Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia'S Great Power identities and military intervention in Abkhazia

Review of International Studies

Volumn 31, Issue , 2005, Pages 225-243

  Hopf, Ted ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645059163     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S026021050500687X     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. These norms are stated most explicitly in the United Nations Charter Chapter 1, Article 2. (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/) (accessed June 2005).
2. Mark Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force’, International Organization, 55:2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215-250.
3. For six international norms of peacekeeping, see Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 19-20.
4. Edward Ozhiganov, ‘The Republic of Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, in Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Lara Olson (eds.), Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 385.
5. Krasnaia Zvezda, 28 August 1992.
6. Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 137. And this is saying something, as Lynch can hardly be accused of taking a sympathetic approach to Moscow's intentions in this volume.
7. Ozhiganov, ‘The Republic of Georgia’, p. 389.
8. Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, p. 141.
9. Baranets, Genshtab bez Tain (Moscow: Politbiuro 1999), pp. 112-117.
10. Genshtab bez Tain, pp. 250-254, 266-7. Baranets's testimony is particularly strong evidence as he supported a still more forceful Russian military response to events in the CIS in general.
11. Genshtab bez Tain, pp. 106.
12. Genshtab bez Tain, p. 55.
13. This interesting transnational group was formed in 1989 with representatives of most Soviet Caucasian republics: Chechnia, Daghestan, Adygei, Krasnodar, Stavropol, Cherkessia, Kabardino, North and South Osetia, Ingushetia, and significantly, Abkhazia. Originally the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the inclusion of Cossacks as observers deleted the Mountain. Its ultimate objective was to create a multinational state from the Black to Caspian Seas. For a most extraordinary analysis of this most extraordinary project, see Georgi Derluguian, Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
14. Lynch 2000, p. 133.
15. V. A. Zolotarev, Rossiia (SSSR) v Lokalnykh Voinakh I Vooruzhennykh Konfliktakh Vtoroi Poloviny XX Veka (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2000), 390 and.
16. Lynch 2000, 131.
17. Ozhiganov, ‘The Republic of Georgia’, p. 381. Basaev would go on to become one of the most notorious Chechen rebels/terrorists/field commanders. He remains at large.
18. Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, p. 133.
19. Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, pp. 19-20.
20. While I derive these discourses from popular novels, history textbooks, film reviews, and newspaper articles in Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 153-210, it is encouraging that other scholars, relying on vastly different sources, have developed taxonomies of Russian foreign policy thought itself in the 1990s that track quite well with my interpretation.
21. See, for example, James Richter, Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 207-210;
22. James Richter, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of Russian Identity’, in Celeste Wallander (ed.), The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 69-94;
23. Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 306-309;
24. Johan Matz, Constructing a Post-Soviet International Political Reality: Russian Foreign Policy Toward the Newly Independent States (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2001);
25. Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press);
26. Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 220-268;
27. Margot Light, ‘Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: The First Decade’, in Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (New York: Oxford, 2001), pp. 419-428;
28. Neil Malcolm, ‘Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, in Peter Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), pp. 3-27;
29. Andrei Tsygankov, Pathways after Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-Soviet World (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); and.
30. William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
31. Kolsto, Political Construction Sites: Nation-building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), pp. 203-227
32. and Tadashi Anno, ‘Nihonjiron and Russkaia Ideia: Transformation of Japanese and Russian Nationalism in the Postwar Era and Beyond’, in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 344-347.
33. Matz, Constructing Post-Soviet Reality, p. 169 and English, Russia and the Idea of the West, p. 237.
34. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, pp. 222-247.
35. My discussion of institutions relies on Bennett, Condemned to Repetition, pp. 306-310;
36. Matz, Constructing Post-Soviet Reality, pp. 40-143;
37. and Hopf, Social Construction, pp. 153-210.
38. Bennett, Condemned to Repetition, pp. 313-323.
39. and Emil A. Pain, ‘Contiguous Ethnic Conflicts and border Disputes Along Russia's Southern Flank’, in Renata Dwan and Oleksandr Pavliuk (eds.), Building Security in the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 185.
40. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 241.
41. Izvestia, 2 January 1992.
42. Kozyrev, ‘Andrei Kozyrev: “Rossiia obrechean byt velikoi derzhavoi …” ’, Novoe Vremia 14 January 1992, p. 24. On ‘Western states as natural partners and allies’, see Kozyrev's interview in Le Monde, 19 June 1992, quoted in Matz, p. 15.
43. Interview in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1 April 1992.
44. Izvestiia, 30 June 1992. See also Andrei Kozyrev, ‘Russia and Human Rights’, Slavic Review, 51:2 (Summer 1992), p. 291.
45. Izvestiia, 30 June 1992.
46. Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, January 1993, p. 4.
47. February 1993, quoted in Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, p. 52. See also Yeltsin's speech reported in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 18 March 1993.
48. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 24 November 1993.
49. Rossisskie Vesti, 9 February 1994.
50. Sergei Stankevich, ‘Vystuplenie S. B. Stankevicha’, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, 6:1992 (31 March 1992), p. 39.
51. This is evident from the high school textbooks, crime novels, and other mass texts sampled to arrive at the domestic discourses on Russian identity. See Hopf, Social Construction, pp. 153-210.
52. Jeff Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly, 43:1 (March 1999), pp. 83-114;
53. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda’, International Studies Review, 2:1 (2000), pp. 73-76;
54. and Theo Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army’, European Journal of International Relations, 7:1 (2001), pp. 63-102.
55. Speech 14 January 2005 in St. Petersburg with German President Horst Kohler.
56. For example, Joint Statement of Putin and Bush on New Relations Between Russia and the United States, 13 November 2001 in Crawford, Texas.
57. See, for example, Putin's joint statement with Schroeder in Moscow on 9 September 2004. See also Putin's joint statement with Berlusconi in Moscow on 3 November 2004.