History, ed. R. Brunner and W. Ende (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001).
52. CPA, The Events of November, 26.
53. Ibid.
54. Buchan, "Opposition in Saudi Arabia," 119.
55. Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf," 179.
56. "Bahrain Welcomes Support by Holding a Gulf Foreign Minister's Meeting," al-Yawm, 13 September 1979.
57. al-Yawm, 2 and 3 October 1979.
58. "Oh [King] Khalid release your hands [from power], the people do not want you."
59. Although there is virtually no documentation available from the Saudi security forces, the OIR managed to obtain copies of various administrative letters and materials that give a sense of the state's direct approach to protest. In one, published regarding the summer of 1979, the Saudi chief of police in the Eastern Province warned security forces about possible Shi'a unrest during the month of Ramadan, purportedly at the urging of broadcasts from radio Tehran. Encouraging them to deal swiftly and powerfully with possible unrest, the letter directed the security forces to "be vigilant, attentive, and resolute in oppressing an aggressive act they [the Shi'a] undertake with [showing] no leniency or carelessness." Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, no. 3049, 1400/9/26. In Supplement on Intifada, 38.
60. The monthly newsletter of The Organization for Islamic Revolution, Appendix on the Intifada, no. 54, October 1984, 28-29.
61. Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, Memoir of the Events in January and February 1980, in CPA, The Events of November, 31-42. 0
62. Ibid., 36.
63. Ibid., 22-23. The CPA also claims that public events were staged in over 70 communities, a number that likely takes into account each village in the Eastern Province.
64. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave, 2001), chap. 7.
65. Ibid., 198.
66. Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, 147.
67. See also al-Rasheed, "The Shi'a of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity," British Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1998): 121-38.
68. Hussein Musa, al-Ahzab wa-l-harakat al-islamiyya fi al-Khalij wa-l-Jazira al-Arabiyya (The Islamic Parties and Movements in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula) (Manama, Bahrain: N.p., 2004), 52-53. This is not the author's real name. A Bahraini political dissident who lived in exile for over thirty years, Hussein Musa is his pen name.
69. Musa, Islamic Parties and Movements, 7.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 53.
72. OIR, The Intifada of Muharram, 18.
73. Ibid., 19-21.
74. Ibid., 27-38.
75. CPA, The Events of November, 22.
76. Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia (CDHR), printed in ibid., 36.
77. Ibid., 32.
78. Ibid., 32.
79. al-Yawm, 2 December 1979.
80. al-Yawm, 11 December 1979.
81. al-Yawm, 12 December 1979.
82. al-Yawm, 15 December 1979.
83. Goldberg, "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia," 244.
84. Ibid., 244.
85. Ibid., 245.
86. See Hamza al-Hassan, Shi'a fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya, documents 5-8, 423-29 for local letters appealing to state authorities for an end to violence and the release of political prisoners. It seems that the kingdom's leaders answered to pleas for kindness, rather than initiating it.
87. Saudi Shi'is took up temporary residence in various world cities, including in Iran and the United States. Hassan al-Saffar spent most of the 1980s in Damascus and returned to the kingdom in 1994.
88. CDHR, in The Events of November, 40.
89. OIR, Supplement on the Intifada, 12-13.