A positive model of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 4-5, 2006, Pages 703-723

  Klor, Esteban F ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Fiscal federalism; Income taxation; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645954287     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.04.001     Document Type: Article

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