Law and Politics in the WTO — Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 5, Issue , 2001, Pages 609-674

  von Bogdandy, Armin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 57149089098     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
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References (257)

1. That, at least, appears to be the common ground of most strands of legal and constitutional theory, cf. E.W. Bockenforde, "Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsstaatsbegriffs", in: id., Recht, Stoat, Freiheit, 1991,143 et seq.; M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, 1992,138 et seq.
2. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 1690, Chap. XII f.; G. de Vergottini, Diritto costituzionale comparato, 5th edition, 1999, 346 et seq.; for an exhaustive analysis H. Seiler, Gewaltenteilung: Allgemeine Grundlagen und schweizerische Ausgestaltung, 1994.
3. W. Graf Vitzthum, "Begriff, Geschichte und Quellen des Volkerrechts", in: id., Volkerrecbt, 1997,41.
4. H. Schermers/ N. Blokker, International Institutional Law, 3rd edition, 1995, paras 389 et seq.; throughout this text, legislation means rule-making. This equation might appear questionable since contemporary political and legal thought often reserves the term legislation for parliamentary rule-making. However, given the function of many WTO provisions to provide for general rules, this equation is defensible. On the transnational level, the terms legislation and legislator are generally applied to any rule-making body, even if not a parliamentary institution, see ECJ, Case C-280/93, Germany/Council, ECR 1994,1 - 4973, para. 47.
5. P. Eeckhout, "The domestic legal status of the WTO Agreement: interconnecting legal systems", CML Rev, 34 (1997), 11 et seq.; S. Griller, "Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union", JIEL 3 (2000), 441 et seq.; A. v. Bogdandy/ T. Makatsch, "Collision, Coexistence, or Cooperation?", in: G. de Bruca/ J. Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO, 2001, (forthcoming).
6. R. Dahrendorf, "Anmerkungen zur Globalisierung", in: U. Beck (ed.), Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft, 1998, 31, 46 et seq., whose disquieting prediction is that the 21st century might become a century of authoritarianism because of globalization; J.M. Guehenno, "From Territorial Communities to Communities of Choice: Implications for Democracy**, in: W. Streek (ed.), Internationale Wirtscbaft, nationale Demokratie, 1998, 137, 140 et seq.; K. Giinther, "Alles Riding", Rechtshistorisches Journal 19 (2000), 232 et seq., (242,244); D. Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone too Far?, 1997, 70.
7. ,,, in: D. Simon/ M. Weiss (eds), Liber amicorum Spiros Simitis, 2000, 437, 446. The projected and much criticized OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment has been seen as part of the WTO-process, E. Altvater/ B. Mahnkopf, Grenzen der Globalisierung. Okonomie, Qkologie und Politik in der Weltgesellscbaft, 4th edition, 1999, with reference to WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero.
8. 8 U. Brand/ A. Brunnengraber/ L. Schrader/ C. Stock/ P. Wahl, Global Governance. Alternativen zur neoliberalen Globalisierung*, 2000, 104; see also the critique of Public Citizen L. Waliach/ M. Sforza, Whose Trade Organization*\ 1999, 3, 217 et seq.
9. 9 So far, 32 Reports of the Appellate Body and 53 Panel Reports are published on the WTO web site (as on 30 November 2000).
10. 9 1995, 10, "Die Frage nach einer internationalen Wirtschaftsverfassung ist mit dem Hinweis auf das Theorem der komparativen Kosten also nicht beantwortet, sondern im Grunde erst (sinnvoll) gestellt."
11. On "in dubio mitius" in general see, R. Bernhardt, "Interpretation in International Law", in: id. (ed.), EPIL 7 (1984), 318 et seq., (321).
12. D. Held/ A. McGrew/ D. Goldblatt/ J. Perraton, Global Transformations, 1999,16; U. Beck, Was ist Globalisierungf, 1998, 55 et seq.
13. G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edition, 1928, 609 et seq.; G. Zimmer, Funktion - Kompetenz - Legitimation: Gewaltenteilung in der Ordnung des Grundgesetzes, 1979,33 et seq.
14. Mostly, that function is considered as inherent part of the executive function, Locke, see note 2, Chapter XIV; for the increasing parlamentarisation of the external power R. Wolf rum, "Kontrolle der auswartigen Gewalt", VVDStRL 56 (1996), 38 et seq.
15. M. Bothe, "Neue und alte Konzepte der Durchsetzung des Humanitaren Volkerrechts*', in: V. Epping (ed.), Festschrift Knut Ipsen> 2000, 23, 37 et seq.; T. Marauhn, "Towards a Procedural Law of Compliance Control in International Environmental Relations", ZaoRV 56 (1996), 696 et seq., (707). This strategy is a specific and quite successful method in international law to achieve compliance without centralized enforcement.
16. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/lOmis e/lOmOl e.htm "In fact: it's the governments who dictate to the WTO." On the dispute settlement procedure in detail E Feliciano/ P. Van den Bossche, "The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization", in: N. Blokker/ H. Schermers (eds), Proliferation of International Organizations, 2001, 297; R. Hudec, "The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure", Minn. J. Global Trade 8 (1999), 1 et seq.; P. Mavroidis/ D. Palmeter, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 1999; E.U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1997; A. Ligustro, Le Controversie Tra Stati Nel Diritto Del Commercio Internazionale: Dal Gatt All'OMC, 1996, 439 et seq.; for a comparative analysis R. Keohane/ A. Moravcsik/ A.M. Slaughter, "Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational", International Organization 54 (2000), 457 et seq.; A. Ziegler, "Scope and Function of the WTO Appellate System: What Future after the Millenium Round", Max Planck UNYB 3 (1999), 439 et seq.
17. J. Weiler, "The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections in the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement**, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 09/00.
18. From the point of view of transparency, this set-up is not convincing since responsibilities are obfuscated. The institution to which the decision is attributed, i.e. the Council, has almost no control. If this scheme were applied to the national plane, it would be convincing to call the U.S. President (rather than Congress) the American legislator given his veto power, article I Sec. 7(2) U.S. Constitution.
19. See furthermore arts 8.9, 8.11,13 and 17.7 DSU.
20. y 1990.
21. With respect to their role in the dispute settlement procedure in detail B. Jansen, "Die Rolle der Privatwirtschaft im Streitschlichtungsverfahren der WTO", ZEuS 3 (2000), 293 et seq., (295 et seq.).
22. In detail M. Nettesheim, "Sec. 301 of the Trade Act of 1974", in: E. Grabitz/ A. von Bogdandy (eds), US, Trade Barriers. A Legal Analysis, 1991, 353 et seq.
23. In detail see G. Berrisch/ H.G. Kamann, "Die Handelshemmnis-Verordnung. Ein neues Mittel zur Offnung von Exportmarkten", EuZW 10 (1999), 101 et seq.
24. Panel Report of 31 March 1998, WT/DS44/R, Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper.
25. See, e.g. article XIX GATS; important examples of so called "built-in agends" are to be found with respect to financial services and telecommunication, D. Barth, "Die GATS 2000-Verhandlungen zur Liberalisierung des internationalen Dienstleistungshandels", ZEuS 3 (2000), 273 et seq., (280).
26. On the organizational features J. Jackson, The World Trade Organization. Constitution and Jurisprudence> 1998, 41 et seq.
27. In the EU, however, trade policy decisions do not need parliamentary assent, article 133.3, article 300.3 EC.
28. For the respective U.S.-American debate cf. J. Jackson, "The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results", Colum. J. TransnatH L. 36 (1997), 157 et seq.
29. My entire argument only applies to WTO members whose internal structures can be considered democratic. The problem with respect to citizens living under autocratic rule needs a separate investigation.
30. For attempts to further the participation of NGOs in the work of the WTO, G. Marceau/ P. Pedersen, "Is the WTO Open and Transparent?",
31. / W T 3 3 (1 9 9 9), 5 e t s e q.
32. J. Goldstein/ L. Martin, "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note**, International Organization 54 (2000), 603 et seq., (612).
33. P. Norton, "National Parliaments and the European Union: where to from here", in: P. Craig/ C. Harlow (eds), Lawmaking in the European Union, 209; D. Judge, "The Failure of National Parliaments ?", West European Politics 18 (1995), 79.
34. Jackson, see note 27, pages 33, similarly, 1 and 100.
35. Jackson, see note 27, 51; Similarly Goldstein/ Martin, see note 32, 605.
36. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philiosophie des Recbts, 1821 (1970), § 3.
37. E.W. Bockenforde, "Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip*', in: id., Stoat, Verfassung, Demokratie, 1991, 289, 322.
38. For the specific situation in Common Law countries P. Atiyah/ R. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, 1991,141 et seq.
39. aRisiko als Rechtsproblem", Verwaltungsarchiv 84 (1993), 484 et seq., (490 et seq.).
40. ,>, Zeitscbrift fiir das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 1997, 289 et seq., (290 et seq.); R. Schmidt, "Staatliche Verantwortung fur die Wirtschaft", in: J. Isensee/ P. Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland> Vol. Ill, 1988, § 83; on the economic constitution in Germany and the European Union, see D. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, 1998, 232 et seq.
41. K. Abbott/ D. Snidal, "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance", International Organization 54 (2000), 421 et seq., (439); J. Goldstein/ M. Kahler/ R. Keohane/ A. Slaughter "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics", International Organization 54 (2000), 385 et seq., consider this a common political strategy.
42. See article 13 para. 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217 A (III) of 10 December 1948; article 12 para. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; article 2 para. 2 Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights; see P. Weis/ A. Zimmermann, "Emigration", in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL Instalment Vol.11,1995, 74 et seq.
43. See in particular the friendship, trade and shipment treaties or on the protection of investment, D. Blumenwitz, "Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation", in: Bernhardt, see note 11,484.
44. In detail M. Bothe, "Environment, Development, Resources", Hague Academy of International Law, 2001 (forthcoming).
45. y 1995, 532 et seq.; on the development see R. Senti, "Die neue Welthandelsordnung. Ergebnisse der Uruguay-Runde, Chancen und Risiken", Zeitschrift der ordoliberalen Scbule (ORDO) 45 (1994), 301; T. Stoll, "Die WTO: Neue Welthandelsorganisation, neue Welthandelsordnung", ZaoRV 54 (1994), 241 et seq.; W Meng, "WTO-Recht als Steuerungsmechanismus der neuen Welthandelsordnung*', in: M. Klein/ W. Meng/ R Rode (eds), Die neue Welthandelsordnung der WTO, 1998,19.
46. For an overview G. Kegel/ K. Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, 8th edition, 2000, 69 et seq.
47. Ibid., 5, 8 et seq.
48. v. Bogdandy, see note 39.
49. E.g., article 15.4 TBT Agreement stipulates that the TBT Committee must review the implementation and operation of the agreement every three years. The first report has just been published, http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt5.htm For further evidence cf. article 20 Agreement on Agriculture; article 12.7 SPS Agreement; article 15.3, 15.4 TBT Agreement; article 9 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; article 7.1 Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; article 31 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; article 71.1 TRIPs.
50. 50 On the lack of direct effect explicitly WT/DS152/R United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of1974', Report of the Panel, para. 7.72. For an earlier attempt to introduce direct effect and supremacy cfr. DS 23/R United States-Measures affecting alcoholic and malt beverages, Report by the Panel adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39 (1991-1992), 206 et seq., (297).
51. 51 In detail A. Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen, 1929, 283 et seq.; M. Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, 2nd edition, 1976,167 et seq.
52. 52 M. Shapiro, "The European Court of Justice", in: P. Craig/ G. de Burca (eds), The Evolution ofEULaw, 1999, 321, 340.
53. 53 Appellate Body Report of 4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/ AB/R, WT/DSll/AB/R,/*/?*w - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 15.
54. 54 Ibid. For the common ground between civil law systems and common law systems on this point cf. J. Esser, Grundsatz und Norm, 4th edition, 1990.
55. Brand et al., see note 8,105.
56. On the question whether the WTO should be considered a constitutional order and would therefore lead to a different conclusion see below, Part III, 1.
57. Barth, see note 26,273 et seq., (288).
58. 58 Given the overwhelming importance of the dispute settlement procedure, the comparative ease with which the DSU can be changed is surprising. It can best be explained historically: the dispute settlement procedures under article XXIII GAIT were set up through decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under article XXV: 1 GATT. This tradition lives on in article X:8 WTO, but with an important modification: whereas according to article XXV: 1 GATT the majority of votes cast decides, article X:8 WTO requires consensus.
59. yJWTL 21 (1987), 73 et seq. Beyond being an analysis of positive law, his contribution can be understood as a proposal for a possible further development of the world trade regime.
60. 60 Ibid., 74.
61. 61 Ibid., 77; the possibility of Roessler's interpretation is confirmed by Jackson, see note 34,42; for a general account on autonomous rule-making cf. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern/ G. Loibl, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisational einschliejilich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften, 6th edition, 1996,212 etseq.
62. 62 Ibid., 76-77.
63. 63 Ibid., 74-75.
64. 64 Ibid., 75.
65. 65 Ibid, 76.
66. 66 Jackson, see note 34, 43. WTO provisions prevail over the unchanged GATT provisions, article XVI:3 WTO.
67. 67 On this Bernhardt, see note 11, 325.
68. The Appellate Body has, however, introduced some indirect control, see Appellate Body Report of 9 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, paras 179 -188. This form of control does not, however, appear sufficient if the organization is to develop a fully functional legislator.
69. The supremacy of the WTO Agreement with respect to the GATT results from article XVI:3 WTO.
70. 70 J. Jackson, TheJurisprudence ofGATT & the WTO, 2000,186.
71. 71 WT/DS27/AB/R, 1997, see note 68, paras 183,185,187.
72. 72 On the parallel discussion how to control the UN Security Council when enacting legislation see J. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council*, AJIL 90 (1996), 1 et seq.; B. Martenczuk, Rechtshindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicberheitsrates, 1996.
73. 73 Cf. e.g. the work from 30 October - 3 November 2000. The following bodies met in that week: Trade Policy Review Body; Informal Working Party on the Accession of Russia; Committee on Anti-Dumping; Committee on Rules of Origin; for the - disappointing - work of the important Committee on Trade and Environment see R. Tarasofsky, "The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment: Is it making a Difference?", Max Planck UNYB 3 (1999), 471 et seq.
74. 74 The regular procedure and quorum for decisions are laid down in article IX: 1 WTO in a surprising formula: consensus shall be the practice. If, however, consensus cannot be attained, the majority of the votes cast shall decide. As the tedious procedure leading to the nomination of Director-General Moore proves, consensus is sought even in cases that appear almost impossible; majority decisions, although legally possible, appear to be largely theoretical.
75. 75 Appellate Body Report of 23 August 1999, WT/DS90/AB/R India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products.
76. 76 Such a decision would need to be taken according to the rules of article IX WTO, i.e. by consensus or a majority of the votes cast.
77. WT/DS90/AB/R, see note 75, para. 5.114; "It is also clear that panels could not ignore determinations by the BOP Committee and the General Council".
78. 78 Ibid., paras 18,25.
79. Identical to the reading by R. Howse/ P. Mavroidis, "Europe's evolving regulatory strategy for GMO's - the issue of consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine an Brine", 7 (manuscript), Fordbam Int'l L. /., 2001, forthcoming. This majority does not collide with the rule of reverse consensus in article 16.4 and article 17.14 DSU because the authoritative decision would not affect the settlement in a disputed case.
80. E.U. Petersmann, "The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization*, EJIL 6 (1995), 161 et seq., (186, 208); sceptical about the benefits of legalization Goldstein/ Martin, see note 32, 630 et seq.; see on the costs also Weiler, see note 18,7 et seq. On the question, whether this is an aim of the WTO, see below III 2 a.
81. On these positions in more detail below, III. 1.
82. This strategy has, however, not even worked properly within the European Union, E. Vos, "Market Building, Social regulation and Scientific Expertise", in: C. Joerges/ K.H. Ladeur/ E. Vos (eds), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making, 1997,127,134.
83. aDie Entscheidung des WTO Appellate Body im Hormonfall*', EuZW 9 (1998), 147 et seq., (148); M. Hilf/ B. Eggers, «Der WTOPanelbericht im EG/USA-Hormonstreit", EuZW 8 (1997), 559 et seq.; R. Howse/ P. Mavroidis, see note 79; A. Quick/ R. Bliihtner, "Has the Appellate Body Erred?**, Journal of International Economic Law 2 (1999), 603 et seq., (637); M. Ritter, "Das WTO-Ubereinkommen und seine Auswirkungen auf das Deutsche und Europaische Lebensmittelrecht*', EuZW 8 (1997), 133 et seq., (136 et seq.); G. Sander, "Gesundheitsschutz in der WTO - eine neue Bedeutung des Codex Alimentarius im Lebensmittelrecht?", ZEuS 3 (2000), 335 et seq.; J. Pauwelyn, "The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as applied in the first three SPS disputes. EC - Hormones, Australia - Salmon and Japan - Varietals",/o«rnal of International Economic Law 2 (1999), 641 et seq. Report of the Panel on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) of 18 August 1997, WT/DS26/R/USA; EC and Report of the Appellate Body of 16 January 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R. A similar issue was discussed in the Appellate Body Report of 20 August 1999, WT/DS46/AB/R Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft. The Appellate Body held that the Brazilian export finance regime for Brazilian aircraft violated article 3.1. lit.(a) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMA) because it was "used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms" which, according to the definition under lit.(k) of the illustrative list in Annex I SCMA, is a prohibited export subsidy. As a possible benchmark for the definition of a material advantage the Appellate Body referred to the "Commercial Interest Reference Rate" developed by a sub-body of the OECD, even though this standard appears nowhere in the SCMA and even though the defendant, Brazil, was not a member of the OECD and had therefore not participated in the development of this standard (para. 181).
84. The Union acts in the WTO under the legal personality of the European Communities, in detail, A. v. Bogdandy, **Organisational Proliferation and Centralisation under the Treaty on European Union", in: Blokker/ Schermers, see note 17,177.
85. WT/DS26/R/USA, see note 87, paras 8.59, 8.69; Appellate Body Report of 16 January 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, see note 87, para. 162 et seq.
86. Established through the 11th Sess. of the Conference of FAO in 1961 and the 16th World Health Assembly in 1963 during which both passed resolutions to establish the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The two bodies also adopted the Statutes and Rules of Procedure for the Commission; http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114e04.htm Article 7 CAC-Statute; article IX No. 5 Rules of Procedure http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/ECONOMIC/ESN/codex/Manual/statutes .htm For an extensive analysis see T. Makatsch, Gesundheitsschutz und Lebensmittelbandel im Recht der WTO, 2001 (forthcoming).
87. Rule 11.3 Rules of Procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commisssion (Procedural Manual, 11th edition, FAO and WHO, 2000); No. 4 and 5 Guidelines for Codex-committees.
88. 94 D. Eckert, "Zur Harmonisierung des Lebensmittelrechts, 1. Teil: Bilanz der letzten 10 Jahre**, Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 1984, 1 et seq., (11).
89. 95 For a detailed description see the CAC's presentation of its procedure in: Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts, http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/ECONOMIC/ESN/codex/Procedl.htm
90. 96 "Weniger Lebensmittelschutz durch GATT", Suddeutsche Zeitung of 24 June 1993,2.
91. 97 G. Sander, "Gesundheitsschutz in der WTO - eine neue Bedeutung des Codex Alimentarius im Lebensmittelrecht?", ZEuS 3 (2000), 335 et seq., (345).
92. 98 N. Avery/ M. Drake/ T. Lang, Internationale Harmonisierung lebensmittelrechtlicher Normen, epd-Entwicklungspolitik: Materialien II/93, Frankfurt 1993, 13, 23; 49 per cent of the official delegates of the U.S. during the 19th Sess. of the CAC were representatives of the national food industry. In the Swiss delegation this portion was even 61 per cent.
93. 99 ALINORM 91/40, No. 154 et seq. Ritter, see note 86,137.
94. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the 21st Sess. of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission 61 app. (1995), ALINORM 95/8, 3.
95. Ritter, see note 86,137; Sander, see note 97,352.
96. Hilf/ Eggers, see note 86, 560.
97. K. v. Beyme, Der Gesetzgeber: Der Bundestag als Entscheidungszentrum, 1997', 148 et seq.; Schermers/ Blokker, see note 4, para. 558.
98. E. Denninger, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Normsetzung im Umwelt-und Technikrecht> 1990,122 et seq.
99. In detail v. Bogdandy, see note 39,166 et seq., 385 et seq.
100. See, for example, Appendix I to Directive 98/73/EC Machines O. J. 1998, L 207/1.
101. 107 93/43/EEC, O.J. 1993, L 175/1.
102. 108 In detail for the forms of acceptance, ALINORM 95/7,2 et seq., 6 et seq.
103. WT/DS26/R/USA, see note 87, para 8.44; 8.86.
104. 110 Ibid., para. 8.44.
105. 111 Ibid., para. 8.83.
106. 112 Ibid., para. 8.87.
107. 113 CAC Document of 24 May 1995, ALINORM 95/7, Particle 1 (Revised), 6.
108. 114 Hilf/ Eggers, see note 86, 565; Sander, see note 97, 366; Ritter, see note 86, 135.
109. WT/DS26/AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R, see note 87, para. 163 et seq.
110. 116 Ibid., para. 165.
111. 117 Ibid., para. 165.
112. 118 Ibid., para. 172.
113. 119 Ibid., para. 173.
114. 120 Eggers, see note 86,150 et seq.; Sander, see note 97, 370.
115. On this in more detail below, Part III. 3.
116. For the legal discussion on the national level cf. J. Barcelo, "Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment", Cornell Int'l L. /. 27 (1994), 755 et seq.; K.H. Ladeur, "The Integration of Scientific and Technological Expertise into the Process of Standard-Setting According to German Law", in: Joerges/ Ladeur/ Vos, see note 84, 77.
117. On 5.7 SPS Agreement see Appellate Body Report of 22 February 1999, WT/DS76/AB/R Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, para. 86 et seq.
118. 124 In detail J. Scott, Jean Monnet Papers 3 (1999), 24 et seq. at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonner/papers/index.html - D. Wirth, . Annotation, AJIL 92 (1998), 755 et seq., (759).
119. WT/DS26/AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R, see note 87, para. 193.
120. 126 Ibid., para. 194.
121. WT/DS76/AB/R, see note 123, para. 84.
122. 128 Cf. WT/DS18/AB/R, Australia Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, part V.B., para. 10.
123. WT/DS76/AB/R, see note 123, para. 113.
124. WT/DS18/AB/R Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, part V. C. 3., para 8.
125. 131 This rule is nevertheless of great significance since it is probable that domestic legislation so far has only occasionally been based on scientific evidence in accordance with the Appellate Body's stringent interpretation of the SPS Agreement.
126. For a broad comparative analysis see N. Blokker/ H. Schermers (eds), Proliferation of International Organizations. Legal Issues, 2001; Goldstein/ Kahler/ Keohane/ Slaughter, see note 41.
127. See the overview on the website of the ICJ at http://www.icj-cij.org (visited 1 November 2000). The most recent declaration was made by Lesotho on 6 September 2000.
128. Declaration of 1 January 1969. This is in notable contrast to the fact that all five Permanent Members of the Security Council always have had a judge at the ICJ, P. Malanczuk, Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, 1997,284.
129. Besides the United Kingdom the other two are Canada, Declaration of 10 May 1994, and Japan, Declaration of 15 September 1958.
130. On the reservations see J. Merrills, "The Optional Clause Revisited", BYIL 64 (1993), 197 et seq.
131. M. Schroder, "IGH - International GerichtshoP, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), Handbuch Vereinte Nationen, 2nd edition, 1991, 321 et seq., para. 13; S. Rosenne, The World Court, 1989, 92.
132. See the Fisheries Case (Spain v. Canada), in which Canada had modified its declaration when facing possible proceedings before the Court, in detail K. Oellers-Frahm, Trobleme und Grenzen der obligatorischen internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit", AVR 27 (1989), 443 et seq.
133. See U.S. Department of State, Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction of 7 October 1985, ILM 24 (1985), 1742 et seq.; A. D'Amato, "Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court", AJIL 79 (1985), 385 et seq. Since 1951, 12 declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory have been withdrawn.
134. R. Jennings, "The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years", AJIL 89 (1995), 493 et seq., (495).
135. See the list of treaties on the homepage of the ICJ, which is based on the UN Treaty Series, http://www.icj.cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasictreatiesandotherdocs.htm (visited 1 November 2000).
136. Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992, ILM 31 (1992) 818 et seq., article 27 para. 3 lit.(b).
137. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992, ILM 31 (1992), 849 et seq., article 14 para. 2 lit.(a).
138. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context of 25 February 1991, ILM 30 (1991), 802 et seq., article 15 para. 2; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions of 14 June 1994, ILM 33 (1994), 1542 et seq., article 9.
139. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, UNTS Vol. 596 No. 8638; Optional Protocol article I; see the Order of 9 April 1998, Paraguay v. United States of America (Case discontinued by order of 10 November 1998), and the order of 3 March 1999, Germany v. United States (LaGrand).
140. Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, ILM 10 (1971), 1151 et seq.; Case Libya v. United Kingdom/ United States of America, Judgments of 27 February 1998.
141. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, A/RES/260 A (III) of 9 December 1948, article IX; Yugoslavia had brought ten NATO countries before the ICJ on these grounds. The proceedings against Spain and the United States were removed from the docket, as Spain and the United States had made reservations with respect to article IX and the ICJ thus lacked jurisdiction. Calculation based on the years 1995-2000.
142. In detail A. v. Bogdandy, "The EU as a human rights organization?", CML ito>. 37 (2000), 1307 etseq.
143. Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECR 14921, para. 129; Case C-416/96, El-Yassini, ECR 1999,11209, para. 45.
144. This understanding is confirmed by the Charter. In Consideration 3 it distinguishes clearly between common values and human rights, on the one hand, and the freedoms, on the other. Furthermore, no freedom except the freedom of movement and residence (article 44) is mentioned in the Charter.
145. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, ECR 1979, 649, 662, para. 8; Case C-51/94, Sauce Hollandaise, ECR 1995,1 3599, 3627, para. 29; Case C-470/93, Mars, ECR 1995,11923, 1940, para. 12; this formula does not appear in all judgments, see, e.g., Case C-412/93, Leclerc, ECR 1995, 209, 216, para. 18 et seq.
146. The same is true for the two other important bodies of primary law, namely competition law and gender discrimination law: they do not affect the discretion of the Union's legislature.
147. 154 Cases 80 and 81/77, Ramel, ECR 1978, 927, para. 37; Case C-47/90, Etablissements Delhaize freres, ECR 1992, 1-3669, para. 44; Case C-350/97, Monsees, ECR 1999,1 - 2921, para. 24; M. Poiares Maduro, We, the court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution, 1998, 76 et seq., (78); a tighter control is exercised with respect to movement of workers, given its human rights dimension, Case 41/84, Pinna, ECR 1986,17, para. 21.
148. 155 This is also the evidence from Goldstein/ Kahler/ Keohane/ Slaughter, see note 41, 385 et seq., (389, 398), analyzing a number of international agreements under the categories of "obligation, precision, and delegation".
149. 156 The international law of human rights appears to have taken a separate development since the total submission of politics to essential human rights standards has become an established feature, A. Cassese, / diritti umani nel mondo contemporaneo, 4th edition 1999, 5 et seq., 85 et seq.; C. Tomuschat, "Das Strafgesetzbuch der Verbrechen gegen den Frieden und die Sicherheit der Menschheit", EuGRZ 25 (1998), 1 et seq.; A. Zimmermann, "The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court'', Max Planck UNYB 2 (1998), 169 et seq.
150. On the relationship to Civil Society see J. Scholte/ R. O'Brien/ M. Williams, "The WTO and Civil Society", JWT 33 (1999), 107 et seq.; in more general terms D. Bodansky, "The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?", AJIL 93 (1999), 596 et seq.
151. Some scholars assume that for that reason the most important processes of forming new law have moved from the traditional institutions to societal actors, Teubner, see note 7, 437; see also K. Ipsen, Volkerrecbt, 4th edition, 1999, § 3, paras 29, 30.
152. It is telling that only the U.S. - the most influential member of the WTO - is considering withdrawal, Abbott/ Snidal, see note 41,438 et seq. The substantive debate today is whether a WTO member is free to choose between fulfilling the recommendations of a dispute settlement report - and thus being obliged to adapt its internal order - or mere compensation, article 22 DSU. The opinion that a member must adapt appears more convincing, Jackson, see note 34, 85 et seq.; for the opposite view J. Sack, "Von der Geschlossenheit und den Spannungsfeldern in einer Weltordnung des Rechts", EuZW 8 (1997), 650 et seq., (688). Also the debate on direct applicability of WTO law can be understood in this light.
153. 161 M. Weber, "Die 'ObjektivitaV sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis", in: id., Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenscbaftslebre, 7th edition., 1988, 146 et seq., 190 et seq.; for its usefulness in legal scholarship cf. E. Grabitz, Gemeinschaftsrecht bricht nationales Recht, 1966,28 et seq.
154. 162 This part has been inspired by Maduro, see note 154,103 et seq.; see also A. v. Bogdandy, * A Bird's Eye View on the Science of European Law", ELJ 6 (2000), 208 et seq., (224 et seq.), (235 et seq.)
155. 163 The Economist, "World Trade Survey", 22 September 1990, 5 et seq.; The Economist, "A Survey of World Trade", 3 October 1998, 4 et seq.; B. S. Frey, Internationale Politische Okonomie, 1985, 12 et seq.; H. Glismann/ E.J. Horn/ S. Nehring/ R. Vaubel, Weltwirtschaftslebre, Vol. I, 4th edition, 1992, 72 et seq.
156. y 1989, 305; this latter position corresponds to the understanding proposed in this article.
157. 165 Jackson, ibid., 102, quoting R. Coase in his authority as a Nobel Prize winner.
158. >Y/ Fikentscher, Wirtscbaftsrecht, Vol. I, 1983, 255. Fikentscher's great monograph interprets the whole of international economic law as parts of an emerging world competition order, ibid., 204 et seq.
159. w, Rechtshistorisches Journal 11 (1992), 473.
160. For a thorough theoretical review cf. Gerber, see note 40,232 et seq.
161. Drexl, see note 7, 841, 846; for the theoretical underpinning cf. C. Goodhart, "Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic?*, Modern Law Review 60 (1997), 1 et seq., (17 et seq.).
162. For a theoretical account N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 1995, 407 et seq.
163. De Vergottini, see note 2,206 et seq., 234 et seq.
164. 172 For further uses of this category on the international level cf. B. Fafibender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A Constitutional Perspective, 1998, 25 et seq.
165. 173 E.U. Petersmann, "The WTO Constitution and Human Rights", JIEL 3 (2000), 19 et seq., (24).
166. The leading work is E.U. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law, 1991; in particular 210 et seq.; furthermore H. Hauser, "Domestic Policy Foundation and Domestic Policy Function on International Trade Rules", Aussenwirtschaft 41 (1986), 171 et seq.; F. Roessler, "Competition and Trade Politics*, Aussenwirtschaft 41 (1986), 467 et seq.; J. Tumlir, "International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism", Zeitschrift der ordoliberalen Schule (ORDOJ 34 (1983), 71 et seq.
167. 175 The question of the direct effect of WTO law is the subject of the richest and most controversial discussion in international trade law; its adequate presentation is not the object of this contribution; see Advocate General A. Saggio, Conclusions of 25. February 1999 in Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, para. 14 et seq., para. 24; W. Meng, "Gedanken zur Frage unmittelbarer Anwendung von WTO-Recht in der EG", in: U. Beyerlin/ M. Bothe/ R. Hofmann/ E.U. Petersmann, Festschrift fiir R. Bernhardt, 1995, 1063 et seq., (1064); see also references in note 5.
168. 176 Petersmann, see note 81,189.
169. 177 In detail Meng, see note 175, 1080 et seq.; E.U. Petersmann, "International Trade Order and International Trade Law", in: T. Oppermann/ E.U. Petersmann (eds), Reforming the International Economic Order, 1997.
170. 178 M. Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, 1962, 11; see also Mestmacker, see note 167; this vision is shared by powerful economic actors, see the chairman of Deutsche Bank, R. Breuer, "Offene Burgergesellschaft in der globalisierten Weltwirtschaft", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 4 January 1999, 9.
171. 179 For a discussion of costs and benefits cf. E.U. Petersmann, "International Competition for Governments and for Private Business", JWT 30 (1996), 5 et seq., (12, 15 et seq.)
172. 180 In detail Langer, see note 10, 18 et seq.; R. Howse/ K. Nicolaidis, "Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far", http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/trade/howse.htm
173. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, see note 87, para. 187; for the relationship between internal economic policies and international trade law cf. A. v. Bogdandy/ M. Nettesheim, "Access to the Internal Market. The System of the European Community's Legal Instruments", World Competition 17 (1993), 27 et seq.
174. 182 Petersmann, see note 174, 96 et seq.
175. 183 Goldstein/ Martin, see note 32,609 f.
176. In detail D. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, 1996, 180 et seq.; E. Hobsbawm, Das Zeitalter der Extreme, 1995, 703; C Lofdahl, "On the Environmental Externalities of Global Trade", International Political Science Review 19 (1998), 339 et seq., (351); P. Perkins, "Sustainable Trade", in: R. Keil/ L. Fawcett (eds), Political Ecology, 1998, 46, 51; see also the references in note 7.
177. As the economist Goodhart, see note 169, 2, puts it: "Economics has become an increasingly and unashamedly imperialist social science in recent decades. And you in the law provide one of our finest colonies." On this distinction Altvater/ Mahnkopf, see note 7, 45, 63 et seq., 133 et seq., 219 et seq.
178. In detail Maduro, see note 154, 59 et seq.
179. 188 For further arguments cf. Maduro, see note 154,145 et seq.
180. 189 See IL 4 b above.
181. 190 The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, 1995, 9 et seq.; M. Zurn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates, 1998, 329 et seq.; Altvater/ Mahnkopf, see note 7,397.
182. 191 O. Hoffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 1999, 310 et seq.; convincing the critique by Gunther, see note 6, 232 et seq.; similarly the ideas of a cosmopolitan democracy, D. Held, "Rethinking Democracy: Globalization and Democratic Theory**, in: Streek, see note 6, 59.
183. 192 D. Messner/ F. Nuscheler, "Global Governance. Herausforderungen an der Schwelle zurn 21. Jahrhundert", in: D. Senghaas (ed.), Frieden machen, 1997, 337, 351; G. Shell, "Trade Legalism and International Relation Theory", Duke Law Journal 44 (1995), 829 et seq.
184. 193 Petersmann has made important proposals, see e.g. see note 81, 221; as a possible model for future development Langer, see note 10, 330; Howse/ Nicolaidis, see note 180,13 et seq.
185. 194 See above, II. 3. a. aa.
186. 195 See above, II. 3.
187. 196 To my knowledge, those fundamentally critical of the WTO have not yet proposed a scholarly model for interpretation.
188. 197 Langer, see note 10, 65, et. seq.; Robert Howse, with his concept of "embedded liberalism" proposes what is, perhaps, the most elaborate position within this school of thought, cf. Howse/ Nicolaidis, see note 180; R. Howse, Democracy, Science, andFree Trade: Risk Regulation on trialat the World Trade Organization (forthcoming); R. Howse, "Eyes Wide Shut in Seattle: The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization", in: Heiskanen and Coicaud (eds), The Legitimacy of International Institutions, 2001, forthcoming United Nations University Press-; on related works quoted in this article, see notes 86,180.
189. 198 Ibid.
190. 199 This is often assumed by critics, Altvater/ Mahnkopf, see note 7, 396.
191. 200 Petersmann, see note 176.
192. 201 Similarly the 2nd recital of GATT; see also the 2nd and 4th recitals of GATS, 1st recital of TRIPs.
193. 202 J. Tumlir, *GATT Rules and Community Law", in: M. Hilf/ F. Jacobs/ E.U. Petersmann (eds), The European Community and GATT, 1986, 1, 7, with respect to GATT, of course.
194. 203 F. Bydlinski,/«nstt5c/?e Methodenlekre, 2nd edition, 1991,444.
195. my analysis of arts 2 and 3 EC, v. Bogdandy, in: E. Grabitz/ M. Hilf (eds), EU-Kommentar, 2000, article 2 EC, para. 1, 19 et seq.
196. 205 For further differences see C D . Ehlermann/ G. Campogrande, "Rules on Services in the EEC: A Model for Negotiating World-Wide Rules?", in: E.U. Petersmann/ M. Hilf (eds), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 5,1988,481, 482 et seq.
197. 206 See, e.g., WT/DS2/9, see note 21, 22; WT/DS58/AB/R United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, para. 164,167.
198. ,,, in: id. (eds), Weltkonferenzen und Weltberichte. Ein Wegweiser durch die international Diskussion, 1996,12, 21.
199. 208 Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos, ECR 1963, 1, 24; M. Heintzen, "Die Legitimation des Europaischen Parlaments", ZEuS 3 (2000), 377 et seq., (381 et seq.).
200. 209 For an interpretation in the sense of "coordinated interdependence" Langer, see note 10, 264 et seq.
201. TRIPs only sets up certain minimum standards for the treatment of foreigners and does not address the treatment of nationals. According to article 1.3 TRIPs "Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of other Members''. See also A. Schafers, "Normsetzung zum geistigen Eigentum in international Organisationen, WIPO und WTO - ein Vergleich", Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Int., 1996, 763 et seq., (770 et seq.).
202. 211 Cf. Howse/ Mavroidis, see note 86, 2 (manuscript).
203. WT/DS26/AB/R, see note 87, para. 165.
204. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, see note 87, para. 165, emph. in original.
205. 214 Ibid., para. 177.
206. 215 Similarly WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206, para. 193; WT/DS2/9, see note 21, 30.
207. 6 W. Culbertson, International Economic Policies, 1925,185-192; R. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, 1956,16,17.
208. 217 Maduro, see note 154, 35 et seq.
209. 218 R. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, 1987, 133; on the centrality of discrimination RT. Stoll, "Freihandel und Verfassung", ZaoRV 57 (1997), 83 et seq., (119).
210. 219 Appellate Body Report of 4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Till.
211. 220 In detail on the cases F. Altemdller, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der Berucksichtigung von Umweltschutzzielen in den Vertragstexten der Weltbandelsorganisation, 1996, 87 et seq., 213 et seq.; see also e.g. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ILM 30 (1991), 1594 et seq. and ILM 33 (1994), 936 et seq.; v. Bogdandy, "Internationaler Handel und nationaler Umweltschutz: Eine Abgrenzung im Lichte des GATT", EuZW 4 (1992), 243 et seq.
212. w, EJIL 11 (2000), 249 et seq.
213. 222 Such a proposition does not conflict with the Appellate Body's decision in Shrimps/Turtles, as the delineation between article III and article XI was not at issue there, WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206; the measure in Shrimps/Turtles was country-based and not origin-neutral.
214. 223 Howse/ Regan, see note 221,259-261.
215. 224 Ibid., 257.
216. 225 Ibid., 261.
217. 226 Ibid., 269-272.
218. 227 See the discussion of the Belgian Family Allowances Case by B. Jansen, "The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective**, EJIL 11 (2000), 309 et seq., (311); Howse/ Regan, see note 221,262-263.
219. 228 See Jansen, see above, 311.
220. 229 D. Bodansky, "What's so Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?*, EJIL11 (2000), 339 et seq.
221. 230 Howse/ Regan, see note 221,274.
222. 231 Ibid., 279.
223. 232 See e.g., J. Jackson, "Comments on the Shrimp/Turtle and the Process/Production Distinction", EJIL 11 (2000), 303 et seq.; Jansen, see note 228, 309 et seq.
224. 233 Case 7/61, Commission/Italy, ECR 1961, 695, 720; Case 113/80, Commission/Ireland, ECR 1981, 1625, 1637, in detail: H. Matthies/ R. v. Borries, in: Grabitz/ Hilf, see note 204, note 3 et seq.
225. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, see note 87, para. 104.
226. 235 For possible steps see the proposals in: Wuppertal Institut fur Klima, Umwelt, Energie, Zukunftsfahiges Deutschland, 1996,153 et seq.
227. 236 M. Hilf, "Freiheit des Welthandels contra Umweltschutz?", Neue Zeitschriftfiir Verwaltungsrecht 19 (2000), 481et seq., (483 et seq.)
228. 237 Maduro, see note 154,146 et seq.
229. WT/DS2/9, see note 21, 27; WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206, para. 174 et seq.
230. 239 Most important in this respect is the discussion which derives organizational and procedural standards from fundamental rights, T. Vesting, Prozedurales Rundfunkrecht, 1997,94 et seq.
231. WT/DS2/9, see note 21, 27; WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206, para. 174 et seq.
232. WT/DS2/9, see note 21,27.
233. WT/DS2/9, see note 21, 28; WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206, para. 169, 172 et seq.
234. WT/DS2/9, see note 21,26.
235. WT/DS2/9, see note 21,26.
236. WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206, para. 177.
237. 246 Ibid.
238. 247 Ibid., para. 190.
239. 248 The importing countries had to comply with the guidelines under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B). In practice this meant that they were required to use turtle extractor devices. See e.g., ibid., para. 177 et seq.
240. 249 Ibid., para. 181.
241. 250 Ibid., para. 180, footnotes deleted.
242. 251 Ibid., para. 183.
243. 252 An important provision of this type is article 7 SPS in conjunction with Annex B SPS Agreement. It contains a publication requirement, obliges the members to create a national information office and provides for a special notification procedure. The Appellate Body gives significant weight to these provisions. In WT/DS76/AB/R Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products it decided that the publication requirement for measures regulated by the SPS Agreement was not only applicable to legally enforceable instruments but also to other instruments which are applicable generally and similar in character to those explicitly mentioned, paras 102 - 108. This publication requirement goes well beyond what is constitutionally required in most Member States, v. Bogdandy, see note 39,484 et seq.
244. WT/DS58/AB/R, see note 206, para. 169 et seq.
245. 254 R. Schmidt, *Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen", WDStRL 36 (1977), 66, 69; or, in an pointed formulation: "Each state is the whole world from a different perspective**, Langer, see note 10, 29.
246. 255 A further field of crucial importance for the development of the coordinated interdependence model are the issues of the burden of proof and the standard of review. Given their complexity, they are not addressed in this article, though the model's general thrust as applied to these issues should be rather evident.
247. 256 This is the principle of non-discrimination, environmental variety, as developed by the OECD. In detail M. Bothe, "Grenziiberschreitender Verwaltungsrechtsschutz gegen Umwelt belastende Anlagen", Umwelt- und Planungsrecht 3 (1983), 1 et seq.; id., *Le Tribunal administratif federal allemand reconnait le principe de 1'egaUte d'acces", Revue juridique de Venvironnement 1988, 186 et seq.; M. Haedrich, "Internationaler Umweltschutz und Souveranitatsverzicht*, Der Staat 39 (2000), 547 et seq., (554 et seq.).
248. 257 Doc. UNEP/IG 12/2 of 2 February 1978.
249. For the positions cf. the website of the Centre for International Development of Harvard University, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade on the far reaching European position see "Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europaische Parlament, Das Konzept der EU fur die WTOJahrtausendrunde", KOM 99, 331 endg.; B. May, "Die deutsch-europaische Verhandlungsposition bei der WTO-Handelsrunde", Aus Pol. & Zeitgesch. B 46-47/99, 27; for the position of developing countries see J. Wiemann, **Die Entwicklungslander vor der neuen WTO-Runde", Aus Pol. & Zeitgesch. B 46-47/99,32.
250. For the profound impact that human rights can have on a transnational institution cf. v. Bogdandy, see note 149; therefore, one should shy away from using the WTO as an instrument to install or further democracy in WTO members; in this direction Howse, see note 197, 312 et seq.
251. y Vol. 4 No. 44, 21 November 2000, http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/storyl.21-llOO.htm
252. Goldstein/ Martin, see note 32, 612; Weiler, see note 18, 11 et seq.; for far-reaching strategies cf. Howse/ Nicolaidis, see note 180,11 et seq.
253. For a dramatic picture of what could happen otherwise J.M. Guehenno, "Demokratie am Wendepunkt?", Internationale Politik 4 (1998), 13 et seq., (16).
254. With respect to the European Union, it probably entails that the Directorate-General for Agriculture loses its competence to develop policies on health issues and consumer protection, given its protectionist bias. For the challenges see S. Cassese, "Gli stati nella rete internazionale dei poteri pubblici", Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico 49 (1999), 321 et seq., (326 et. seq.).
255. For example, Howse's attempt to reconcile these requirements with the democratic principle, see note 197, 309 et seq., is largely outside constitutional orthodoxy.
256. Ground-breaking Langer, see note 10,23 et seq., (51).
257. On this aspect of sovereignty G. Dahm/ J. Delbriick/ R. Wolfram, Volkerrecbt 1/1,2nd edition, 1989, § 23 IV 1.