Participation and voting in committees: Evidence from the ILO

Public Choice

Volumn 126, Issue 3-4, 2006, Pages 405-427

  Boockmann, Bernhard ^a  

^a CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645570786     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-3888-y     Document Type: Article

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