Auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 4-5, 2006, Pages 657-678

  Fearon, Gervan ^a   Busch, Lutz Alexander ^b  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Auction; Audit; Mechanism design; Niskanen bureau; Public good provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645908177     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.04.002     Document Type: Article

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