Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 187-208

  Beetsma, Roel ^a   Jensen, Henrik ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Contingent deficit sanctions; Fiscal effort; Monetary union; Public debt; Stability pact

Indexed keywords

DEBT; HAZARD; MONETARY UNION; SANCTION;

EID: 0141538277     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00083-1     Document Type: Article

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