Transition modes and post-transition inter-party politics: Evidence from Spain (1977-82) and Argentina (1983-89)

Democratization

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 205-226

  Field, Bonnie N ^a  

^a BENTLEY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Argentina; Democratization; Modes of transition; Political parties; Spain

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; DEMOCRATIZATION; ELITE POLITICS; PARTY POLITICS;

ARGENTINA; EURASIA; EUROPE; SOUTH AMERICA; SOUTHERN EUROPE; SPAIN;

EID: 33645775501     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340500523911     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. See, for example, Juan J. Linz, 'Comment: Some Comparative Thoughts on the Transition to Democracy in Portugal and Spain', in Jorge Braga de Macedo and Simon Serfaty (eds), Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 25-45
2. Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, 'Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain', in Wayne A. Selcher (ed.), Political Liberalization in Brazil (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 175-216
3. Alfred Stepan, 'Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 64-84
4. Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1-21
5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)
6. Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, 'Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern, and Eastern Europe', International Social Science Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), pp. 269-84
7. J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 57-104
8. Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, 'Modes of Transition and Democratization: South American and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1997), pp. 343-62.
9. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 37.
10. Ibid., p. 39.
11. Karl and Schmitter (note 1), p. 282.
12. Karl, 'Dilemmas', p. 9.
13. See, for example, Arend Lijphart, 'Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland: 1989-91', Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1992), pp. 207-23
14. Josep Colomer, Strategic Transition (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
15. See, for example, Omar G. Encarnación, 'Labor and Pacted Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2001), pp. 337-55.
16. Karl, 'Dilemmas'
17. Karl and Schmitter (note 1).
18. Karl, 'Dilemmas', p. 15.
19. Terry Lynn Karl, 'Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela', Latin American Research Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1987), pp. 63-94
20. Karl, 'Dilemmas'
21. Frances Hagopian, '"Democracy by Undemocratic Means?" Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1990), pp. 147-70
22. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
23. O'Donnell and Schmitter (note 2), p. 38
24. Share and Mainwaring (note 1), p. 180
25. Przeworski (note 10), p. 90.
26. Omar G. Encarnación, 'Do Political Pacts Freeze Democracy? Spanish and South American Lessons', West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2005), p. 182.
27. Bonnie N. Field, 'De-thawing Democracy: The Decline of Political Party Collaboration in Spain (1977-2004)', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 9 (2005), pp. 1079-1103.
28. Ibid.
29. O'Donnell and Schmitter (note 2), p.6.
30. www.freedomhouse.org
31. There are substantial bodies of literature on the Spanish [see, for example, Richard Gunther, 'Spain: The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement', in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 38-80]
32. and Argentine [see, for example, Monica Peralta-Ramos and Carlos H. Waisman (eds), From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy in Argentina (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987)] transitions, which cannot be reviewed here.
33. These dimensions are taken from McGuire's synthesis of the literature on modes of transition as well as his own additions. See James W. McGuire, 'Interim Government and Democratic Consolidation: Argentina in Comparative Perspective', in Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz (eds), Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 194-5.
34. Ibid., p. 194.
35. However, the mode of transition and the choice of political institutions, and the nature of the party system are not entirely independent. For example, negotiated transitions may facilitate the adoption of more consensual political institutions and the development of more moderate party systems.
36. If the Senate vetoes a bill passed by the Congress, the Congress debates the Senate veto, and then the initial text of the bill approved by the Congress is submitted for a vote. The Senate veto is lifted with the favourable vote of the absolute majority of the members of the Congress. If the initial text does not receive an absolute majority, another vote is taken two months from the time of the Senate veto. At this time, the veto is lifted with a simple majority of the vote. If not, the veto stands. The Congress can also reject Senate amendments rather easily. Senate amendments are debated and submitted to a vote in the Congress. Only those that receive a favourable simple majority of the vote are incorporated into the text. See Constitution 1978: Article 90; Provisional Parliamentary Regulations for the Congress of Deputies passed October 13, 1977. Boletín Oficial del Estado, N. 256 (October 26, 1977).
37. The amendment process works somewhat differently. Bills passed by the initiating chamber are sent to the review chamber. If the review chamber revises the bill, it is returned to the initiating chamber. The initiating chamber must approve these revisions by an absolute majority. If they are approved, the modified bill is sent to the president. If they are not approved by an absolute majority, the bill then returns to the review chamber, and the revisions are voted on once again. The chamber must approve the amendments with a favourable vote of two thirds of the members present. If this majority is not attained, the original bill is sent to the president. If this majority is achieved, the bill will once again be returned to the initiating chamber. At that point, if the initiating chamber cannot attain a two-thirds majority in support of its original bill, the revised bill will be sent to the president. If the initiating chamber attains a two-thirds majority in support of its original bill, that original bill will be sent to the president. See Liliana De Riz and Eduardo Feldman, Guía del Parlamento Argentino, Edición Actualizada a 6/3/90 (Buenos Aires: Fundación Friedrich Ebert,1990), pp. 16-22.
38. Juan J. Linz and José Ramón Montero, 'The Party Systems of Spain: Old Cleavages and New Challenges', Working Paper 1999/38 (Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1999), p. 19.
39. James W. McGuire, 'Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina', in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (eds), Building Democratic Institutions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 226.
40. The Congress did not formally invest Adolfo Suárez as prime minister in 1977. Rather, King Juan Carlos named the prime minister, who was the leader of the largest party. In 1979 Suárez did not have to go beyond the first round of the investiture vote. He received the votes of his own party (168), Alianza Popular/Coalición Democrática (9), the Partido Socialista de Andalucía (5) and two additional votes from smaller parties. Following Suárez's resignation, the UCD selected Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as their prime ministerial candidate. Calvo-Sotelo did not win an absolute majority of the vote in the first round in 1981. He received 169 positive votes (165 votes from his own party, three from CD and one from the Mixed Group) and 158 negative votes. It was expected that Calvo-Sotelo would be elected prime minister in the second round with the same distribution of the vote and due to the lower hurdle of a simple majority. However, on the day of the second round of voting an attempted coup interrupted the plenary session. After the defeat of the coup attempt, the second-round investiture vote elected Calvo-Sotelo with 186 votes in his favour, ten votes over an absolute majority. Calvo-Sotelo received the votes of the UCD (165), AP/CD (9), CIU (9), and three votes from smaller parties. For vote results, see Jordi Capo Giol, 'Estrategias para un Sistema de Partidos', Revista de Estudios Políticos, No. 23 (1981), p. 161.
41. N. Guillermo Molinelli, M. Valeria Palanza and Gisela Sin, Congreso, Presidencia y Justicia en Argentina: Materiales para su Estudio (Buenos Aires: CEDI-Fundación Gobierno y Sociedad, 1999), pp. 564, 573.
42. See, for example, Jordi Capo Giol, La Legislación Estatal en la Espanã Democrática. Una Aproximación Politológica (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1990)
43. Lynn M. Maurer, 'Parliamentary Influence in a New Democracy: The Spanish Congress', Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1999), pp. 24-45
44. Field (note 13).
45. Liliana De Riz, Alfonsín's Argentina: Renewal of Parties and Congress (1983-1989) (Buenos Aires: CEDES, 1991), p. 5.
46. Ana María Mustapic and Matteo Goretti, 'Gobierno y Oposición en el Congreso: La Práctica de la Cohabitación durante la Presidencia de Alfonsín (1983-1989 ', Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 32, No. 126 (1992), pp. 251-69.
47. These figures were calculated using data provided by the Congress of Deputies. The data cover two legislative periods with the same governing party. The number of bills presented includes any government bills presented during either legislative period, except it does not double-count government bills that expired during the Constituent Legislature (1977-79) but were carried over to Legislature I (1979-82). The number of government bills passed includes those passed at any point during the two legislative periods.
48. Liliana De Riz, Radicales y Peronistas: El Congreso Nacional entre 1983 y 1989 (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, SA, 1994), p. 59.
49. De Riz (note 28), p. 11.
50. De Riz (note 31), p. 59.
51. Elaborated by the author based on legislative information provided by the Congress of Deputies.
52. Molinelli, Palanza and Sin (note 26), p. 434.
53. As mentioned above, most bills that do not become law in Spain are not rejected in a vote - the bills simply expire. Also, in Argentina, floor votes are not recorded in the congressional record.
54. International treaties and royal decree laws are not included in this study. Organic laws did not exist until following the approval of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. The Congress cannot delegate the passage of organic laws to legislative committees. However, the chamber can in some cases delegate the passage of ordinary laws to the relevant committee, referred to as 'full legislative power' (competencia legislativa plena), and therefore the entire chamber does not vote. The study includes laws passed on the floor (91 per cent) and in committee (9 per cent).
55. Constitution 1978: Article 81.
56. The percentages do not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.
57. This measure assumes proportional attendance across parties and party discipline. During the latter part of Legislature I (1979-82) the governing UCD faced severe internal divisions, which led ultimately to significant splits from the parliamentary group and the party, and the eventual disappearance of the UCD. Therefore, during this period, a lack of cross-party collaboration or a lack of party discipline within the UCD may account for the laws that are passed without substantial collaboration. See Field (note 13) for an application of this measure longitudinally (1977-2004) in the Spanish case.
58. Gunther (note 17), p. 59.
59. Roll call votes are published; however, there were few roll call votes taken during the Alfonsín presidency-thirty-nine in the Chamber of Deputies. See Mark P. Jones, 'Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress', in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds), Legislative Politics in Latin America (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 151.
60. Mustapic and Goretti (note 29).
61. The requirement of a committee report can be by passed with a 2/3 vote on the floor.
62. Elaborated by the author based on committee assignments provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina. This was calculated based on committee assignments made following the 1983 elections, and does not include changes that occurred subsequently.
63. Mustapic and Goretti (note 29), p. 259.
64. De Riz (note 28), p. 19.
65. Mustapic and Goretti (note 29), p. 262.
66. Ibid., p. 264.
67. There are laws that authorize the disbursement of state funds related to international treaties.
68. This should only be considered an estimate. Mustapic and Goretti (note 29, p. 263) do not break down their data in this way, but rather present some raw numbers and percentages which were used to derive this approximate percentage.
69. Ana María Mustapic, 'Oscillating Relations: President and Congress in Argentina', in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds), Legislative Politics in Latin America (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 43.
70. This should be considered only an estimate. Mustapic and Goretti (note 29, p. 263) do not break down their data in this way, but rather present some raw numbers and percentages which were used to derive this approximate percentage.
71. Mustapic and Goretti (note 29), p. 263.
72. The categorization is primarily based on committees of the same name(s). However, a few laws were not treated in committee and the committee structure changed between 1977 and 1982. I have therefore performed an analysis of the law titles to maintain substantive categories. The Industry, Public Works and Services category includes Energy, Environment, Transportation and Tourism. The Social and Employment Policy category includes Health and Social Security. The Budgets category includes the general budget laws and authorizations for budget increases.
73. For a review of the debate on presidential systems, see Gerardo L. Munck, 'Democratic Politics in Latin America: New Debates and Research Frontiers', Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 7 (2004), pp. 437-62.
74. Field (note 13). This percentage is based on laws with a recorded vote.
75. Encarnación, 'Labor', pp. 339-41.
76. De Riz (note 28), p. 12.
77. Mario Maurich and Gabriela Liendo, 'θ?Estilo Decisionista de Gobierno o Estrategia Decretista de Gobierno? La Argentina de Alfonsín y Menem', in Eugenio Kvaternik (ed.), Elementos para el Análisis Político (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1998), p. 377.
78. Ibid., pp. 376-8.
79. See Field (note 13) for an account of how political elite continuity, fear of the reversal of democratization, the ideological distance between the two principle parties and government strength help explain the patterns of political party collaboration over time (1977-2004) in the Spanish case.
80. This does not assume that all stalemates will lead to a pacted transition nor that pact making will necessarily lead to a successful outcome. However, if pact-making generates successful outcomes, this may foster continued collaboration.
81. Field (note 13). The percentages are based on laws with a recorded vote.
82. McGuire (note 18), p. 181.
83. Field (note 13). The percentages are based on laws with a recorded vote.
84. This analysis includes only laws for which there was a recorded vote (N = 357). If we include 'missing data' as a category (N = 380), the trends do not change-in fact, the decline overall and in the areas mentioned is actually greater.
85. Both UCR presidents, Alfonsín (1983-89) and De la Rua (1999-2001), were unable to complete their constitutionally fixed terms of office.
86. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1994), pp. 55-69.