Genetic ties: Are they morally binding?

Bioethics

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 64-76

  Fuscaldo, Giuliana ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Blood ties; Causal parent; Gamete donation; Genetic parent; Intentional parent; Parental obligations

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIRTH; FATHER; FREEDOM; HUMAN; MOLECULAR PHYLOGENY; MORALITY; MOTHER; PARENT; PARENTHOOD; PROGENY; REPRODUCTION; RESPONSIBILITY;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

CHILD; CHILD, UNWANTED; DIRECTED TISSUE DONATION; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; FEMALE; GERM CELLS; HEALTH PERSONNEL; HUMANS; INTENTION; MALE; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS; PARENTS; PEDIGREE; PHILOSOPHY; REPRODUCTION; REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES, ASSISTED; SURROGATE MOTHERS; TISSUE DONORS;

EID: 33644902904     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2006.00478.x     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. T. Bayne A. Kolers Toward A Pluralist Account of Parenthood Bioethics 2003 17 221 242
2. Ibid. p. 241.
3. Family Court of Australia Media Release at (accessed 4 June 2003).
4. Family Court of Australia. 2002. Re Patrick: (An Application Concerning Contact) [2002] FamCA 193. At:.
5. Bayne & Kolers, op. cit. note 1.
6. K. Bartlett Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When The Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed Va Law Rev 1984 70 879 927
7. R. Alta Charo Biological Determinism in Legal Decision Making: The Parent Trap Tex J Women Law 1994 3 265 306
8. T. Murray G.E. Kaebnick Genetic Ties and Genetic Mix-Ups J Med Ethics 2003 29 68 69
9. G. Fuscaldo What Makes A Parent? It's Not Black or White J Med Ethics 2003 29 66 67
10. Bayne & Kolers, op. cit. note 1.
11. J.L. Nelson Reproductive Ethics and the Family N Z Bioeth J 2000 1 4 10
12. J.L. Nelson Parental Obligations and the Ethics of Surrogacy: A Causal Perspective Public Aff Q 1991 5 49 61
13. I. Munro. $70,000 Paternity Ruling Sets Precedent. The Age. 23 November 2002, p. 3. See also Duped Father to Fight Appeal. News.Com.Au at (accessed 4 June 2003).
14. P. Gregory Judges strip damages from man who paid maintenance for another's children The Age 1971 18 March 2003 p 3
15. L. Skene Voices in the ART Access Debate Monash Bioeth Rev 2001 20 9 23
16. G. Fuscaldo Fatherless Families: How Important is Genetic Relatedness Monash Bioeth Rev 2002 21 18 29
17. Ibid.
18. Nelson, op. cit. note 8.
19. Ibid.
20. D. Callahan Bioethics and Fatherhood Utah Law Rev 1992 3 735 46
21. Ibid. pp. 738, 739.
22. Nelson 1991, op. cit. note 8, p. 59.
23. Ibid. p. 51.
24. It is claimed that the case report may be the origin of the phrase 'son of a gun'. See.
25. D. Napoleon N Y State J Med February 1959 492 93
26. D.A. Hicks Oral Conception. Impregnation via the Proximal Gastrointestinal Tract in a Patient with an Aplastic Distal Vagina Br J Obstet Gynaecol 1989 96 501 502
27. After the publication of this story in the American Medical Weekly the following appeared as an Editor's Note on 21 November 1874: 'Dr. L.G. Capers, of Vicksburg, Miss., disclaims responsibility for the truth of that remarkable case of impregnation by a minnie ball, as reported in No. 19 of this Journal. He tells the story as it was told to him. He does not say it is untrue, but is disposed to appositely remember the truth of the old adage, that "accidents may happen in the best regulated families". While I accept that the veracity of this case report is in doubt, as I'm sure does the reader, I continue to use this case to illustrate my argument. In some ways it makes no difference whether or not the case represents a true event because the point made applies to all examples of accidental pregnancies, as will be become obvious.'
28. R. Munson. 1988. Artificial Insemination and Donor Responsibility. In Intervention and Reflection. R. Munson, ed. Belmont, CA. Wadsworth: 448 (original emphasis).
29. Ibid. p. 449.
30. Munson uses the word 'responsible' not 'accountable', but here I suggest that what he means is 'accountable' because we are in fact responsible for what we (foreseeably) cause. To say that someone is morally responsible for an outcome is not to say they acted wrongly in bringing it about but only that this is an outcome that falls inside the realm of consequences for which they might be called on to give an account, or for which they might be judged praiseworthy or blameworthy.
31. Munson, op. cit. note 22, p. 448.
32. It is relatively uncontroversial to assert that moral responsibility requires free choice, a point discussed further below.
33. Nelson 1991, op. cit. note 8, p. 58.
34. See for example M. Zimmerman. 1991. Sharing Responsibility. In The Spectrum of Responsibility. P.A. French, ed. New York. St Martin's Press: 276; G. Mellema. 1988. Individuals, Groups and Shared Moral Responsibility. New York. Peter Lang.
35. J.L. Hill What Does It Mean To Be A 'Parent'? The Claims of Biology As The Basis for Parental Rights N Y Univ Law Rev 1991 66 353 420
36. Ibid. p. 414 (original emphasis).
37. Ibid.
38. The approach that Hill suggests settles disputes between intended (commissioning) parents and gamete providers in the case of surrogacy arrangements.
39. As argued by Bayne & Kolers, op. cit. note 1.
40. M. Roberts Good Intentions and a Great Divide: Having Babies by Intending Them Law Philos 1993 12 287 317
41. M.J. Zimmerman. 1992. Responsibility. In Encyclopedia of Ethics. L.C. Becker & C.B. Becker, eds. New York. Garland Publishing: 1089-95.
42. R.A. Duff. 1998. Responsibility. In Encylopedia of Philosophy. New York. Routledge: 290-94. See also M. Zimmerman. 1998. An Essay On Moral Responsibility. Totowa, NJ. Rowman & Littlefield: ch. 1, 4.
43. H. Frankfurt Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility J Philos 1969 66 23 829 39
44. See G. Dworkin. 1987. Intention, foreseeability, and responsibility. In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. F. Schoeman, ed. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 338-54.
45. Although commonly accepted, responsibility for foreseeable consequences, as opposed to foreseen consequences, is not universally held. For discussion see M. Zimmerman, op. cit. note 36, ch. 4.
46. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. 1996. At.
47. It is legally required in several Australian states that gamete and embryo donors and couples seeking artificial insemination or IVF undergo counselling prior to commencement.
48. J. Boyle Who is Entitled to Double Effect J Med Philos 1991 16 476
49. For discussion see S. Kagan. 1989. The Limits of Morality. New York. Oxford University Press; W. Quinn. 1993. Morality and Action. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
50. Note, however, that this account does not entail that everyone that contributes to the existence of a child is equally responsible for that child. The question of whether intending a consequence that eventuates is morally weightier (more blameworthy or praiseworthy) than merely unintentionally causing a foreseeable consequence is complex and outside the scope of the present analysis. For discussion see M. Zimmerman, op. cit. note 36, ch. 4.
51. R. Alta Charo Biological Determinism in Legal Decision Making: The Parent Trap Tex J Women Law 1994 3 265 306
52. Bayne & Kolers, op. cit. note 1; Bartlett, op. cit. note 6.
53. S. Kagan Causation and responsibility Am Philos Q 1998 25 293 302
54. J. Blunstein. 1979. Child Rearing and Family Interests. In Having Children. O. Oneill & W. Ruddick, eds. New York. Oxford University Press: 115-22.
55. Ibid.
56. Nelson 1991, op.cit. note 8, p. 50.
57. Ibid. p. 60.
58. T. Bayne Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility J Appl Philos 2003 1 83
59. Nelson 1991, op. cit. note 8, p. 60.
60. C.L. Ten A child's right to a father Monash Bioeth Rev 2000 19 4 36
61. Bayne, op. cit. note 52.
62. I leave the topic of parental claims and the possibility that these are analogous with proprietorial claims to a forthcoming paper.
63. Bayne, op. cit. note 52, p. 79.
64. Although, as highlighted earlier, this does not entail equal responsibility.
65. It could be argued that just as some rights are inalienable perhaps some obligations cannot be abrogated. (I am indebted to Justin Oakley for raising this point.) The question of whether there are indeed inalienable duties and whether parental duties are of this type is however outside the scope of the present discussion and remains a topic for future consideration. For further discussion of conditions under which it is permissible to transfer parental obligations see Bayne, op. cit. note 52, p. 82.
66. Nelson 2000, op. cit. note 8, p.10.
67. D. Benatar The Unbearable Lightness of Bringing into Being J Appl Philos 1999 16 173 180
68. Ibid.
69. For an example of open embryo adoption programs see Creating Families at ; Snowflakes Embryo Adoption Program at.
70. Benatar, op. cit. note 61, p. 176.
71. See K. Daniels. 1998. The Semen Providers. In Donor Insemination: International Social Science Perspectives. K. Daniel & E. Haimes, eds. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 76-104.
72. These type of phrases are repeatedly used in advertising campaigns aimed at recruiting sperm donors, e.g., see the DHS press release published Wednesday 26 January 2005, ref. no. 2005/0023, which asks potential gamete donors to 'give life, give hope'..
73. G. Pennings What are the ownership rights for gametes and embryos? Advance directives and the disposition of cryopreserved gametes and embryos Hum Reprod 2000 15 979 86
74. A.M Capron Parenthood and Frozen Embryos More Than Property and Privacy Hastings Cent Rep 1992 22 5 32 33
75. G. Fuscaldo Gamete Donation: when does consent become irrevocable Hum Reprod 2000 15 515 19
76. For a discussion of the obligations associated with promising see L. Gillam. 2002. Surrogacy, Autonomy and Promising. At (retrieved 10 March 2005); R. Bronaugh. 1992. Promises. In Encyclopaedia of Ethics. L.C. Becker, ed. New York. Garland Publishing: 1020-23. In response to a question raised by Professor Charles Weijer: in the unlikely event that IVF doctors or technicians refused to relinquish the children they helped to bring into existence the same considerations apply. Conversely an IVF doctor who secretly created a number of embryos and (were it possible) artificially gestated these embryos to viability would be held to be morally accountable for the resultant children. On my view, in this case the progenitors are not responsible for their genetic offspring because the theft of their gametes was unforeseeable, however the question of whether they have any special claims with regard to these children requires further analysis.
77. Without knowing the details of the understanding between the 'sperm donor' and Patrick's mothers it is difficult to know whether or not both parties agreed to such a transfer. It is precisely this sort of confusion that supports lesbian couples' access to the conventional donor insemination programs offered by most IVF clinics, where the role and future obligations of sperm donors are made clear from the outset.
78. E.g., as argued by Almond and Callahan that parental obligations give rise to parental claims because preventing a sperm donor from accessing or sharing in the rearing duties of his son prevents him from discharging his duties and causes him to breach his moral obligations. B. Almond. 1994. Parenthood - social construct or fact of nature? In Constituting Families: A Study In Governance. D. Morgan & G. Douglas, eds. Verlag, Stuttgart. Franz Steiner: 105; see also Callahan, op. cit. note 15.
79. Note that this does not entail that the sperm donor in Re: Patrick has no claim to access Patrick. Even without any parental obligations for Patrick, there may be other factors that justify the 'sperm donor's' claim for access, e.g., the possibility that he and Patrick have an established relationship that should be allowed to continue in the boy's best interest.