Sovereign bond restructuring: Collective action clauses and official crisis intervention

Fixing Financial Crises in the Twenty-first Century

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 230-253

  Kletzer, Kenneth M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33644850496     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203390634     Document Type: Chapter

References (30)

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