Justifying affirmative action: Perception and reality

Journal of Law and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 1-23

  McHarg, Aileen ^a   Nicolson, Donald ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33645159108     PISSN: 0263323X     EISSN: 14676478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2006.00344.x     Document Type: Review

References (131)

1. They are soft in the sense of not requiring mandatory preferences, but can effectively act as quotas if backed by sufficient pressure; see, for example, n. 31 below.
2. See, for example, A. McColgan, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2005, 2nd edn.) 143.
3. J. Gardner, 'Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination' (1989) 9 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 1, at 15-16.
4. ss. 47 and 48.
5. ss. 35, 37, and 38.
6. S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (2002) 145.
7. The Disabled Persons (Employment) Act 1944 imposed a 3 per cent quota for the employment of registered disabled persons. However, having been widely ignored in practice, it was repealed by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
8. Though the quota can be varied by ministerial order if it would result in a serious recruitment shortfall.
9. Compare S. Fredman, 'Equality: a New Generation?' (2001) Industrial Law J. 145, at 163.
10. See, for example, Lawrence v. Regent Office Care Ltd, Case C320/00, [2002] ECR I-7325.
11. Freedman, Industrial Law J. op. cit., n. 9, p. 164.
12. See McHarg, in this volume, pp. 149-51.
13. s. 75 and sch. 9. The Welsh Assembly and the Greater London Authority are under similar duties, though not subject to external scrutiny - Government of Wales Act 1998, s. 120; Greater London Authority Act 1999, s. 33.
14. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (1999; Cm. 4262; Chair, Sir W. Macpherson).
15. ss. 71-71E RRA.
16. s. 21B DDA 1995.
17. Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, S.I. 1660, Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, S.I. 1661, implementing Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ L 303/16, 2 December 2000; s. 1(1A) RRA, implementing Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ L 180/22, 19 July 2000; Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2467, implementing Directive 2002/73/EC, OJ L269/15, 5 December 2002.
18. Previously, these could only be justified if they related to the employer's specific needs, not by reference to wider social issues - Greater Manchester Police Authority v. Lea [1990] IRLR 372. Now, they must simply be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
19. See Directive 2002/73/EC, and Art. 141 EC regarding gender; Directive 2000/43/EC, regarding race; and Directive 2000/78/EC, regarding religious belief, sexual orientation, discrimination and age, all at n. 17 above.
20. id.
21. Directive 2000/78/EC, id.
22. See Burrows and Robison, in this volume, pp. 39-40.
23. But the regulations implementing the age discrimination provisions of Directive 2000/78/EC, id, will allow direct discrimination to be justified. This may include, for example, fixing a minimum age to qualify for certain employment-related advantages in order to recruit or retain older people - DTI, Equality and Diversity: Coming of Age: Consultation on the Draft Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (2005) para, 4.1.7.
24. In the Matter of an Application by Mark Parsons for Judicial Review [2002] NIQB 46. The Court of Appeal later also rejected the argument that the provision breached Art. 9 - [2003] NICA 20.
25. See, generally, McColgan, In the Matter of an Application by Mark Parsons for Judicial Review op. cit., n. 2, pp. 151-7;
26. see, also, L. Barmes, 'Public Appointments and Representativeness' [2002] Public Law 606.
27. L. Barmes with S. Ashtiany, 'The Diversity Approach to Achieving Equality: Potential and Pitfalls' (2003) 32 Industrial Law J. 274, at 276-7.
28. Barmes, Industrial Law J. op. cit., n. 24, p. 611.
29. McColgan, Industrial Law J. op. cit., n. 2, p. 153.
30. See D. Nicolson, 'Demography, Discrimination and Diversity: A New Dawn for the British Legal Profession' (2005) 12 International J. of the Legal Profession 201;
31. Barmes with Ashtiany, International J. of the Legal Profession op. cit., n. 25;
32. and see Francis and McDonald, in this volume, p. 101.
33. C.L. Bacchi, The Politics of Affirmative Action (1996) 23.
34. Local Government Best Value (Exclusion of Non-commercial Considerations) Order 2001, S.I. 909.
35. However, in the civil service, diversity targets have recently been strengthened by linking them to performance bonuses, a practice also employed by some companies 'Too Few Black and Asian Faces at the Top' Guardian, 17 November 2005.
36. McColgan, Guardian, op. cit., n. 2, p. 155.
37. id., p. 171, referring to Acas v. Taylor, Appl No EAT/788/97, unreported, 11 February 1998.
38. In limited circumstances, direct discrimination in order to ensure a diverse workforce may be justified as a 'genuine occupational qualification' - S. Fredman, 'Reversing Discrimination' (1997) 113 Law Q. Rev. 575, at 583; and see n. 22 above, regarding age discrimination.
39. The former expires in 2015; the latter must be renewed on a triennial basis. It currently runs until March 2007 - Police (Northern Ireland) Act (Renewal of Temporary Provisions) Order 2004, S.I. 114.
40. Compare C. McCrudden, 'Rethinking Positive Action' (1986) 15 Industrial Law J. 219, at 219.
41. See, for example, 'Women: Putting Women in their Place' Guardian, 3 December 1991;
42. 'Comment' Independent, 28 July 1995;
43. 'Equality in Education RIP' Daily Mail, 7 October 2002:
44. 'Admissions Bias Alarms Heads' Times Educational Supplement, 26 September 2003, 19.
45. Compare R. Delgado, 'The Imperial Scholar Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature' (1984) 132 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 561, at 570-1;
46. M.J. Radin, 'Affirmative Action Rhetoric' (1991) 8 Social Philosophy and Policy 130, at 136;
47. G. Ezorsky, Racism and Justice: They Case for Affirmative Action (1991).
48. The idea of society repaying its debts to particular groups also underlies uncontroversial preference schemes for war veterans: compare Stock, in this volume, p. 69.
49. But compare Bacchi, Racism and Justice: They Case for Affirmative Action op. cit., n. 29, p. 43;
50. M. Levin, 'The Free Market and Feminism' in Ethics in Practive: An Anthology, ed. H. LaFollette (2002, 2nd edn.), in relation to women.
51. See, for example, M. Levin, 'Reverse Discrimination, Shackled Runner, and Personal Identity" (1980) 37 Philosophical Studies 139;
52. J. Edwards, When Race Counts: The Morality of Racial Preference in Britain and America (1995) 174-6, in relation to distributive justice schemes which use the same calculation.
53. As Justice Scalia put it in Adarand v. Pena 515 United States 200 (1995), at 241, there can be no such a thing as a debtor or creditor race. For a persuasive response, see W. Sadurski, 'The Morality of Preferential Treatment (The Competing Jurisprudential and Moral Arguments)' (1983-4) 14 Melbourne University Law Key. 572, at 587-95.
54. T. Nagel, 'Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination' (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 348, at 358; Hopwood v. Texas 78 F 3d 932 (1996), where the state-funded University of Texas's affirmative action programme, designed to compensate for discrimination in Texan state schools, was invalidated.
55. See, for example. T. Eastland, Ending Affirmative Action: The Case for Colorblind Justice (1996).
56. Compare H. Jones, 'Fairness, Meritocracy, and Reverse Discrimination' (1977) 4 Social Theory and Practice 211, at 212-13;
57. T. Mullen, 'Affirmative Action' in The Legal Relevance of Gender: Some Aspects of Sex-based Discrimination, eds. S. McLean and N. Burrows (1988) 247-50.
58. But see, also, P. Brest, 'The Supreme Court. 1976 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle' (1976) 90 Harvard Law Rev. 1, at 42, who argues that the compensatory justice case becomes less pressing and more vulnerable to the competing claims of other victims of social injustice the further that wrongs recede into the past;
59. Edwards, Harvard Law Rev. op. cit., n. 40, pp. 191 ff., who distinguishes between enduring wrongs, which justify compensation, and lingering harms, which do not.
60. Compare C.R. Lawrence III, 'The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism' (1987) Stanford Law Rev. 317, at 325. fn. 31.
61. For example, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co 96 S Ct 1251 (1976), the defendant was ordered to give priority consideration in future vacancies and back-dated seniority benefits to those against whom it had discriminated.
62. For example, A. Goldman, Justice And Reverse Discrimination (1979).
63. Indeed J.H. Verkerke, 'Compensating Victims of Preferential Employment Discrimination Remedies' (1989) 98 Yale Law J. 1479, goes further to suggest that affirmative action remedies should be replaced by monetary compensation.
64. But see R.B. Parekh, 'A Case for Positive Discrimination' in Discrimination: The Limits of the Law, eds. B. Hepple and E.M. Szyszczak (1992) who sees the healing of the wounds of discrimination victims through affirmative action as not simply a matter of backward-looking restitutive justice, but as necessary to create a better society.
65. See the Advocate-General's opinion in Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen Case C-450/93, [1995] IRLR 660, 664.
66. Gardner, Discrimination: The Limits of the Law, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 4-5.
67. But, for a cautionary view, A.J. Morris, 'On the Normative Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law: Understanding the Competing Models of Discrimination Law as Aristotelian Forms of Justice' (1995) 15 Oxford. J. of Legal Studies 199.
68. H. Collins, 'Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion' (2003) 66 Modern Law Rev. 16, at 16.
69. Compare McColgan, Modern Law Rev. op. cit., n. 2, pp. 141-2.
70. In fact, policies which aim to remove direct or indirect discrimination can be regarded as fonns of affirmative action - see, for example, McCrudden, Modern Law Rev. op. cit., n. 35, p. 223.
71. Collins, Modern Law Rev. op. cit., n. 51, p. 17.
72. id., p. 18;
73. see, also, Fredman, Modern Law Rev. op. cit., n. 6, pp. 147-50.
74. Collins, id.
75. Case C-409/95, [1997] ECR 1-6363.
76. Kalanke, Modern Law Rev. op. cit., n. 49.
77. Compare Bacchi, Modern Law Rev. op. cit., n. 29, p. 34.
78. R.J. Fiscus, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action: Making the Case for Quotas (1992).
79. See, for example, Collins, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action: Making the Case for Quotas op. cit., n. 51, pp. 21-6.
80. That is, only certain, socially significant grounds of discrimination are prohibited, and in respect only of certain, socially significant goods.
81. Collins, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action: Making the Case for Quotas op. cit., n. 51, pp. 26 ff.
82. For similar critiques of the relationship between antidiscrimination, equality, and substantive goals see, also, P. Westen, 'The Empty Idea of Equality" (1982) 95 Harvard Law Rev. 537;
83. Gardner, Harvard Law Rev. op. cit., n. 3, pp. 17-22:
84. N. Bamforth, 'Conceptions of Anti-Discrimination Law' (2004) 24 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 693, 703-15;
85. E. Holmes 'Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality' (2005) 68 Modern Law Rev. 175.
86. See B. Hepple, 'Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity - Northern Irish Lessons' (1990) 10 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 408.
87. See Nicolson, in this volume, p. 117.
88. Compare Bamforth, Oxford J. of Legal Studies op. cit., n. 62, p. 710.
89. See, for example, Justice Thomas in Adarand v. Pena, op. cit., n. 41, at pp. 240-1.
90. See, for example, Fredman, Oxford J. of Legal Studies op. cit., n. 6, p. 129.
91. But see L. Barmes, 'Adjudication and Public Opinion' (2002) 118 Law Q. Rev. 600.
92. Fredman, Law Q. Rev. op. cit., n. 33, p. 596.
93. Compare McHarg, in this volume, pp. 154-6;
94. Barmes with Ashtiany, Law Q. Rev. op. cit., n. 25, pp. 290-1.
95. Compare Barmes with Ashtiany, id., pp. 291-2.
96. See, for example, M. Cavanagh, Against Equality of Opportunity (2002);
97. Holmes, Against Equality of Opportunity op. cit., n. 62, p. 194.
98. Gardner, Against Equality of Opportunity op. cit., n. 3, p. 8.
99. In fact, it might be argued that there is no discrimination at all where group classifications are made for benign purposes. For example, white people who fail to benefit from affirmative action programmes are not 'like" their black counterparts because treating them differently would not cause them to be stigmatized as racially inferior - Westen, Against Equality of Opportunity op. cit., n. 62, pp. 582-3.
100. See G. Davies, 'Should Diagonal Discrimination Claims be Allowed?' (2005) 25 Legal Studies 181.
101. Compare Bacchi, Legal Studies op. cit., n. 29, p. 25;
102. D.A. Farber, 'The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action' (1994) 82 California Law Rev. 893;
103. D.B. Wilkins and G.M. Gulati, 'Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis' (1996) 84 California Law Rev. 496, at 513.
104. C. McCrudden et al., 'Legal Regulation of Affirmative Action in Northern Ireland: An Empirical Assessment' (2004) 24 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 363.
105. See, more generally: Edwards, Oxford J. of Legal Studies op. cit., n. 40, chs. 4 and 5;
106. Farber, id., p. 913.
107. Compare Bacchi, Oxford J. of Legal Studies op. cit., n. 29, eh. 8.
108. W.G. Bowen and D. Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (1998).
109. For useful guidelines, see R.H. Fallen and P.C. Weiler, 'Firelighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice' [1984] Supreme Court Rev. 1, 47.
110. See McHarg, in this volume, pp. 157-9, for discussion of the appropriateness of the sunset clause in SDECA.
111. Providing them with only one preference or quota place might underestimate the obstacles they faced, but awarding a preference for every additional form of disadvantage might ignore overlapping causes of disadvantage: J. Kaplan, 'Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of Special Treatment' (1966-7) 61 Northwestern University Law Rev. 363, at 371.
112. Compare n. 6 above and accompanying text regarding Northern Ireland; Fiscus, Northwestern University Law Rev. op. cit., n. 59, pp. 92 ff.;
113. Fallon and Weiler, Northwestern University Law Rev. op. cit., n. 80, pp. 54 ff.
114. See, also, Malleson, this volume, p. 132, who argues that affirmative action becomes increasingly untenable the longer applicants have invested in existing markers of merit.
115. Compare Edwards, Northwestern University Law Rev. op. cit., n. 40, pp. 31-3;
116. Fiscus, id., pp. 85-92.
117. See Kaplan, Northwestern University Law Rev. op. cit., n. 82, p. 370 on the differing problems with either strategy.
118. Compare Bacchi's distinction between 'moderate' and 'radical' quotas: Northwestern University Law Rev. op. cit., n. 29, p. 148.
119. Compare Nicolson's distinction, in this volume, between 'ball-park' and 'tie-break' preferences, p. 110.
120. See, for example, W. Van Alstyne, 'Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution' (1978-9) 46 University of Chicago Law Rev. 755, at 805,
121. regarding the question of which groups deserve assistance; and in response, O.M. Fiss, 'Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" (1976) 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 107.
122. See, also, G. Liu, 'Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test' (1998) 33 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Rev. 381, at 427-8, regarding the argument that affirmative action has no logical stopping point.
123. C. Bacchi, 'Policy and Discourse: Challenging the Construction of Affirmative Action as Preferential Treatment' (2004) 11 J. of European Public Policy 128, at 142.
124. See, for example, Bacchi, J. of European Public Policy op. cit., n. 29 and id;
125. D.A. Bell Jr., 'Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies' (1979) 67 California Law Rev. 3;
126. R. Delgado, 'Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?' (1991) 89 Michigan Law Rev. 1222;
127. S. Sturm and L. Guinier, 'The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal' (1996) 84 California law Rev. 953.
128. For example, Richard Nixon allegedly supported affirmative action in the hope that it would divide the Democratic vote: Gastland, California law Rev. op. cit., n. 43, p. 51.
129. Bibbings: Francis and McDonald; Nicolson. Compare, also, Fredman, California law Rev. op. cit., n. 6, p. 160;
130. L.C. Harris and U. Narayan, 'Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of "Preferential Treatment"" in LaFollette, California law Rev. op. cit., n. 39, 450-1.
131. Busby, in this volume, p. 45.