Partisan politics and treaty ratification: The acceptance of International Labour Organisation conventions by industrialised democracies, 1960-1996

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 153-180

  Boockmann, Bernhard ^a  

^a CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645037408     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00294.x     Document Type: Article

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