Characterizing pareto improvements in an interdependent demand system

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 427-443

  Kooreman, Peter ^a   Schoonbeek, Lambert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645292748     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00173.x     Document Type: Article

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